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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an atternpt to solve a fundan.ental problern in rv'arx'~
theory of history, historical materialism. Marx depicts historical
development as a process of increasing productive power and as a process by
which human beings take control over the condi tions of their social 11 fe, a
process of increasing social freedom. The problem is tha t he presen ts no
argurnent as to how these two processes relate. In particular, he presents no
argument as to whether or not the increase of productive power itself
entails greater social freedom. This thesis contends that the growth at
social freedom is the result of a separate process. I offer an account of this
process based on a specific doctrine about values, namely, that there are
"objective" valuE's (values which are In true human interests), and tha t their
objectivity is a crucial reason for why these values are realized in history.
It is the pursuit of these values which results in the expansion of human
control over the conditions of social life.
The first two chapters of this thesis offer an exposition and criticisrn
of two recent attempts to clarify the theory of historical rna terialism, those
of G.A. Cohen and Allen "'ood. I argue that both atternpts fail to account
for the process whereby social freedom is expanded. In chapter three, I turn
to Marx's own writings and contrast the Grundrlsse with The Gerrnan
Ideology. I argue that while The German Ideolog~ depicts historical
development solely in terms of the growth of pro uctlve forces, the
Grundrisse emphasizes the importance of the recognition by social actors ot
the conditions required for their freedom. Marx, however, gives no
explanation for how this growing awareness emerges.
The remainder of the thesis attempts to provide such an explanation.
In chapter four, I argue that, for Marx, autonomy Is an objective value.
Autonorny is the exercise of collective control ovor social practices and
institutions, primarily the system of production. The interest which human
beings have In autonomy gives them reasons for desiring it and acting to
realize it. I also provide a new interpretation of Marx's view of morality.
~1arx's condemnation of morall ty must be understood in the same tf~rrns as
his condemnation of religion: morality both distorts and expresses true
human interests. Finally, in chapter fIve, I argue for the existence of a
"collective learnIng process," a process by which human beings gain an
Increasing awareness of their interest In autonon.y and of the existing social
constraints on their ability to realize that interest. Through their struggles,
human beings learn that the moral norms of their society are not an
accurate representatIon of their true interests. Progr~ss in realizing
ii
autonomy results frorn the fact tha t people have the capaci ty to recogni~e
the requirements of autonomy, that they learn about these requirernents
through social interactions and struggles, and tha t their increasing
recognition of these requirements motivates thern to act to achieve
autonomy.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joshua Cohen
Ti tie: Associa te Professor of PhIlosophy
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Introduction
Marx left no clear and unambiguous statement of his theory of history,
historical materialism. Within Marx's own writings there are two major
strands of analysis of historical chanR~. The first strand emphasizes the
growth of human productive power and explains changes in social forrns as
the product of this growth. Social forms adapt themselves to the
requirements of productive development. The second strand focuses on a
second process, the growth of freedorn in socIal life. According to this
strand, social forms change in order to enable the expansion of freedorn.
The problem is how to construe the relationship between these different
trends. Marx depicts history as a process of emancipation frorn both the
constraints of external nature and those imposed by social relations of
dependence and domination. However, he never clarifies the relationship
between these two lines of development.
Recent work has given primacy to the first strand, the ~rowth of
productive powerl as a result, Marx's argurnent for productive growth has
been substantially clarified. This work 1s flawed, however, by its inadequate
treatment of the second strand of Marx's theory, the expansion of social
freedom. It treats this second strand as a necessary product of the first:
the expansion of productive power nd the expansion of socia! freedom are
understood as the products of a single historical process. This "hes!s argues
that these two strands represent independent processes and shows that an
explanation of both processes Is necessary for the construction of a theory
of history which Is in broad accord with Marx's writings taken as a whole.
2In the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Econofny,
'v1arx states that historicaJ development is the product of changes in the
material forces of production. Recently, the pasi tion of the Preface has
been strengthened by the work of American and British analytic
philosophers.! Accordin~ to the prevailing interpretation, historical
materialism is a theory which explains the "survival value" of different
forms of society in terms of their contribution to the develop1nent of human
productive power. In G.A. Cohen's words, "social forms rise and faJI
according as they enable or irnpede that growth."2
If this now-dominant interpretation of historical rnaterialism were
correct, the level of productive development would determine the fornl of
society. This) however, contradicts not only hIstorical experience, but also
Marx's own denial of the unilinearity of history. In his writings to Russian
socialists in the 18705, \1arx stresses the widely divergent historical paths
available for Russian developfnent: Russia could "incorporate the positive
achievements of the capitalist system without having to pass under its harsh
tribute."} Therefore, this interpretation fails to account for a central
feature of Marx's view of historical progress: the expansion of freedofn in
social life. In addition to the development of productive forces, Marx
argues that human beings emancipate themselves from social relationships
based on dependence and force. There is no necessary reason why
productive progress in itself should produce this result. If we accept Marx's
premise for the purposes of argument -- that Is, if we accept t: .at there has
been progress In realizIng freedom in soclal11fe -- can historical
materialism explain this without relying on the false Esssumptlon of
historical uniiinearity?
This thesis attempts to provide such an explanation by relying on a
specific doctrine about values. It claims that there ar~ "objective values,"
values which satisfy objective hurnan interests and, furthermore, thi.1t the
objectivity of these values is a crucial reason for why these values are
realized. I argue that, for 'Aarx, autonomy is an objective value.
Autonomy requires the exercise of collective contral over social practices
and institutions, primarily the systern of production. The interest which
human beings have in autonomy gives them reasons for desiring it and actin~
to promote it. Progress in realizing autonorny results trarn th~ fact that
agents have the capacity to recognize their interest in autonofny, that they
learn about the requirements of autonomy through social interactions and
struggles, and that their increasing reco~nltiC''lof both their interests anti
these requirements motivates them to act to realize autonofny,
The first two chapters of this thesis offer an exposition and criticisrn
of two recent attempts to clarify the argument of historical rnaterialisrn.
80th G.A. Cohen and Allen Wood defend an interpretation of historical
materialism in which the development of the forces of production is
accorded primacy in explaining social change. In particular, G.A. Cohen
makes a substantial effort at clarifying the nature of this primacy and
~arx's related argument for the tendency to productive growth. Cohen
demonstrates that Mar).'s argument relies on premises about human nature
acting under conditions of scarcity. Human beings, driven by their
intelligence and rationality, will tend to develop the productive forces and
choose social relations that enhance further productive development and
4reject relations which inhibit it.
Cohen's argument is only partially successfld, however, for it cannot
account for the nature of the social relationships which result frorn
revolutionary transformations. A specIfic set of social relations does not
automatically follow from a given level of productive deveJoprnent because
there may be "functionally equivalent" relations which are also optirnal for
productive development. Cohen cannot explain, then, why one set of social
relations rather than another obtains. This is crucial because social
relations vary in the nature and degree of the constraints they set on hurnan
freedom. There is no reason to suppose that all the functionally equivalent
social relations will represent advances in social freedom. To the extent
that there is a direction in the ability of these relations to realize freedorn,
Cohen's theory does not account for it.
Allen Wood makes a similiar argurnent about productive developrnent.
He focuses, however, on an issue which Cohen does not examine: Marx's
criticism of morality. Wood argues that Marx held a functional view of
justice, according to which a mode of production always sa tisfies the
standards of justice applicable to it, and a view of morality as an "Ideology,"
a world view which benefits the socially dominant class. Morality deceives
indivIduals about their interests and needs; It is pos! tively harmful to those
who follow it. Wood concludes that Marx's condernna tion of capl tal1sm does
not rest on moral consideratIons. I argue, however, that Wood does not
adequately account for the reason why Marx does condemn capItalism, its
constraint on human freedom.
5Chapter three begins the process of tying together the two issues
raised in the first two chapters: the process of historical development which
explains the expansion of freedom in social life and the basis for Marx's
condemnation of capitalism. In this chapter I examine ~1arx's writings in the
Grundrisse and The German Ideology. My aim is to separate out those
'jtrands in Marx's argument which focus on the social interaction of
different classes anJ the development of particular human capcci ties.
argue that these two works present different views about historical progress
and about its relation to the stated endpoint of history, comrnunisrn. I argue
that while The German Ideology depicts historical developrTlent solely in
terms of the growth of the productive forces, the Grundrisse emphasizes the
importance of the recogn! tion by social actors of the condi tions required for
their autonomy. This recognition is !l2! recognition of the requirernents for
the growth of the forces of production. However, Marx gives no explanation
in the Grundrisse for how this growing awareness emerges.
The remainder of the thesis is an attempt to provide such an
explanation. In chapter four, I address two issues which emerged earlier in
my discussion of Wood's views: the nature of autonomy as an objective value
and the nature of moral values. I argue that the process of the increasing
emancipation of human beings from relations based on domination can be
expJained if we interpret autonomy as an objective value, a value which
satisfies true human interests. Furthermore, I argue that morality
expresses the human desire for autonomy insofar as moral practices and
standards represent a certain degree of knowledge about the requirements
of autonomy. Marx's condemnation of morality must be understood in the
same terms as his condemnation of religion: morality both distorts and
expresses true human interests. All true human interests are universal, or in
Marx's words, "general interests." Morality partially represents a "general
interest" even as it distorts some of our knowledge about the conditions
required to realize that general interest. This is because it represents a
general interest under circumstances in which there exists, in fact, no real
community of interests. The disparity between this standpoint of a general
interest and the actual conflict of particular interests in society undercuts
the particular moral norms of a society. These norms are challenged to live
up to their claims.
My new interpretation of Marx's view of morality is undoubtedly
controversial. I try to support it by (a) comparing it to Marx's criticisrn of
religion. Marx views religion as a form of distorted consciousness which
emerges in condi tions of social misery. The appeal of religion, however, is
really the appeal of each person's self-affirmation: religion is the "30ul of
soulless conditions."4 I develop my interpretation of \t1arx's view of
morality along these lines; (b) I show that Marx explicitly recognizes
progress In moral systems. Moral systems evolve in a direction which rnore
closely approximates true human interests.
Chapter five completes the argument of the thesis. I argue for the
existence of a "collective learning process," a process by which social agents
galn an increasIng awareness of their true interest In autonomy and of the
existing social constraints on their ability to realize that interest. The most
reliable source of this learning lies in the rjeslres of the oppressed to be free
7of their oppression. Through their struggles over the subordination of their
interests to the interests of other classes, agents learn that the moral norlllS
of their society are an inadequate expression of their true human interests.
I illustrate this process of collective learning through a discussion of Marx's
view of the transition to communism.
I conclude by criticizing Marx's belief that under full communiSfn
morality would be sublimated into new norms which would no longer be
moral in form. I argue that moral consciousness will not "wither away" and
that, ther~fore, Marx's criticism of capitalist society cannot be as radical as
he intended. The "general ideas" of freedom and justice \vil1 not
"completely vanish••• with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.,,5
A "reconstructed" historical rnaterialism bears obvious similarities to
Hegelian idealism. Hegel too saw in history a movement to the expansion of
human freedom. Marx's criticism is more radical, however, than Hegel's
views. Hegel stresses the need for "internal criticism," criticism that
begins from a society's norms and conventional beliefs. Marx shares the
view of internal criticism, but he rejects the idt!n that everything necessary
for criticism is immediately available to everyday social consciousness.
Marx stresses the existence of false consciousness and the need for a
critical theory to facilitate the dispelling of illusions. While collective
learning is a tendency, it Is not inevitable.
This thesis Is a reconstruction of Marx's materialist theory of history.
My reconstruction departs from ~arx in two Inajor ways. First, I maintain
that morality is not simply ideology, but a distorted representation of true
8human interests. This is consistent with Marx's view only to the extent that
while he condemns morality, he never tells us what eX;.1ctly he takes it to be.
However, the sense of his remarks do suggest a more negative conceptior.
than is adopted here.
Second, I reject the idea that communist society will be a society
"beyond good and evil." That is, I reject the idea of a society in which there
are !l2 conflicts of interest and no need for moral norms.
Yet, my reconstruction remains plausibly Marxist. In particular, I
accept what I see as the core theses of historical materlaUsrn:
(1) progress in i ~aljzing autonomy is materially conditioned;
(2) the frustration of material interests is an important irnpetus to the
recognition of one's interest in autonomy;
(3) there can be no full realization of autonomy in a class based
society; and
(4) classes are the subjects of collective l~arning and the agents of
historical transforrnation.
I have tried to reconstruct historical materialism in a manner which
remains fal thful to \t1arx's intention for it to be a cr i tical theory, a theory
aImed at revealing true human interests. To do 50, I have emphasized a
strand In Marx's thought which he often underplays: the growth of
consciousness about the conditions for social freedom. I have emphasized
this strand because I believe It makes the argument of historical
materialism more plausible. For, without some account of how human
beings can learn about their true interests and the social constraints which
9prevent their attainrnent, there Is no connection b~tween the process of
history (1.~., material developrnent) and the endpoint of history, communisln.
That is, if historical developme'lt is conceived of as the process of
Increasing productivity alone, there 1s no necessary reason for cornmunisrn
to be the endpoint of history, and not some other social form equally sui ted
to further productive growth.
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Chapter One:
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History and the Value Of Material Progress
1.1 Introduction.
In the 18.59 Preface to A Contribution to A Critique of Political
Economy, Marx calls the materialist conceotion of history the "guiding
thread" 1 of his work. Since then, students of Marx have struggled to define
the central propositions of "historical materialism." There are two rnajor
areas of ambiguity. The first concerns the relationship, in Marx's thought,
between science and criticism. Is historical materialism a "science of
history" that predicts the rise and fall of social forms? If so, is the course
of history inevitable? Or, is Marx's thought a form of critical theory whose
understanding is necessary for human agents to take rational and conscious
control of social1ife? What is the relationship between these two aspects of
his thought?2
The second and related ambiguity concerns Marx's lack of clarity as to
which factors in history he gives explanatory primacy. Is social change
explained by the requisites of the material forces of production, as Marx
maintains in the 18'9 Preface, or does class struggle have explanatory
primacy, as the Communist ~anlfesto3 seems to suggest? Do the
conditions for the growth of the productive forces and those for revolution
necessarily go to~ether?
In this chapter, I will focus on one unusually clear and cogent
reconstruction of historical materialism that succeeds 1n resolving some of
the dilemmas and ambiguities which the theory faced in its original form. In
particular, this reconstruction makes a substantial contribution to clarifying
12
the nature of 'v'arxist causation. In Karl \t1arx's Theory of History, (K~1TH)
Gerald Cohen asserts the primacy of the productive forces, subordinatin~
the role of class struggles to the requirements of productive development.
and argues that historical materialism is a science. The criticisrn of false
consciousness and ideology, while an essential component of \1arx's theory,
is not seen by Cohen as playing an explanatory role in historical
materialism. For the version of historical materialism which Cohen
defends, the central feature of history is "the growth of human productive
power, and forms of society rise and fall according as they enable or impede
that growth."4 Cohen attempts to formulate this feature in a ri~orous way,
to specify the conditions under which social forms' change. In outline,
Cohen argues that social forms will continually be transformed because: (1)
the existence of a particular social form depends on its contribution to
material progress; and, (2) no social form can accomodate more than a
certain amount of productive ~rowth. Cohen claims that when a given
social form is no longer suitable for further productive growth, it is replaced
by a new social form which Is. The result Is a sequence of social forms
which is "progressive"; each ranks higher than its predecessor 1n productive
capacity. Ultimately, a stage is reached (I.e., communism) when social
forms are no longer necessary fur productive progress, and they "subslde."6
A ~ar)(lst theory of history, that makes progress (which Cohen
defines as the growth of human productIve power) the central tendency,
"requires some extra-social factor •••controlling historical change."7 There
must be some extra-social factor or factors capable of overcoming
recalcitrant social structures so that productive power can continually
advance. According to KMTH, the extra-social factors are rnaterial
13
scarcity and the features of human rationality and intelligence. The latter
are ex\ra-soclal I'. that they are given in human biology. Cohen claims that
it is a fact for all historical periods characterized by scarcity that human
beings driven by their intelligence and rationality wIll tend to develop the
productive forces, and select for each historical period sets of production
relations that enhance further productive development and reject relations
that inhibit it.S The level of productive development achieved by a society
"selects" for the new social production relations most optimal for further
rnater ial progress.
Above, I referred to Cohf:n's view as a "reconstruction" of historical
materialism. Habermas defines a reconstruction as "taking a theory apart
and putting it back together again In a new form In order to attain more
fully the goal it has set for itself."9 Because of "'arx's own vagueness and
imprecision In his scattered exposition of historical materialism,
reconstruction may indeed be necessary to clarify ~arx15m1s basic
theoretical commitments. It can rework the theory to resolve or at least
lessen the tensions of the original theory and to discard other elements that
prevent the construction of a consistent argument (while remaining faithful
to Marx's intent and to the themes of the theory). Cohen's work makes a
substantial contribution to this endeavor, explicating the nature of a process
which Marx surely did see as fundamental for historical change: the process
of the growth of human productive power.
Cohen's reconstruction of historical rnaterlalism, however, does not
provide an adequate account of a second fundamental aspect of
historical developmentl the particular social forms that result
from revolutionary transformations. Because there may be
14
"functionally ~quivalent" relations of production optima! for the
development of the productive forces, no particular production relations
automatically follow frorn a given level of productive development. Cohen,
however, cannot explain why one set of production relations rather than
another obtains. And this is crucial because product jon relations vary in the
nature and degrt;e of constraints they set on human freedom. The3e
constraints have an important bearinR on Marx's theory of history. In "'arx's
description of the historical process, not only Is there the productive
progress that Cohen emphasizes, but there are also changing justifications
given for social practices, an increasing equalization of social conditions,
and the growing political recognition of human beings as free and equal
agents.
Marx's writin~5 depict evolutionary changes in the development of
social forms. At one end of the spectrum are societies based on slavery or
caste distinctions In which a person's life prospects are determined by birth,
and justified by tradition or religion:
In the relations of slavery and serfdom •••one part of society is treated by the
other as itself merely an inorganic and natural condition of its o\vn
reproduction'l.classified, along with the other natural beings, such as cattle,
as an accessory of the earth.! 0
Towards the other end of the spectrum lie capitalist societies in which every
self conceives itself reciprocally, as one among others, each of whorn are
accorded for.nal rl~hts and freedoms. For all of Its shortcomings, Marx
considered capl tal1st political democracy a "great progress••• the final forrn
of human emancipation within the prevailing social order."ll Like material
production, the equalization of basic conditions and the changes in social
norms have an evolutionary direction (the replacement of tradition by
15
reason, the universalization of norms), converging on a social form in which
the conditions for substantive human freedorn will be realized.
Insofar as Cohen's explanation of historical change cannot adequately
indicate the particular nature of the outcomes of social revolutions, it
cannot account for the movement toward substantive human freedom.
Cohen's reconstruction of ~~arx therefore tends to regard this historical
development as either fortuitous or of no consequence for historical
materialism. I will argue that Cohen's neglect of the processes by which
social norms change, leads him to give inadequate accounts of the social
forms which result from historical chan~e, the role of criticism, and the role
of social classes as understood by historical materialism. Cohen's
refinement of historical materialism constitutes a first step which is of
great value, but is in need of further elaboration. Historical materialisrn
relies on more assumptions about human nature than are explicitly present
in Cohen's reconstruction of it.
1.2 Cohen's view: ex,?ositlon.
Marx's 18.59 Preface to the Critique of Political Econom~ contains the
authoritative text for Cohen's reconstruction of historical rnaterlal1sm:
In the social production of their life men enter into definite relations of
production which correspond to a definIte stage of development of the
productive forces•••At 8 certain stage of their development, the material
productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of
production••• From forms of development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social
revolutlon,12
Cohen attempts to build from this terse and somewhat enigmatic
formulation a defensible Marxist theory of history. The Preface provides
evidence that Marx acknowledges the "primacy of the productive forces,"
16
that is, that ~~arx believes that the level of productive developrnent
determines the relations of production. The relativns are as they are
because the level of productive development requires that they be so. It is
this claim which Cohen wishes to defend. In order to succeed, he rnust
respond to a rnajor criticism to which the Preface argument has been
subjected, a paradox which Philippe Van Parijs has called \I1arxisrn's "central
puzzle." 13
The puzzle is as follows. The 1859 Preface holds that the relations of
production are causally dependent upon the forces of production; the forlner
are said to "correspond" to the latter. In this clause, the explanatory
primacy of the forces is maintained. Yet the Preface also indicates that the
forces of production are thernselves causally dependent on the relations of
production since, at a certain stage, the relations "fetter" the forces. Here
the prlrnacy of the forces is threatened. "Fettering" indicates that the
relations can have significant causal effect on the forces. For, if the forces
of production constrain the relations of production, then, as Cohen notes,
"the constraint is symrnetrical. If high technology rules out slavery, then
slavery rules out high technology."14 How can Marx claim, as he clearly
does, that the productive forces are at once prirnary over and causally
dependent on the form taken by the relations of production? If the
constraint of the forces and relations 1s mutual, how can one of thern have
explanatory primacy?
In order to resolve this paradox, Cohen introduces a genera! thesis
about human history: "The productive forces tend to develop throughout
history."l' He argues that both the explanatory primacy of the forces over
the relations of production, and the causal dependence of the forces on the
17
relations of production can be sustained if (1) the tendency to productive
gro".'th is based on exclusively asocial prernises about hUlnan nature and (2)
the relations of production are explained functionall~ by the furces of
production. Briefly, functional arguments seek to explain the existence or
nature of something by virtue of its effects. Cohen argues that it is because
a given set of production relations is required for optirnal productive
growth, that these relations obtain:
The productive relations are of kind R at tirne t because relations of kind R
are suitable to the use and development of the productive forces at t, given
the level of development of the latter at t.16
A functionalist interpretation of the explanatory prirnacy of the forces of
production would enable Cohen to preserve the coherence in maintaining
both the explanatory prirnacy of the forces over the relations of production
and the substantial control of the latter over the former. The rel~tions of
production obtain precisely because of their i,npact on the produc Live
forces:
The forces would not develop as they do were the relations different, but
that is thy the relations are not different - because relations of the ~iven
kind su t the development of the forces.17
In order to achieve this correspondence, Cohen's functionalist argu~nent
depends on the existence of an underlying asocial tendency to which social
forms must adapt. For only if there is such a tendency, can we understand
why it is the social relations, and not the productive forces which give way.
Cohen and Kymlicka summarize the argument, in which an asocial
tendency for productive growth is used to derive the functionalist
explanation of production relations, as follows: t 8
(1) The productive forces tend to develop throughout history.
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Since this tendency is supposed to be independent of facts about social
structure, it may be rewritten as:
(2) There is an autonomous tendency for the productive forces to de~.. elop.
If there is an autonomous tendency for the productive relations to develop,
then social relations must he such as to serve it. Hence:
(3) Social structures have, by and large, been propitious for the developrnent
of the productive forces.
The derivations of (3) from (2) is thus:
(4) Because there is an autonornous tendency for the productive forces to
develop in history, social structures are so shaped or selected to allow for
that development.
Since the particular relations selected for at a given sta~e depend on the
level of productive development at that stage:
(5) The nature of productive relations of a society is explained by the level
of development of the productive forces.
In KMTH, (1) is called the Development Thesis, and (5) the Primacy
Thesis. The argument states that if the Development Thesis can be
defended on asocial grounds (in other words, if (2) is true and the tendency
to productive growth is not dependent on any facts about social structures)
it can sustain the functionalist interpretation of the Prilnacy Thesis.
However, this argument will work only if premise (2) is true. Only if
there is an autonomous tendency to productive development can (5) be non-
circularly derived from (1 ). For, if (2) is false, then, if (1) 1s true, (3) is part
of its explanation. Consequently (.5) would not be derived from (1) since, the
fact that social relations are benefIcial for productive developrnent is part
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of the explanation for that productive deve_oprnent itself. In other words,
the Primacy Thesis cannot both follow frorn the Developlnent Thesis and be,
at the same time, presupposed by it. If the Development Thesis cannot be
defended on asocial grounds, then the functionalist argument is irrelevant.
Without it, the prirnacy of the productive forces could not be established
and the constraint of the forces and relations would be symrnetrical.
Cohen's defense of the explanatol y prirnacy of the productive forces
rests on his ability to provide an explanation for the Development Thesis
which is independent of facts about social structure. How can productive
growth occur independent of society? Cohen distinguishes between the fact
of productive growth which is dependent on particular relations of
production (e.g., feudal relations are less good at prornoting productive
development than capitalist ones), And the tendency of productive
development. It is the latter that must be rooted in socially unspecific
circumstances. These circumstances, Cohen argues, are certain asocial
characteristics of human nature, and the general historical situation of
scarcity.
According to Cohen's argument, the circumstances in which people
find themselves are ones of relative scarcity, in which few wants can be
satisfied without individuals "doing what they would rather not do," 19
engage In burdensome labor. In as rnuch as human beings "possess
intelligence of a kind and degree which enables them to irnprove their
material situation,"20 they will know how to develop tools and skills which
enhance productivity. Finally, being rational, they will tend to use the
innovations that their capacities create In order to lessen scarcity. Cohen's
argument is that human beings, In a situation of scarcity, will seek and
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succeed in finding ways of easing their situation by lrnproving the force~ )f
production. This ledds to a continual irnprovement in the forL~s of
production:
Given their rationality, and their naturally incJernent situation, people will
not endlessly forego the opportunity to expand productive power recurrently
presented to them, and productive power will, consequentl>:1 tend, if not
always continuously, then at least sporadically, to expand. 1.1
At this point, it rnight reasonable be asked whether the Development
Thesis really solves the primacy puzzle. The above characterization of the
Development Thesis suggests an image of hu~,an rationality operatin~ on the
productive forces, through individual producers introducing innovations to
conserve their own effort. The impulse to progress is located outside the
relations of production. In this picture, production relations can only slow
down or speed up a pre-existing trend. Yet, if interpreted in this way, the
Developmen't Thesis contradicts Cohen's claim that the production
relations "profoundly affect productive forces,"22 (t.e., that the forces are
causally dependent on the relations). A correct solution to the prirnacy
puzzle would capture that fact. Cohen's response is that the image above is
misleadln~: hu'nan rationality also operates directly and independently on
the relations of productiu". "Being rational, people retain and reject
relations of production as the latter do and do not allow productive
development to continue." 23 That is, people choose productive relations
that, in turn, seJect for the optimal development of the productive forces.
It can be true therefore that the social relations are a direct, or sometirnes
an indirect, source of rnaterial progress without contradicting the fact that
there is an autonomous tendency towards productive development. Because
people are rational, they will choose those relatIons with the greatest
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propen~ity to further materia. progress.
Even with the autonomy which the DeveJoprnent Thesis possesses
clearly located, the premises of human nature do not, on their own, establi~h
it. Cohen notes two reasons why the premises, as stated, fail. In the first
place, the argument assurnes the priori ty of the interest in material progress
over other kinds of interests,24 so that when non-material interests conflict
with material interests, the latter override them. But, "perhaps certain
cultural and social possessions are worth a great deal of material sacrifice
in the calculus of human welfar~.,,25
This is a non-trivial problefn, because while Cohen rnaintains that the
intere~t in material progress is the effective historical interest,26 he does
not believe that this interest constitutes Marx's full conception of hurnan
nature. Nowhere in KMTH does Cohen argue that human beings are !!.y
nature solely or prirnarily productive beings, even though certain
characteristics of human nature are involved in his argurnent. There is a
disjunction between the full conception (which he refers to as Marx's
"philosophical anthropology") and the premises about human nature which
are relevant to historical materialism:
In the anthropology, people are by nature creative beings. They flourish only
in the cultivation and exercise of their manifold powers•••But in the theory
of history people produce not freely but because they have to, because
nature does not otherwise satisfy their wants; and the development in
history of the productive power of man (as such, as a species) occurs at the
expense of the creative capacity ortJie~ who are the agents and victims
of that development.27
The production that is an expression of human nature and the production
that results from the interaction of human beings with inclernent historical
circumstances 1s not the same.
The second reason why the premises of human nature fall to esta!:>lish
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the Development The!Jis is that hUInan nature operates through indiv~duals,
but social tral1sforma~ion depends on the actions of groups. As Cohen points
out,
It is not evident that societies are dispose:d to bring about what rationali ty
would lead men to choose. There is some shadow bet\yeen what reason
suggests and society does,28
There are many reasons why such a "~hadow" might exist (for example,
nature might be "too lavish"29 to induce the tendency to produc tive
growth), but the rnost irnportant reason is that history is an arena of
conflict. Functional explanations generally have difficulty dealing with
situations where desires and interests are heterogenf~ousacrOS5 individuals
and groups. For then not everyone will be acting to prornote productive
p. ogress. It might be, in virtue of their social posi tion, that a powerful
group has ar_ interest against productive progress. What insures that any
other group or groups who do have an interest in ennanc.i:ag productivity wi!!
have the power to realize their goals? 30
These gaps must oe closed if the asocial basis of the J)evelopm~nt
Thesis is to be established. Human rationality must have the ability to
overpower its obstacles, or at least, to find a way to circumvent thern. That
is, the interests of human beings in material growth must actually be strong
enough to control historical change.
Cohen introduces a "sub-argument" to provide some evidence that the
premises of human nature have more weight than both of the objections
allow. The sub-argument claim~, that in fact there has been productive
progress anft that unless one ~upposed that the asocial premises of hUInan
nature were "weighty," it would not be possible to explain why this has been
the C;.lse. Only if we accept the weight of the assumptions aLout human
nature can we have a "superior account of the rnarked lack of regression in
productive power."31
The sub-argument atternpts to show that human rationality succeeds
despite the fact of real obstacles bt:fore it. It provides evidence that
material interests are primary for people, or that their other interests, if
not secondary "tend not to conflict with their material interest~ in prugress-
defeating ways."12 This latter qualification IS important to note, as it is
easy to mistake Cohen's focus on the role of material interests as implying d
narrow materialism. It does not; Cohen is explicitly aware that people want
many kinds of goods. They may, in fact, want sorne of these goods fnore
than material goods. Although he never explicitly develops an argument
about the relative weights of different goods, Cohen might be interpreted dS
5u8gestin~ that most of the ~oods people want can be acquired only when
their more basic material needs are met. The a~illty of hutnan beings t,)
acquire non-material goods, including moral goods, (e.~., justice) would then
be, according to Cohen, rnaterially conditioned. The sub-argurnent also
responds to the objection which pointed to the diverse rnotivations of social
groups by showing that societies have not, 1n fact, been blocked by the types
of locial and political structures it Ilnagines. The interests of ~roup5
opposed to material progress do not win out over those groups with an
interest in promoting that progress.
Three important consequences follow from Cohen's reconstruction of
historical materialisml
1. The central explanations of historical materialism are functional.
New locial relations arise when and because they are optimal for the
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development of the productive forces. The level of productive developrnent
selects for the set of social relations required for productive growth. Not
only social relations, but morality and legal structures (property relations,
rights, etc.) have the character they do "because the productive relations"
which are suitable for the development of the productive forces "require
that they have it."])
2. The productive forces progress from one class society to another,
and ultimately to communism. Each new social form ranks higher than its
predecessor, judged by the criteria of productivity. The index of
productivity is the arnount of surplus generated by that society, the arnount
produced over and above what is needed to reproduce the direct producers.
Cohen correlates the major historical epochs with distinct levels of
productive development:)4
Form of Economic Structure
1. Pre-class society
2. Pre-capitalist class society
3. Capitalist society
4. Post-capitalist society
Level of Productive Development
No Surplus
Some surplus, but less than
Moderately high surplus, but less than
Massive surplus
Cohen identifies progress with material progress. To those who would argue
that this equation 15 "demeaning to hurnanlty" he retorts that there 1s "an
extensive coincidence in fact and in "1arx's perception between the growth
of the productive forces and the growth of hUfnan powers."3.5 The
development of the forces of production 1s itself the development of hurnan
powers, through the continual growth of human independence from nature.
3. Rather than constituting an alternative source of causation, Cohen
argues that class victories are explained by the conduciveness of the rule of
a given class to further productive expansion. In Cohen's words, u\1arx holds
that a class gaIns and possesses power because it rnarches In :step with the
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productive forces."36 Cohen denies that this rernoves class struggle fro'll
the center of historical explanation. Rather, class conflicts are part of the
answer to the question tI~ does the fact that a new econornic structure
would benefit the productive forces explain its actualization?"37
.hLCohen's view: three difficulties.
i. insufficient constraints on outcomes.
Cohen's reconstruction captures a major part of Marx's theory of
history. Its central insight is, as we saw, that a theory of history In which
progress is the main tendency needs an extra-social factor (e.g., prernises
about intelligence, rationality and scarcity) which wUl overcorne social
obstacles. Cohen claims that the rationality of human beings and the
existence of scarcity set constraints on social structures which are strong
enough to induce change when their interests require it. Social forrn~ will
change when and because the further development of hurnan productive
power requires it. The new social form selected for will be just that form
which is optimal for the ~rowth of the productive forces. As it stands,
however, this claim offers insufficient constraints on the outcome of social
transformations. There Is more than one set of tracks along which the
productive forces can run. This means that material constraints alone
cannot determine which optimal social relations will obtain.
What was Marx's view on this issue? 15 Marx's theory of history
unil1near: does \1arx think that there Is a unique path of historical
development?
While many of Marx's writings suggest a linear theory of history, 1n
which successive social forms rank "higher" than their predeccesors wi th
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respect to productive developrnent, on the Issue of unilinearity, he is less
clear. In the Preface to Capital he writes,
Intrinsically it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of
development of the social antagonisrns that result from the natural laws of
capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these
tendencies working with an iron necessity to inevitable results. The country
that it most developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the
image of its own future.38
While Jon Elster reads this passage as endorsing a unique path of universal
development,39 the passage applies only to countries which are already
more or less capitalist. (In this passage, ~arx was referring to Germany.)
In both his early and late writings, 'v1arx explicitly considers the
possibility of alternative paths of development. For example, in his
commentary on Friedrich List's book, ~arx refers to the rise of the great
workshops of industry in England:
To hold that every nation goes throuRh this developlnent internally would be
as absurd as the idea that every nation is bound to go through the political
developrnent of France or the philosophical development of Germany. What
the nations have done as natIons they have done for human society; their
whole value consists only in the fact that each single nation has
accomplished for the benefit of other nations one of the maln historical
aspects.40
In this early writing, \I1arx indicates that other nations can spare themselves
the conditions of their contemporaries, by learning from them. Each
country builds on the highest level attained by another. If one cOLintry is the
first to arrive at a stage n, then another country may skip stage n and go
directly to stage n+l. Thus, in this passage, what England has done (develop
capitalist industry) has been done for the whole world. Of course, this is a
youthful writing and such writings can always be dismissed as products of a
"pre-scientific" ~arx. Without intending to endorse such a view, I move to
consider some evidence from the "later" Marx.
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During the 18705, \~arx wrestled wi th the question of historical
unilinearity when Russian socialists posed the question of whether or not
Russia could bypass the capitalist stage and base socialist developtnent on
the peasant cornmunes. In letters and drafts of letters to Vera Zasuiich,
Marx considered the possibility of a "Russian road." He decided that since
the Russian communes were based on territory ra ther than kinship and
included elements of individual ownership, they were less susceptible to
dissolution than were earlier forms of communal property. Because of their
"flexibility" and the existence of capitalisrn in the West, the communes
might become the starting point for a socialist transforrnation:
The historical situation of the Russian 'rural commune' is without
oarallel! ••• While it has in cornmon land ownership the (natural) basis of
collective appropriation, its historical context - the contemporaneity of
capitalist production - provides it with ready-made material conditions for
huge scale common labor. It is therefore able to incorporate the positive
achievements of the capitalist systern without having to pass under its harsh
tribute•••lt may thus become the direct starting point of the econornic
systern towards which modern society is tending. 41
Marx qualified this by adding that should Russia becofne isolated from the
capitalist world, it would be unable to obtain the benefits of capitalisrn's
advanced methods, and would be forced to undergo all the stages of
capitalist development. However, nowhere In his drafts to Zasulich does
Marx indicate that the "Russian road" would be suboptimal wi th respect to
capitalist productive development. To the contrary, Russia could
"incorporate the positive achievements of the capitalist systern without
having to pass under its harsh tribute." (emphasis added). Not only could
Russia industrialize under relations which were the "functional equivalents"
of capitalist relations, but she could do so under conditions which were
significantly freer and more humane.
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How might Cohen respond to an objection that his theory cannot
explain why Industrializa tion occurs under one se t of re la tions (capi ta Ii srn)
or another (socialism) given that both are "optirnal" for productive
development? In KMTH, Cohen responds to a sirnilar objection brought
against functional explanation by Hempel.42 In "The LogIc of Functional
Analysis," Hempel argued tha t there migh t be Inore than one candida te
which fulfills a given function. Why, then, should the fact that social
relations of type A are optimal for productive developrnent suffice for its
actualization, when other social relations of type B with similar productive
potentials are not actualIzed?
Cohen offers two rnajor responses to this objection. First, he counters
that there might be other reasons why social relations of type B don't
obtain. It may be that (1) relatIons are optirnal only under the condition
that they are "part of the repertoire of" (i.e., historical options for) th~
predecessor society. No social relations which are not part of the repertoire
can be optimal; this is a condi tion for optimal! ty. But (2) suppose tha t social
relations which are n:>t part of the repertoire~ optirnal. Then, j t rnight be
argued that being part of the repertoire is also required to obtain a
suffIcient condition: only if a set of social relations is optirnal for
productive development~ part of the repertoire of the existIng social
relations, will it occur. Cohen might use (2) to argue that, given the
absence of anything like the Russian commune (and the also absent
"rnaterlal condi tions for huge scale Jabor"), soclallst reJa tlons of produc tion
were not available for English industrlallzation.43
Cohen's second response to this objection (if the first objection doesn't
disqualify all of the potential functional equivalents) Is to poInt out tha t
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"every explanation fails to account for innumerable properties of the
explanandum phenomenon."44 \\'hether or not this failure is important
depends on our interests. Perhaps we cannot show which functional
equivalent obtains, but we can show why~ equivaJent rnust obtain.
Cohen's two answers do not take us very far. His first Jine of defense
is to hlstoricize the explanation of a given outcome, making it contingent on
the specific social institutions of the predecessor society. He can then
claim that there are not as many functIonal equivalents available as the
objection to linearity su~gests. While this is a plausible line of argurnent, it
still fails to explain what I am contending is a basic feature of Marx's
account of history. As Marx describes It, history is not only characterjzed
by productive growth, but also by changes in agents' norrnative beUefs, their
motives for action, and the prevailing social norms. Successive societies
incorporate greater numbers of people on an increasingly free and equal
basis. While the ability to incorporate people as free and equal mernbers of
a community may be materially conditioned, (i.e., incorporation has
material costs) the existence of alternative routes of development shows
that the ability is not materially determined. There can be no doubt that
Marx saw In the possibility of socialism in Russia, a freer and more humane
path of Industrial development than that of capitalism. Historicizlng the
explanation of why one set of social relations as opposed to another obtains,
makes the progressIve contributions of social relatjons to actualize greater
amounts of freedom appear as a fortuitous accident. Given the existence of
many functional equivalents at every stage, why, should the norrns of
successive societies display a direction?
Cohen might grant the existence of a directional Jogle In the
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development of social norrns, and adrnit that there are greater degrees of
freedom obtained at the higher material levels of development. He notes
that it is a "banal but lmportant truth that hurnan beings on the whole prefer
freedom to its opposit~"'4; Yet this does not make this development
causally relevant as Cohen's second response above to the objection about
functional equivalents irnplips. Cohen seems to thinl< that it is ultirnately
insignificant to historical materialism that there happens to exist a
direction in the changing justi! 'cations for social norms, for there equally
could have been no direction to them.
But this assertion denies sornethin~ essential in Marx. It is obviously
very significant, from the standpoint of human well-being and Marx's theory,
that historical options exist which, although equalJy optirnaJ for material
development, prornote varying degrees of human freedom. The structure of
Marxist explanation Is not silnply functIonalist, with everything which is not
functionally explained bein~ uninteresting. It is significant that there is a
direction in the bases of social norms (e.g., greater universal! ty, changes in
the type of justification given for social practices), and in the equalization
of fundamental social conditions. For example, a society based on a
traditional justification of norms, would not, in Marx's view, historically
follow a society based on their formal rational justification.
In order to account for this direction in social norms, historical
materialism needs Il\Ore theoretical structure than Cohen has provided.
FunctionaJ argument alone cannot account for it. While Cohen has shown us
that, at a given point, an old social form needs to be changed, he has not
told us enough about the new social form whjch will replace it.
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ii. insufficient account of the role of criticism in V1arx's theory.
In the introduction to this chapter, I raised the problem of the
relationship between Marxism as a science, and as a form of social
criticism. With respect to ~arxisln as a science, in Capital, 'v\arx clairns to
represent the "economic law of motion of modern society" as a "natural
law."46 Marx thus purports to give knowled~e about the necessity of the
transformation of the present social order into a classless society. This
knowledge is of "objective conc1itions"; it is knowledge of the constraints
which capitalist social relations imposes on the further developlnent of the
productive forces. With respect to 'v1arxisrn as a critical social theory, the
aims are somewhat different. As a critical theory, \1arxlsm seeks to expose
the false beliefs and illusions that keep social agents frorn grasping their
true interests in the world. While these true interests must be in sorne sense
"already ours" (i.e., they cannot be implanted in us by well-meaning
revolutionaries), they need to be revealed. We do not really know what is in
our interest.
Both of these aspects - criticism and science - are central to Marx's
thought, and a variety of positions have been taken within the Marxist
movement regarding their relationship. Some Marxists, for exarnple Lul<acs,
have even equated them, arguing that Marxism Is a non-standard form of
science which is identical tv criticism. For Lukacs, the proletariat
transforms the world in the process by which it arrives at an understanding
of the world.47 Despite Lukacs, however, it is clear that science and
criticism are not identical. The exposure of illusions does not change the
conditions which create them:
The belated scientific discovery that the products of labor, in so far as they
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are values, are rnerely the material expressions of the human labor expended
to produce them•••by no means banishes the semblence of objectivity
possessed by the social characteristics of labor. 48
The situation of criticism is therefore frustrating. Since critical
consciousness need not change the conditions which create illusions, its
effects must, invariably, be evanescent. And this makes it easy (and even
tempting) to lose sight of the central role which criticisrn plays in \ttarx's
theory.
Cohen's view makes the mistake of neglecting the centrality of
criticism for 'v1arx's theory. For C;ohen, Marxism really is a science,
enabling us to see behind the appearances "the natural law" dictating the
rise and fall of social forms. It ,,'auld be wrong to conclude, however, tha t
Cohen believes that Marxism is not without a critical or moral dimension.
Cohen certainly believes that cElpitalism is unjust, and that it deserves to be
condemned as such:
The main indictment of capitallsrn is that it crushes people's creative
potentials, and that the chief good of communisrn is that it permits a
prodigious flowering of human talent."49
But, capitallsrn's condemnation is of little use to its critics. For Cohen,
capitalism's injustice has nothing to do with the fact that it will be replaced
or with the kind of society that will replace it. The constraints on
capitalist social relations which induce its demise, are not social, but
"material." Human rationaJity, intelligence and scarcity and not the hurnan
desIre for freedom are the fact\Jrs which make socialist transformation
inevitable.50 The prob:enl for Cohen is that it 1s not clear that the extra-
social premises lead to soc;lal1sm (and not some despotic functional
equivalent). As we saw with respect to Marx's writings on Russia, legal
structures and property relations are not simply given in the level of
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productive developlnent. And Cohen's reconstruction of ~arx's theory gives
us no good reason to suppose \t\arx wrong on this point.
Given Cohen's belief in the inevitability of soclaJisrn, what is his
account of revolutionary agency? Cohen's own account is very silTliliar to
one given by 'Aarx in Capital:.51
(1) While there is no final crisis, at a certain point capitalism undergoes a
series of worsening crises. Between each breakdown, the forces of
production continue to grow, makin~ socialism more and more feasible. The
growing "contradiction" between the socialized forces and the capi taiist
relations of production is the quantitative presupposition for socialisrn.52
(2) However, Cohen recognizes that sociaJisrn has qualitative presuppositions
as well. 53 These are: (a) the collectivization of the working class within
large scale production; (b) the homogenization of the wage levels of the
working class through desl<illing; (c) universal education; and, (d) the class
unity which arises as a result of working class struggle. A t a given point,
the working class acts to overthrow capi talism: "The maladies of capi talisrn
and the development of the productive forces stimulate proletarian
militancy."54
This argument is not complete for it does not specify how workin~
class militancy Is supposed to generate socialist consciousness. The
organization of capitalist production conceals the role of human beings in
the production process. In KMTH, the sections where Cohen speaks of the
overturning of the concealment have no human 5ubj~. Typical sentences
are, "socialist revolution supresses fetlshism,".55 "capitalism reveals itself a
merely historical necesslty."'6 But In the absence of self-conscious subjects
-- who know not only how to run production but also that the social evils of
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capitalism are avoidable -- it is not clear that socialism (i.e., dernocratjc
producers' control) would be established.
Cohen argues that one reason workers have failed to revolt is that
"they lack the power because they do not know that they have it."57
Knowledge and belief are important for the exercise of collective power.
But, what kind of knowledge and belief? And, what are their sources?
Cohen would probably respond that if knowled~e is the only thing which
people lack to realize their interest in rndterial progress, they will
ultimately obtain it. However this answer is not satisfactory because,
again, the material interest people have can be realized in different social
forms. If the interest in material pro~ress leads the proletariat to
knowledge about the shortcomings of existing conditions, this does not
explain the full nature of the knowledge the proletariat obtains. The
interest in material progress on its own cannot inform the proletariat of the
potential alternative forms of social organization. The interests which
Marxism as a critical theory reveals are not only those interests people have
in overcoming nature, but those having to do with human social ideals. The
uncovering of these ideals involves more than showing that actual
circumstances do not optimally develop the productive forces. The evils of
capitalist society have to be shown to be avoidable.
First stage communism, as Marx describes it in The Critlgue of the
Gotha Program involves a new form of social relations and new distributive
principles. These principles represent "higher" principles than those of
capitalism, not because of their bearln~ on productivity, but because they
substantively realize the formal freedom and equality of capitalist society.
In fact, when Marx criticizes the principles of first stage communlsrn, it is
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precisely in terrns of their li,nitations with respect to hurnan self-
determination and autonomy:
It is therefore a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Ri~ht by
its very nature can c('nsist only in the application of an equal standard; but
unequal individuAls (and they would not be different individuals if they were
not unequal) are only measurable by an equal standard in so far as they are
brought under an equal point of view••• everything else being ignored.
Further, one worker is married, another not; one has more children than
another and so on and so forth. Thus with an equal performance of
labor•••one will be richer than another •••To avoid all these defects right,
instead of being equal, would have to be unequal."58
The development of the productive forces was no ~arx's only
argument for comlTlunisrn. He placed great stress on the development of the
free developrnent of the individual (of which the growth of the forces of
production is but one aspect) as the main reason for preferring cornrTlunlsin.
How then do the values realized in communisrn relate to the interests and
desires which individuals have now?
Cohen presents Marxism solely as a theory about productive
development and the social conditions that facilitate it. If there are equally
good ways (from the standpoint of the productive forces) to move beyond
capitalism, then, according to Cohen, ~arxism doesn't predict which path
will be taken, nor can knowledge of Marx's theory by the working class help
to push things one way or another. Thus, Cohen's ~arxism does not
necessarily lead to socialism, nor can it help human beings select sociaJislrt
from competing functional equivalents.
iIi. Insufficient account of processes
Finally, Cohen's discussion of social transformation fails to capture
the importance of classes in Marx's theory. Recall that Cohen denies that
his account of historical materialism removes classes from the center of
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historical change, arguing that the fact that the coincidence between the
interests of a particular class and humanity at large is part of the
explanation of why that class is successful. Class struggle. Cohen holds, is
an important part of the answer to the question "how does the fact that a
new structure would benefit the productive forces explain its
ac tual ization?" 59
While this response may defend Cohen against charges that adherence
to the primacy of the productive forces is incompatible wi th a role for class
a~ency, it is an inadequate response to my criticism, which has to do with
the centrality of classes in ~arx's theory.
It is not clear why, in Cohen's reconstruction, classes should be
privileged agents in the explanation of social change. There is no reason in
principle why other non-class agents (the state or state
bureaucrats/planners, for exafnple) could not be the vehicles of social
transformations. In KMTH, Cohen explains the li'llitation of the working day
as the outcome of an intervention by the state to protect the interests of
the capitalist class as a whole. Individual capitalists, acting to rnaxirnize
their profits, continually extended the workin~ day. Eventually, they
reached a point where they threatened the physical health of the laborers.
By endangering the ability of the working class to reproduce itself,
individual capitalists threatened their collective interest, the survival of
capitalism. In order to enforce this colle :tive interest, the state intervened:
The capitalist state, legislator of the Factory Acts, is then the eye of the
otherwise blind capitalist, the stabilizer of a system that capitalist activity
itself endangers. The needs of the systern cannot be attended to by
dispersed entrepeneurs severally driven to maximize individual profit.60
The capitalist state acts to overcome what would otherwise take the form
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of a prisoner's dilemma. In a prisoner's dilernrna, everyone acts in his own
interest, but because of the lack of cooperation, the aggregate outcorne l~
not collectively rational. The limitation of the workIng day is explained in
terms of its effect on the continuance of capitalism, an effect which in
principle could have been brought about by any actor (e.g., an enlightened
group of capitalists).
Returnin~ to a problem which arose during the exposition of Cohen's
own position, recall that, by themselves, the asocial premises of human
nature failed to establish the Developrnent Thesis. There remained a
"shadow" between what "rationality" demanded and what "a society does.,,61
In particular, there was no reason to believe that a class with an interest in
material progress would have the power to enforce that i.,terest.
Cohen's response to this c1ilemma was to introduce a sub-argument.
The sub-argument claimed that the fact that social relations have generally
been propitious for development can be taken as evidence that the interest
in material progress wins out. But the sub-argument In KMTH did not
indicate specifically in what way the asocial premises make recalcitrant
social structures materially unlikely. In a subsequent manuscript,62 Cohen
addresses this issue, emphasizing the interdependency and uncertainty
imposed by material scarcity. Appealing to recent work In the problerns of
collective action, Cohen contends thAt interdependency "te"ds to rnake
(what would otherwise be) prisoners' djlemma~ occur In indefinitely long
aerles, and it is well known that such seriality facilitates their solution.
Material solutions might allo help 'political entrepeneurs' beat the decision
environment into such a shape that the the free-ric1er quandry 1s
trlnlcended."63
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Cohen's response is revealing. He appeals to "lJolitical entrepenelJrs"
who can "beat the environment into shape," thus solving the free-rider
problem. Cohen does not specify that these entrepeneurs need be classes
and in many of the illustrations that he gives they are not classes. For
example, Cohen appeals to the role of the state 1n insuring favorable
conditions for capitalist reproduction. Yet Marx always centered his
explanations of social transformations ()n the struggles of social classes.
Even in the example Cohen cites, the limitation of the working day, Marx's
own explanation is in terms of classes and their alliances. While ~arx does
state that the results of this llrnitation were functional for capitaljsrn, he
explains the limit as the product of an alliance between the workln~ class
and a fraction of the capitalist class.64 ~ar)('s characteristic explanations
of soc1al changes appeal to classes and their interests.
In fact, while Cohen is correct that serially structured ~arnes are rnore
likely to produce cooperation than games which are not serially structured,
it does not follow from this that within a repetitive game cooperation is
more likely then not to prevail.65 Cooperative behavior depends on other
factors besides the learning which results from rational action in serially
structured games. For example, it depends on the conceptions which
individuals have about each others' beliefs. Without knowledge of what Is in
the collective interest of the working class, for example, black and white
wor~.e"l might not perceive their common interests In cooperation.
Socialism, In Marx's conception, Is not simply the result of the
problems 1n capitalist production, but of self-conscious working class action.
Cohen does not adequately capture the centrality of the working class 1n
locialist transformation. A view which sees classes as central to social
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change must explain why only classes are capable of producing the
conditions required for social transforrnation. Cohen does not do this, and
thus classes lose their privileged position in Marx's theory.
1.4 conclusion.
To sum up what Cohen has accomplished and what he has failed to
achieve:
(1) In several of his writings, ~arx denies the existence of an
individual human nature. ""any conte,nporary Marxists have followed his
lead, maintaining that there is no constant of "human nature."66 A~alnst
this tradition, Cohen has shown, rightly, that the reconstruction of a
successful ar~ument for the primacy of the productive forces and their role
in furthering historical progress depends on facts about hurnan nature.
Without the existence of some "permanent facts"67 of human nature, not
dependent on specific social structures, there can be no underlying tend~ncy
to productive progress. \t1arxi~m would have to dispense with the idea that
progress is the central tendency of history. The function of the premises of
human nature In Cohen's ar~ument Is to provide the foundation of a Marxist
theory of history in whlch history is progressive; In which subsequent social
froms represent not only a chanRe, but an advance. As there can be no
doubt that ~arx saw history as progressive, Cohen's reconstruction here is
successful.
2.(8) Cohen's functional argument attempts to capture the relationship
between the asocial tendency for productive development and the particular
soclal forms which emerge from major historical transformations. But the
functional argument cannot produce an adequate account of the outcornes of
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social transfor'nations. A t best, Cohen has shown why there is a need for
the destruction of the old social form but he has not shown what new social
form will replace it. This is significant because \t\arxiSITl is not an
unambiguous theory of unillnear developrnent.
(b) Cohen's functional argument fails to adequately capture '-"arx's
conception of the agents of social change. 'v\arx saw classes, and their
interests as the agents of social change. However, in Cohen's theory there
is no reason why classes should be privileged, as opposed to the state,
"political enterpreneurs," or non-class social movernents.
(c) Finally, because Cohen believes that the outcornes of social
transformations are determined by the level of productive development,
there is no independent contribution to be made by Marxisrn as a critical
theory. Changes in capitalist production (de-skill1nK, collectivization of !he
wor\( process, etc), in Cohen's analysis, render the interest5. of workers
manifest. There is no need for social criticism to expose their illusions.
Rather, Cohen implies that the knowledge which is involved in furthering
the technical rnastery over nature by itself yields the knowledge which
enables human beings to achieve freedom In social life.
In sum, Cohen fails to see in Marx's theory of hIstory a norrnatlve
dimension of progress ou'tside of production which itself needs to be
explained. Because of this he falls to build enough theoretical structure into
his account of outcomes, agents and critical consciousness.
Cohen admits the possibility that other interests besides material ones
are at work In history, althouRh he suggests that these interests are
materially conditioned. This leaves open the question of what these other
41
interests ~t and whether or not they have any contribution to make to our
understanding of the outcomes, processes and rnotivations involved in
revolutions. In the following chapters, I will be concerned with the nature
of the changes which \t1arx sees in social forms. I will examine whether an
account of these changes can be given which allows for a reconstruction of
historical materialism which retains a central role for classes and criticisrn.
For example, socially subordinate classes which contest the norrns and
power distribution of a given society are in a better posltio:1 to recognize
the source of the social constraints on their freedom than classes which
benefit frorn those constraints. Class struggles could he defended as central
to the social transformation process if it could be shown that only they
could produce the conditions (including the knowled~e of a new form of
social organization) needed for productive advance.
The existence of an independent process through which social forrns
evolve does not necessarilv undercut Cohen's reconstructive project.
Cohen's contribution 1n identifying problems in material production as the
source of the impetus for social chan~e is not invalidated by the realization
that he has shown only that change must occur, but not the social form it
will take. To know that, we rnust turn our attention to the other interests
Marxism says people have, beyond their interest in material pro~ress.
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Chapter Two: History, and the Value of Non-Moral Goods
2.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I assessed Gerald Cohen's reconstruction of
historical materialism and found that it was inadequate in severa! respects.
In particular, Cohen could not account for (1) the basis of Marx's insistence
that classes are the characteristic agents of social change, (2) the
importance of critical consciousness in the movernent for socialism, and (3)
the specific nature of the outcomes of historical transformations. Cohen's
says very little about the nature of the motivations involved in social
transformations other than that if people's non-material interests do playa
role, they "do not conflict with their material interests in progress defeating
ways."l Thus, in Karl Marx's Theory of History, there is no considera tion of
the question as to whether or not capitalism is unjust. 2 This is because, for
Cohen's reconstruction of historical rnaterlal1sm, the question is irrelevant:
its answer cannot tell you when or in what manner capitalism (or any other
social form) will be transformed. For example, while lIving in a more just
society might in fact be preferred by workers, this desire cannot bring about
such a society (e.g., socialism), Ra ther, for Cohen, the posslbili ty for and
form of social change Is "dIctated and permitted•••by the existing productive
forces.")
Cohen's functional argument, however, does not adequateJy specify
the constraints on the social relations which result from revolutionary
transformations. Although Cohen's account does not deny tha t there are
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reasons to prefer socialism to capitalism apart from its contribution to
productive development, he neither specifies what they are nor does he
indicate that they are causally relevant to his reconstruction of historical
materialism. Cohen's emphasis on productive expansion tells us little about
the principles of social organization which "higher" social forms will embody
since, as we saw, productive development can occur under varying social
forms. The emergence of new principles of social organization depends upon
agents' knowledge not only ('\f the constraints that a given set of social
relations pose for productive development, but also of how these constraints
prevent real human interests from being realized. When Marxisrn reveals
the illusions which cloak social life in class societies, it enlightens agents
simultaneously about their real condition and their true interests. What
needs to be understood is the nature of those interests: are they historically
specific, or are they universal? Why does Marx predict that workers will
struggle not only against capitalism, but also for socialism? What is the
relationship between the workers' interest in material progress, and their
other characteristic (class specific or human) interests?
In this chapter, I examine an interpretation of historical materialism
which recognizes the importance of these issues. In his book Karl Marx,4
Allen Wood offers an interpretation of historical materialism in which, like
Cohen, he identifies the growth of productive powers as the central
tendency of history. Wood writes, "Marx postulates certain basic tendencies
in social behavior: the tendency of society's productive powers to increase;
the tendency of social relations to adjust themselves to the efficient
employment of these powers, and to change in response to them.'" Many of
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Wood's positions, though far less clear and consistent, are similiar to
Cohen's. Like Cohen, Wood reconstructs historical materialism in a manner
which gives explanatory primacy to the development of the productive
forces. He seeks to defend his interpretation against the "humanistic
interpretation of Marxist philosophy."6 He also presents a functionalist
argument for why particular social forms rise and fall: the fate of a given
social form is determined by its contribution to further productive progress.
Wood's interpretation, however, provides a better understanding of the
role of interests in the theory of historical materialism and the reasons for
which Marx condemns capitalisrn. While Cohen leaves open the nature of
and role that various interests beyond material interests play in historical
transitions, Wood's ar~ument attempts to clarify these interests and their
relation to the critical intentions of Marx's theory. Wood rnakes two points
in this regard. His first point is that the specific content of moral and
juridical concepts is dependent upon and bound to particular social forms
and cannot transcend them. Moral crltlcisrn cannot motivate social change:
"Changes in the prevailing standards of right and justice do not cause social
revolutions but only accompany them."7 Wood argues, that for Marx, all
moral standards are determined by the requirements of production and have
no validity independent of the function they serve for a particular social
form. Accordingly, these standards 1n themselves cannot be the reason for
Marx's condemnation of capitalism or advocacy of socialism.
Marx did of course condemn capitalism, so the question naturally
arises: Or" what grounds did he condemn it? Wood's second point, his central
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innovation, is introduced in response to this question. He proposes, as an
exegetical hypothesis, that ~'arx distinguishes between moral and non-moral
goods. A good is anything people desire or value. Non-moral goods are
goods which are valued and pursued by people because they satisfy their
conceptions of what is desIrable and not because any moral meri t attaches
to the possession of these goods. Non-moral goods include such things as
pleasure and happiness, goods which people would want irrespective of
whether or not there is any duty to have them. According to Wood, when
Marx advocates socialism because it enhances freedom, human developrnent,
community, etc., he does not do so on moral grounds. These are, Wood
argues, non-moral goods. When workers prefer socialism to capi tallsm they
do so in order to secure greater amounts of the non-moral goods they desire.
MarJ'('s criticism, then, is directed not only to the constraints imposed by
capitalIst property relations on the level of the development of the
productive forces, but also to the degree to which capitalist relations
frustrate the realization of these non--moral goods. The judgement that
socialism is better than capitalism does not simply rest on the fact that it
enables the continual expansion of the productive forces. Socialism provides
other (non-moral) goods which human beings want.
Wood not only offers an explication of many of Marx's
pronouncements condemning morality, he also develops an explicit account
of the human interests which motivate people to choose socialist relations
over capitalist ones. While this account is compatible with Cohen's view in
many respects,S it focuses clearly on what Cohen leaves, at best, implicit.
In this chapter, I shall critically examine Wood's argument. I will
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claim that while Wood builds on Cohen in the right direction, developing
Marx's account of the rnotivatlons which people have and which are crucial
for the establishment of socialism, his reconstruction has several problems ..
FIrst, Wood's functional argument for justice does not explain why a
particular standard of justice prevails. Wood's view of justice as functional
ideology preempts substantive questions. While justice may serve a function
for productive development, it may also serve other interests which people
have. Second, Wood's ac :ount of the non-moral goods does not give a
satisfactory explanation of their origin, of how these goods escape having
the ideological character of moral goods, or of how agents know which non-
moral goods are in their interest. Third, Wood canna t account for the
intrinsIc value which Marx assigns these goods. He too narrowly construes
these goods in terms of particular class interests and not as, what I will
argue they were for Marx, human interests.
2.2 Wood's view: exposition
Wood's view of history and the driving force of historical rnovernent 1s
simiJiar to that offered by Cohen. Wood, like Cohen, sees the growth of
human productive power as providins the fundamental impetus to social
change. There is, in history, a basic tendency for the productIve forces to
expand, "whether or not this expansion is encouraged by the existing set of
rela tlons.,,9
While Wood calls the characteristic explanations of Marxlsrn
"teleologlcal"lO rather than "functional," his view of what constitutes the
explanation is the same as Cohen's. To give a teleological explanation of an
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aspect of a systern is to show how it contributes to the persistent tendencies
chara~teristicof that system and to provide reasons for believing that the
aspect exists because it contributes to those tendencies. Wood argues that
the typical explanations of historical materialism are teleological in this
sense. Thus, social relations are what they are because the productive
forces require them to be that way. A set of relations obtains when and
because it furthers prod""ctl'f''! expansIon:
Historical materialism proposes to account for large scale changes in
social relations either by showing how they serve to adapt these
relations to new productive powers or by sh.'lw1n~ how they contribute
(cit that stage of history) to the persistent expansive tendency of
h'Jmanity's productive powers. Social relations change because of the
development of productive po\vers, that is, in order to accomodate or
effect that development.ll
Wood also follows Cohen In basing the tendency to prodlJ~tlve growth
on features of human rationality: "the human race eventually tends to
do•••what its deepest and most long term interests demand." 12 We should
note, however, two differences between C"hen and Wood implicit in this
comment. First, Cohen was careful to base the leatures of rationality
which support historical materialism 1n ir.t1ividual human nature, whereas
Wood is unclear as to whether or not the interest 1n productive growth Is
characteristic of individuals I'\r of "humanity" as a whole. jlnce els\!where
Wood denies the existence of an intentional collective subject underlying
historical development,13 it would be best to construe him as basing his
argument on features of individual rationality, while noting that he never
clearly states this assumption and, moreover, it does not alway~ seem to
inform his analysls.
Second, Cohen drawl. distinction between the features of human
nature which operate throughout history to secure the tendency for
productive development and those which are always present in humans but
only find expression under communism. In contrast, Wood seems to suggest
that humanity actually develops its "essent1a1 powers" 14 1n history.
Unfortunately, Wood never specifies exactly what he means by "e:..sentlal
powers," and, as noted above, he follows Cohen in assigning explanatory
primacy to the expansion of eroductlve powers. Although Cohen is surely
right in distinguishing between the aspects of human nature which are
impor tant for productive growth in history and the additional ones which
flourish only under communism, this does not rule out the possibility that
these other features of human nature are also important for historical
change. So, Wood may be right that there are other powers or capacities
developed in history, but he does not specify what they are or what their
role is.
Finally, Wood argues, like Cohen, that the rise and fall of social
classes is determined hy their ability to "establish and defend" I 5 a set of
production relations. Classes are the "chief mechanlsm"16 through which
production relations are adjusted to the requirements of the growing
productive forces.
Although the forces of production represent the key causal fact..>rs In
locial change, the requisites of productive development do not constitute
the full basis of \1arx's criticism of existing property relations. Marx
certainly condemns capitalism, as opposed to simply analyzing and
describing its tendencies. When Marxism reveals the nature of human
interests hidden beneath the illusions which individuals have, what it
uncovers is more than an interest in further productive expansion. For, if
socialism develops the forces of production, it simultaneously liberates
individuals from exploitation and the imperatives of the capItalist
accumulation process which are driven only by the necessity of increasing
surplus value.
It is therefore important to have a more precise understanding of
the way in which socialism develops the productive forces, in order to
disassociate it from the logic of capitalist accumulation. Socialism changes
the objectives of accumulation, not only the owners. Sucialist production is
organized not for the purpose of increasing surplus value, but in order to
allow for the realization of freedofn in soclal1ife. The connection between
freedom and the organization of socialist production Is central to the
~ar)(ist project of human ernancipatlon.
It would be natural to conclude from this that Marx's belief that
socialism is superior to capitallsn\ rests on a moral theory in whlch freedom
is a central value. Yet it would be difficult to find support for this
interpretation in ~arx's texts. Throughout hIs writings, Marx explicitly
denies that his argument for soclal1sm 17 Is derived from, or part of, a
larger moral theory. In The Communist Manifesto, he accepts the charge
that "communism •••abolishes all morality, instead of constituting it on a
new basls." 18 In Critique of the Gotha Program he refers to the demand for
"equal rights" as "& crime" and "obsolete verbal rubbish." 19 FlnalJy, nowhere
In any of ~arx's writings 1s there any direct statement that capitalIsm Is
unjust. But how then are we to understand Marx's attack on morality, what
exactly 1, he attacking'? If not for Justice's sake, then for what values and
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ends does ~arx think that workers will be inspired to struggle against the
capitalist system (as opposed to limiting their demands to only partial
grievances)? Most importantly, how can Marx claim that socialism is better
than capitalism, if he rejects morality?
Wood has proposed an interpretation of Marx's anti-moral view which
gives an answer to these questions. While Wood's primary concern is wi th
justice and the allied concepts of rights and fairness, he has also developed
an account of Marx's critique of morality at; such. Before considering this
general account, I will first consider Wood's interpretation of Marx's
criticism of justice.
Wood argues that Marx viewed justice as a juridical-legal concept.
Justice 15 not, for 'Aarx, some neutral standpoint, but a set of standards
which arise out of an existing social order. The laws and distributional
arrangements of a given society are ones appropriate to 1ts production
relations. For Marx, jUCJtlce Is not "determined by the universal
compatibility of acts and interests" as liberalism would have it, but by "the
concrete requirements of a historically conditioned mode of production."20
Systems of justice have no standing independent of their role in a given
society. Like social relations, tl1ey exist in order to fulfill a particular
functional need, specifically, they exist because social relations which are
functional for productive development require them. In Wood's words,
LegaJ and political structures•••owe their existence and their form of
thought to the mode of production within which they operate, to the
specific manner in which they regulate existing production relations
and serve the needs of Indivlduals.21
The standards of right and justice appropriate to a given society are
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precisely those standards which do "fulfill a function in social production.,,22
The function Wood seerns to have in mind is a regulating one; rights and
obligations are distributed 1n a manner which is determined by the existing
social relations. Thus, for example, 1n a capitalist society, formal equality
facilitates exchange In the market, removing the feudal barriers (e.g., serf
labor) to capitalist production.
Wood supports his claim, that Marx viewed justice as functionally
determined by the existing production relations, by considering Marx's views
on the "injustice" of exploitation. Once the purchase of labor power23 has
occured, ~arx holds that it belongs to the capitalist "with full rlght".24 The
capitalist has paid for the value of the worker's labor power, and the fact
that this labor power now creates a greater value than its worth "is a piece
of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice towards the
seller."2' ~arx here parts company with those socialists who argued that
the capitalists' exploitation of the working class (i.e., the capitalists'
appropriation of surplus value) violated the principle of equality of
exchange. According to Marx, the capitalist pays the worker the full value
of his labor power, an amount determined like that of any other commodity,
by the amount of socially necessary labor time needed to produce 1t. Thus,
in response to the Gotha Program's La~al1ean demand for a "just
distribution of the proceeds uf labor," Marx asks,
What 1s a 'just' distribution? 00 not the bourgeoisie assert that the
present distribution 15 'just'? And isn't It in fact the only 'just'
distribution based on the present mode of production? Are economic
relations ruled by juridical relations or do not juridical relations arise,
on the contrary, out of economic ones126
Wood's interpretation of the Marxian critique of justice has two
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striking consequences. First, not only does Marx n2! condernn capitalism as
unjust, but he also believes that its characteristic institutions are just. Of
course, Marx does not thereby approve of capitalist institutions and his
taking them to be just is "worthless to its apologists."27 Rather, Marx's
belief in the justice of many of capitalism's institutions and arrangements
reflects his view that justice 1s simply a standard of social regulation, and
not a rational standard of judgement.
Second, the concept of justice, for Marx, cannot be a genuine impetus
to revolutionary action. The revolutionary rnotivated by a desire for justice
misunderstands the causal dependence of juridical institutions on the level
of productive development. This revolutionary,
views his revolutionar'y aspirations as a kind of ideal juridical structure
underlying the existing society, an ideal or hypothetical contract or
set of natural rights•••which are being violated•••by the rampant
'abuses' and 'injustices' of the present society. He thus treats the
essence of the actual production relations as arbitrary and inessential,
as a set of mere 'abuses' •••His 'revolutionary' aim is therefore not
really to overthrow the existing society, it is only to correct the
abuses prevalent in it, to rectify its tragic and irrational injustices,
and to make it live up to those ideals of right and justice which are, or
ought to be, Its genuine foundation. 28
For Wood's Marx, there is no criteria for justice other than its suitability for
productive growth. There Is no "genuine" concept .:>f justice which a would...
be rev\Jlutlonary can seek to Impose: justice must be compatlbJe with the
productive foundation of its society. E.ach social system has its own form of
justice; democracy is no more or less "just" than is slavery, eac:h Is just on
the basis of its relationship to its respective social form.
If justice cannot be a rational standard for criticism of a social form,
the question arises whether other moral concepts could play this role. For
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example, perhaps ~af'x condemns capitalism because it is a system which
institutionalizes unequal freedom. While there Is equal freedom on the level
of the capitalist market ...-since each is free to buy and sell what he has --
there Is an underlying structure in which workers and capitalists are not, in
fact, equally free. This interpretation would be consistent with what Marx
writes in Capital:
The sphere of circuJation of commodity exchange, within whose
boundaries the sale and purchase of labor power goes on, is in fact a
very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom because both
buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say labor power, are
determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons,
who are equal before the law•••
When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of
commodities which provides the 'free trader vulgaris' with his views,
his concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital
and wage labor, a certain change takes place••• ln the physiogamy of
our dramatis personae. He who was previously the money owner now
strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labor power follows
as his worker. The one smirks self ..importantly and is intent on
business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has
brought his own hide to market and now has nothing to expect -- but a
hidlng. 29
This passage suggests that beneath its appearance, the worker in capitalist
society is neither free nor equal. Perhaps this reality is the basis of Marx's
criticism. Wood, however, does not think that Marx condemned capitalism
on any moral basis. He poInts out that Marx frequently attacks not only
"justice" but also "equality" and "all morality." Wood, therefore, puts
forward a pr~posaJ about Marx's views on morality In general, and not simply
justice and rights. According to Wood, Marx attacks all moral concepts; like
Nietzsche, \1arx Is not a reformer but a critic of morality.
Yet, If Marx follows Nietzsche in condemning morality, the problem 15
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that, unlike Nietzsche, he never tells us exactly what he thinks morality is.
Therefore, Wood introduces a hypothesis which whiJe never stated explicitly
by Marx would, if Marx held such a view, explain his criticism of morality.
Wood suggests that Marx conceived morality along Hegelian lines. Hegel, of
course, distinguished between morality as Moralitaet and morality as
Sittllchkeit. Moralitaet is the capacity of a rational individual to act
autonomously, in a manner which does not depend on inclination. 3D
Moralitaet places an individual under a formal obl1~ation to realize what is
acceptable to reason; autonomous action is action done because reason
requires it. If reason Is to be the determining ground of action, however, it
clearly must have some content. Where does the content of what is
acceptable to reason come from? Hegel argued that Sittlichkeit provides
the content for the moral individual. Slttllchkeit is the set of institutions
and objective norms thr()ugh which the memhers of a social order fulfill the
demands of their society. It refers to the moral obligations people have
simply by being members of their community. Without the social content
derived from the norms of a rational community, Hegel argued that morality
would be reduced to an empty formalism, as was the case with Kant's rnoral
theory.31
Assuming Marx adopts a Hegelian conception of morality, Wood
argues we can make sense of why he condemns it. It would mean that Marx,
like Hegel, rejects a purely formal conception of morality (Moralitaet). But,
unlike Hegel, Marx believes that the objective moral norms of Slttlichkelt
represent, not the demands of a rational community, but the economic needs
of the prevailing order. Consequently these norms "enjoin conduct from
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each individual which is harmonious or functional in relatlon"32 to that
order. The Sittlichkeit of capitalist society is merely a facade concealing
bourgeois interests.
If this is the case, then morality "necessarily subverts the self-
understanding of every individual who follows it."33 For morality claims to
represent a universal interest, when in fact it represents interests which are
beneficial to the ruling classes. By deceiving individuals 3bout the real
nature of its imperatives, morality is harmful for those who follow it. To
workers it "represents as rationally fulfilling a course of conduct which is in
fact directly opposed to their interests."34 Morality e'ven deceives the
capitalists, since it claims to represent not their class interests but a
universal interest. Morality conceals its role in sanctioning a particular
social form. Yet its acceptance stems precisely from that role.
Consequently, Wood argues, morality Is an ideological systern.
Marx cannot, therefore, offer an alternative morality to that of the
prevailing social order. The very idea of a "universal interest" such as
morality claims to represent is unreal. If by a moral point of view we mean
a standpoint which takes the interests of each equally into account, then
Wood holds that Marx must reject such a standpoint. For Wood's Marx,
interests are historically effective only insofar as they take the form of
class interests (which are not universal interests but particular interests).
Wood writes,
As Marx depicts it, the proletarian movement furthers the interests of
other classes (such as the peasantry or the p",tty bourgeoisie) only to
the extent that they are temporarily coincident with•••the interests of
the proletariat.)'
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Disinterested or impartial considerations are, Wood contends, incompatible
with Marx's understanding of the centrality of class interests. Once we
recognize the historical role of class interests, we cannot consider
impartially grounded principles of any primary concern.
Yet Marx does condemn capitalism -- even if not on moral grounds --
and the question remains as to why he condemns it. In response to this
question, Wood draws the following distinction between moral goods and
non-moral goods:
In a narrower and I think more proper sense of 'moral' •••we distinguish
moral goods and evils from non-moral ones. We all know the difference
between valuing or doing something because conscience or the 'moral
law' tells us we 'ought' to, and valuing or doing something because it
satisfies our needs, our wants, or our conceptions of what is good for
us (or for someone else whose welfare we want to promote--desires for
non-moral goods are not necessarily selfish deslres).36
Non-moral goods are things that we would want even if we received no
moral credit for obtaining them. Unlike moral goods whose only justification
lies In their functionality for specific and transient social forms, the content
of these goods is independent of the needs of any particular social order:
The fact that people are free or unfree, self-actualized or alienated
depends on the degree to which they understand and control the
conditions of their existence and to the degree to which they
understand and control their "essential human powers"•••Social
relations may promote or inhibit freedom, community or self~
actualization, but the content of these three is not determined by the
correspondence to prevailing social relations of what people are or
do. 37
According to Wood, while Marx avoids social criticism based on moral
goods or values, he repeatedly condemns capitalism for frustratIng certain
non-moral goods, among which he includes self-actualization, security,
health and freedom. The pursuit of these goods does not contradict the
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thesis that only class interests are historically effective which Wood argues
Marx is committed to. These goods neither represent a "universal interest"
nor is their pursuit motivated out of an impartial concern with the good of
humanity as such. In pursuing these goods, workers are pursuing their
interests, which will be furthered at the expense of the interests of others
(e.g., the capitalists.) If we ask why workers find these goods appealing
rather than others, Wood suggests "we ml~ht give various sorts of answers,
including answers which make reference to the historical materialist
account of our situation. (Workers might particularly care about security
and self-development because they are so totally deprived of these
particular goods.)" 38
Now it might seem that Marx's advocacy of the non-moral goods still
commits him to some kind of moral theory. For example, Mill holds that
what is morally good consists In what is conducive to the greatest amount
of non-moral good (i.e., happiness), For Mill, what Is morally required of
each individual is defined in terms of what rnaxlmlzes the non-moral good of
the totality of individuals. WhIle it may be tempting to see \t1arx as a
utilltarian,39 his position (as interpreted by Wood) departs from Mill's in
crucial respects. According to Wood, Marx never claims that there Is a
systematic relationship between the moral and the non.. moral goods. There
is no indication In his writings that Marx adopts the view that the non~moral
goods should be maximized. Nor does he ever argue that individuals have a
right to the non-moral goods, or that justice requires a certain distribution
of these goods. Nor does Marx agree with the utilitarians about morality,
since he regards moral norms as determined by their correspondence to the
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prevailing social form and not by 'Nhat is conducive to the greatest non-
moral good. Although Marx condemns capitalism as a form of servitude,
Wood contends that Marx never argues that this fact alone mandates that
capitalism be overthrown. This will occur only when capitalism no longer
contributes to further productive expansion:
It is not Marx's belief that servitude as such Is an unqualified wrong,
an evil to be abolished at all cost, with an attitude of fiat justita,
pereat mund!. The servitude of capitalism according to Marx, and
even the direct slavery involved in capitalist colonies, have been
necessary conditions for the development of modern productive forces.
To condemn this servitude unqualifiedly would be to condemn all the
productive advances of modern society, which ~arx was not about to
do."40
So Wood maintains that the desire for the non-moral values can become
historically potent only under certain conditions. These conditions cannot
be chosen; they are, as ~arx says, "directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past."41 Wood does not say that \1arx's critique of
capitalism derives from a "principle" based on some non-moral good such as
self-realization which always ought to be realized. Social forms and their
juridical systems and moral norms are succeeded when this is required by
the productive forces.
In summation, Wood has--through the introduction of an hypothesIs
distinguishing moral from non-moral goods--shown that a particular charge
of inconsistency against Marx--that he cannot repudiate morality and at the
same time advocate soclallsm--is not well taken. Marx can reject morality
as functional to the prevailing social order, and still advocate socialism as
"better" than capitalism. Socialism not only furthers productive capacity,
but also provides greater amounts of the non-moral goods which the working
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class desires.
2.3 Criticisms of Wood's view.
i. inadequate account of justice, and moral goods generally.
Wood's central innovation is his use of the distinction between moral
goods or values, and other types of goods, namely, non-moral goods in
explaining Marx's views about morality and justice.42 In this section, I
examine the first part of this distinction: Wood's account of moral goods,
and especially Wood's interpretation of Marx's concept~on of justice.
Wood's argument strongly suggests tt)at there is at most one systern of
justice functional for any particular set of production relations. He writes,
In any given society, the actual account of juridical relations, and
hence of thejuridicaJ norms that regulate them, is determined by the
society's production relations, which in turn corresp~ to the stage of
development of its 'productive powers.,43
The problem here is that not all societIes with an equal level of productive
development have the same juridical systems. There are different juridical
Institutions consistent with the same social form. For example, there are
democra tic cap! taJist societies and non-democra tic ones. These Ja tter
societies -- while still based on cap'tallst accumula tion -- deny wha t are, in
democratic capitalist societIes, moral goods: freedom of speech, freedorn
of association, the right to political representa tion, etc. The fact tha t the
juridical institutions of capitalist societies can diverge suggests that, like
production relations, moral goods do not immedIately follow from a gIven
JeveJ of productive development, or automaticaJly change to accomodate
productive growth.
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Wood characterizes justice in terms ~f its functional role in stabilizing
class divided societies. But, to say that a moral rU.le or institution is
required if a given society's economy is to function is to say something
about the appropriate level of needs and desires at which it functions. But
what level of satisfaction, and what needs and desires is a particular
economy to provide for? As we have seen, different capitalist societies
answer this question in different ways.
Wood might respond that historical materialism cannot explain every
feature of a social system. If we need to cl te other factors co explain why
one or another standard of justice prevails, this only shows that the program
of historical materialism needs to be carried out in conjunction wi th a
detailed analysis of historical facts. But this response is inadequate becuuse
Wood does indeed claim to explain justice functionally. A central feature of
Wood's argument is its denial of any relevance for social choice regarding
the principles of justice. Revolutionaries cannot use justice as a motivatlo.1
because there is a correct and unique set of juridical institutions which are
compatible with a given mode of production. Yet, if. for example, a
socialist mode of production 15 compatible with more than one set of
juridical (and political) institutions ·..perhaps, one set based on state owned
pr0l'erty with no democratic input and another based on democratic
producers' control -- social and political choices migt.t ha~e more of a poInt
than Wood's account allows.
There is a sceond problem with Wood's account of justice and other
moral concepts. It is not clear in Wood's discussion exactly what functions
he thinks justice serves. Primarily, he thinks that justice regulates the
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actions of groups and individuals In a manner which "helps to stabilize a
social system and promote class interests."44 As Raymoru Geuss has
pointed out, however, one must distinguish between the function of
stabilizing a social form and the function of legitimating that forrnz
Any set of beliefs which legitimizes or justifies a social practice will
thereby tend to support it, but the converse is not always the case; a
belief that a given rulIng class is strong and ruthless, so that any
resistance to the dominant ordpr is futile, may wei! be a belief, the
acceptance of wt,lch by large segments of the population will have the
effect of stabilizing the existing relations of dominance, but it is
unlikely that such a belief could be used to justify those relations.45
Wood's analysis applies more appropriately to the stabilizing function of
justice and morality than their legitimating function. Though both functions
may be implicit In Wood's discussion, for his analysis of the legitimating
function to be adequate, he must say more -~ specifically why legitlrnatlon
matters at alJ. Wood j~nores the fact that some social practices require
legitimation for their reproduction, while others do not. This being the
caso, Wood does not discuss the justificat\Jry aspect of moral systems, the
types of reasons dif~erent systerns give f<.Jr differ ent social practices, their
specific manner of forging consent. He naturally fails, therefore, to work
throURh the consequences o. different types of legitimation. A glv~n
m,-,ral1ty may serve a function which benefits the dominant social class and
still serve other interests, including those of subordinate gruups. ~\ moral
system may be shaped by particular interests and stilI serve more general
interests. Different m~ral systems may in varying degrees recognize the
interests of the oppressed classes. These differences 'Nould be relevant -- 1f
the point above about the existence of "functionally equivalent" juridical
.ysteml stand, _. to situations In which choice Is a possibility_
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Wood's functional argument of moral goods, then, falls adequately to
specify the constraints on the forms of justice of particular social forms or
the interests which Justice serves. He thus leaves open the possibility that
forms of justice change in accordance with a process which does not slrnply
"reflect" the level of productive development.
11. inadequate account of why people value the non-moral goods
The account of non-moral ~oods which Wood gives is excessively
empirical. He treats it as an unproblematic fact about people that they
desire certain non-moral goods, a desire explicable with reference to "the
hlst()ricaJ materialist account of theIr situatlon."46 ThIs formulation,
howev~r, is clearly inadequate as an interpretation of Marx's views. In the
first place, Marx (and Wood) believe that In capitalist society individuals
suffer from illusions about the nature of the social world and their interests
within it. These illusions, moreover, are not simply the product of
subjective deficiencies, attributable to a failure of perceptiveness on the
part of social agents. The illusions are widespread because they have a
"reality." For example, In a capitalist society relations between people do
take the form of reJations between things, which 1s how they appear. But
this raises a difficulty since justice does regulate the varying interests of all
social clalses. even if it does so in a manner which clearly privileges the
ruling class. How then do agents recognize the Ideological character of
capitalist justice, as presumably tt,ey must 1f they are to obtain
revolutionary consciousness?
The probJem is more significant for Wood's anaJysis then it might
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appear. I have thus far followed Wood's own account, taking desires and
interests as interchangable. Wood characterizes the non-moral goods as the
goods people actually desire, based on their conception of what 15 good for
them. But his discussion of the non-moral goods tacitly moves from
conceiving of them as desires (what people want) to thinking of them as
interests, (what people think that they should want, given their conception
of their own good).47 Desires are extremely variable, and agents can have
desires of which they are unaware. People can desire what Is harmful for
them, as in the case of alcoholics. It follows that agents mayor may not
have an "interest' in the satisfaction of their desires, as In the case of the
reformed alcoholic who craves a drink.48 To say that an agent has an
interest in doing something is to show that the agent has reason to believe
that a given desire "ought" to be satisfied. Not all desires, clearly, will be
such that their satisfaction could be consJdered of interest to the agents.
Furthermore, agents can be mistaken ahout their interests, as
presumably Wood thinks that they are when they act out of allegiance to
moral principles. What are the real interests of a group of agents and how
do they come to know them? This is an important question, for, as I have
noted, Marx thinks that agents are generally deceived about their interests.
For example, 1n The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx poses a philosophical riddle:
that men make their own history and everywhere they are in chains to the
palt. That is, everywhere human beings have acted for reasons which they
have only partly understood. They have remained misconceived about the
nature of their interests. Yet MQrx insisted that unlike p"evlous
revolutionary classes, the proletariat could disabuse itself of illusion.
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The social revolution of the 19th century cannot draw its poetry from
the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself, before
It has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past,49
Marx thinks that in their struggles workers achieve the self-clarification
necessary to obtain knowledge of their real1nterests. Any reconstruction of
Marx's view of these interests, then, must explain how knowledge of them is
possible. How do agents come to know their real interests'!
There is no mechanism provided for in Wood's account to link the
proletariat's desires to its 'true' interests. Why should workers' desires for
higher wages, for example, lead them to see the need to overthrow
capitalism as a system? Wood's failure to provide a mechanism here may
reflect the fact that he equivocates as to whether these interests have
causal importance. On the one hand, the form of the socialist society which
realizes the non-moral goods is "dictated" by the development of the
productive forces.
On the other hand, Wood says that the non-nloral values are a lever
for proletar ian action:
to create a 'proletarian morality' or 'proletarian conception of
justice'•••would strike Marx as a short-sighted and self-defeating
course for the movement to adopt. It is safer to rely simply on the
genuine (non-moral) reasons people have for wanting an obsolete and
inhuman social form to be overthrown and replaced by a higher form
of soclety.'O
Given that different social relations and juridical institutions are compatible
with the same level of productive development, the non-moral goods people
want might explain why one set of relations rather than another obtains.
But even if Wood wants to deny that the workers' desire for the non-moral
goods constrains the institutional form of socialism, he must provide some
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further explanation of their status. How can workers' desires for the non-
moral goods escape the ideological ch3racter of their other desires and
interests?
Wood writes that the content of the non-moral goods is "not
determined by their correspondence to social relations." But this does not
tell us of what their content actually consists. In particular, what makes
the non-moral values legitimate, not themselves a product of false
consciousness? Furthermore, how do these values point us beyond
capitalism? In answering these questions, Wood's simple observation that
they are what workers desire is of no help, since there is the problem of
false consciousness. A full acount of the role of the non-moral values in
Marx's thought must provide some reasons for why they are true, as well as
clarify whether or not they have any causal role in social change.
IiI. Inade uate account of the relation between the non-moral oods and
soc alism.
Finally, Wood's examination of the non-moral goods falls to apprehend
the intrinsic value which Marx, in all of his writings, assigns to them. We
have seen that, for Wood, the fact that workers value these goods can be
explained in terms of their situation; e.g., because they are deprived of
security and self-development, they come to value these particular goods
deeply. Wood never indicates that these goods are valued for their own
sake. Wood's socialist man might find a social structure which expanded
everyone's freedom desirable, perhaps because this feature promotes
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stability, by ending class or group conflicts. He might value the freedom of
other people as instrumental to the realization of his other ends, whatever
those ends might be. It is not even inconceivable that collective freedom
would be generally valued by human beings. fiowever, it would not be,
according to Wood, valued as an end in itself.
Here, Wood departs substantially from Marx's treatment of these
goods as intrinsically valuable. The establishment of these values, the free
expression of human capacities, and the subjugation of production to the
conscious regulation of the social agents, marks the beginning of truly
human history.'1 For Marx, communIsm, is the realization of the potentials
given to human beings as part of their nature, which are restricted by
previous social forms:
Communism is the posItive abolition of private property, of human
self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of hUrTlan nature
through and for man. It Is therefore the return of man to himself as a
social, i.e., really human being, a complete and conscious return which
assimilates all the wealth of previous development.'2
In Capital villI, Marx provides us with a list of the values which socialism
realizes. The passage reads in full:
The realm of freedom actually only begins when labor which is
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in
the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material
production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his
wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he
must do so In all social formations a.nd under all possible modes of
production. With his development this realm of physical necessity
expands as a result of his wants, but, at the same time, the forces of
production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedonl In this
field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers,
rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, by bringing it
under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the
blind forces of Naturel and achieving this with the least expenditure of
energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their
human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity.
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Beyond it begins that development of human energy which Is an end in
itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth
only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the
working-day is its basic prerequisite. 53
Communism emancipates human beings from the narrowness imposed on
them by the circumstances of alienated labor; it attenuates the division of
labor and ends man's loss of control over his own social relations. Self-
realizatlon.54 through creative work and collectively exercised freedom are
the essence of Mar..<'s view of communism. To rrlake the value of these
goods co.1tingent on the desires of specific groups in specific circumstances
is to deny their central place in Marx's project. Socialism, as Wood notes,
means more to \1arx then the abolition of competition and want through the
removal of the capitalist barriers to productive rationality. It rneans, above
all, the abolition of man's dependence on social conditions of life which
escape his control. The importance of the non-mural values for soclal1srn is
not captured by Wood's description of them as things people want because
they happen to satisfy their "conception of what is good for them."
The centrality of these values 1s the reason why socialism cannot
result from any process which functionally adjusts production relations to
changing productive forces. It requires the conscious struggle of the
proletariat to gaIn the knowledge necessary to take control over their social
relations. The achievement of self-realization and freedom, while
materially conditioned, are not materially determined.
There is another reason why Wood's view of the non-mora! goods tends
to undermine the status which Marx gives to them. Wood denies not only
the universality and neutrality of moral goods, but also that of the non--
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moral goods. The desire for tht non-moral goods which motivates the
proletariat bear no necessary relation to the interests of other classes.
Wood writes,
As Marx depicts it, the proletarian movement furthers the interests of
other classes (such as the peasantry or the petty bourgeoisie) only to
the extent that they are temporarily coincident with•••the interests of
the proletariat. 55
According to Wood, Marx holds that actions are historically effective only
insofar as they involve the pursuit of class interests. The proletarian
movement gives primacy to the interests of the proletarian class, and if it
happens to furthe; the interests of other class~s this 1s only because their
interests are "coincident" with its own. Of course, Wood acknowledges that
the proletariat consists of the "vast majority," so that the promotion of its
interests furthers almost everyone's. But this should not lead us to think,
Wood warns, that ~Qrx has any "impartial concern with the good of
humanity as such."~6 In a class society a universal interest must be an
illusion.
Wood's argument seems to rest on the following inference: since the
agency of socialist revolution is particular (e.g., the working class), the airn
must also be particular. What are we to make of Wood's claim? Is it an
adequate interpretation of Marx?
There Is no question that 1n the class struggle under capitalism Marx
unequivocally took sides wi th the proletariat. Furthermore, he quite openly
discounted many of the interests of the opposing classes. The capitalists'
interest 1n exploitation, for example, provides them with no legitimate
argument against soclallsm. Nor does Marx expect many capitalIsts
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(although individuals may raise themselves up above their class positions5?)
to recognize that socialism represents their real interests. Marx locates
the point from which capitalism can be overturned in a particular social
agency, the industrial working class. This is the truth In Wood's view.
But Wood overlooks the fact that, in Marx's formulations about
revolutIon, the relationship bet\veen agency and aim is disjunctive. Marx
maintains that revolutions always carry the banner of universal interest, not
class interest, and this universalism is not simply ideological mystification.
Social transformations only occur when the ascending class really represents
a universal interest aRainst the old society. In The German Ideology Marx
writes,
For each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling
before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its airn, to
represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of
society, that is, expressed In ideal form: it has to give its ideas the
form of universality and represent them as the only rational
universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the
very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as
the representative of the whole society•••It can do this because, to
start with, its interest really is more connected with the common
interest of all other non-ruling classes•••Every new class, therefore,
achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class
ruling previously.58
Now Wood might grant that Marx thinks that each succeeding class
represents itself as a unlversal1r'\terest. He would nevertheless argue that
this does not mean that Marx thinks that these classes £.!!811Y bear unt/ersal
interests. Marx might still believe that there are in fact no universal
interests, only class interests. So he might still agree with Wood that
universal interests, at least In class divided societies, are "illusory.,,'9
Leaving aside for now the nature of revolutionary movements before
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the proletarian movement,60 ~arx is quite explicit that a successful
workers' revolution realizes an aim which is in the interests of all: the
abolition of class society.
The emancipation of the oppressed class necessarily involves the
creation of a new society•••Does this mean that after the fall of the
old society there will be a new class domination, expressing itself in a
new political power? No. The conditions for the emancipation of the
working class is the aboli tion of all classes.61
The abolition of classes and the freedom from exploitation, are central to
the ~arxist project. Capitalism is a pre-condition for socialism, not merely
because it develops the forces of production, but because it creates a class
whose specific interests are also interests of all human beings. It is only
because Marx sees in the proletariat the lever for the emancipation of
humanity, that he gives it historical significance. This is especially true in
the sense that his initial ascription of this role to the proletariat is not
based on an empirical analysis of its role in capitalist society, but on a
philosophical hypothesis. The proletariat are a class with "radical chains":
A class In civil society which •••has a universal character because its
sufferings are universal, and which does not claim a ~artlcular redress
because the wrong which Is done it is not a particular wrong, but
wrons in general••• which is, in short, a total los~ of humanity, and
which can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity.62
Perhaps Wood wants to argue that Marx was wrong or that these views stem
from a younger Marx, still under the influence of moral ideology. But while
Marx's later writings focus on the historical emergence 01 the proletariat,
his argument about their universalist character remains. In the Communist
Manifesto, Marx writes, "The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present
society, cannot raIse itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of
official society being sprung in the alr.,,63
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Despite his claims, in fact, it is difficult to see how Wood's own
argument can avoid dependence on a universal interest, namely, the interest
in material progress. Wood, in fact, writes that, "Marx •••believes the
development and exercise of productive powers is man's most basic
aspiration because it shows itself in history to be such."64 As with Cohen,
Wood's "teleological" interpretation requires an extra-social factor
controlling socia! change. Without such a factor it is not clear why some
classes, whose particular interests are opposed to material progress, will not
succeed in blocking it. Cohen attempts to answer this objection by
appealing to human rationality and the historical situation of scarcity which
he believes generate an interest in material progress capable of overcorning
social obstacles. As we have seen in the last chapter, this atternpt has its
failings. Cohen had difficulty accounting for the specific outcomes of
revolutions, the privileged position Marx gives classes in historical change)
and the role of critical consciousness in the transition to socialism. Upon
examination, it is evident that Wood's theory like Cohen's requires a
foundation In some universal interest, aJthough he seems to deny this. At
the very least, his argument must rely on slmiliar assurnptions to Cohen's
about human rationality. Moreover, his distinction between moral and non-
moral values, if properly elaborated might generate an interest in addition
to the Interest In materia! progress eLaborated by Cohen, while at the same
tlrne avoiding the problems that Cohen'~ view cannot surmount.
2.4 Conclusion.
Wood's poInt of depa,"ture is a paradoxa M,arx condemns morall ty, and
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the moral point of view, while simul taneously advoca ting socialism as
"better" than cap! talism. Wood's hypothesis -- that Marx condemns
capitalism on non-moral grounds attempts to resolve thIs paradox. The key
Is to see the desires people have for the non-moral goods as the irnpetus for
their revolutionary action. Moral goods, by contrast, exist only in order to
fulfill a function for transient class-divided societies. Wood's
accomplishment lies in his applying to Marx the distinction between two
types of goods (or values) and then showing that one type of good, non-moral
good, wIll be realized by socialism.
Wood's incorpora tion of this distinction builds on Cohen's account,
because it explicitly examines the motivations which historical materialisrn
ascribes to the proletariat, and because it deepens our understanding of
what socialism is by connecting it with certain goods, especially freedom
and self ...realization.
However, drawing the distinction between moral and non-moral goods
is only the skeleton of a theory; the salIent remaining questIon is how these
different goods are characterized. I have argued tha t nei ther Wood's
discussion of moral goods nor his discussion of non-moral goods is
particularly compelling as an interpretatIon of Marx. There are three rnajor
problems. The first problem concerns the functional argument for justice,
which could not explain why one standard of justice rather than another
prevaiJed. WhiJe Wood might not see this as an important problem (since
historical materialIsm cannot explain everything), it is central to the aspect
of historicaJ materialism which I am examining in this thesis: the changes
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displayed in successive social forms. Most commenta turs, inclurjjng those
sympathetic to Marx, ignore this aspect of his theory of history. In their
view, historical materialism is solely explained in terms of the growth of
technical knowledge, the knowledge which subordinates nature to human
productive capacities. But, the growth of productive capa\~ity is not the
only process of concern to Marx; and, in terms of the transition to socialism,
Marx delineates another process to which he gives at least equal weight:
the consciousness of the working class of the need to re-establish control
over its own creations, its knowlec1~e of its real interests. Of course, it i:i
very difficult to explain clearly what this process involves. But once we are
struck by its centrality we cannot, 1 think, accept as complete any
reconstruction of Marx which fails to account for 1t.
This brings us to the second rna jar problem with Wood's reconstruction.
The theory of "ideology" poses d major issue for Marxist scholarship. Marx
must demonstrate that his own standpoint is not also a product of
ideological distortion. In his exposition, Wood attacks moral goods (values)
as false, a powerful assertion. Yet the force of this claim derives from its
implicit contrast with values which are "lot false, which are true. Wood,
however, provides no account of the sense In which the non-moral goods are
not false. Given that human beings desire a wide range of goods, what
distinguishes these goods from other desired goods? How do these goods
connect with interests? Wood does not say very much which bears on an
answer to these questions.
Third and flnaliy, I have argued that Wood's discussion of the non-
moral goods falls to grant them the intrinsic importance which Marx gives
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to them in hi~ writings. While Wood does not explicitly reject this
importance he denies it by implication, when he assumes that the foundation
-~ why workers value these goods lies in the fact that they happen to suit
their conceptions of what is good for them. There is no reason to believe
that their conceptions will stay the same across major changes in
circumstances. If so, then the non-moral values cannot be primary in the
way that socialism requires.
Wood's pos1tion is useful not only because of the fact that it
incorporates a distinction between moral and non-moral goods but also
because its failings indicate some questions which any reconstruction of
Marx must answer: How are we to understand the values which socialism
realizes? Why are these values different than "ideological" moral values?
How do social agents, suffering from illusion and delusIon, come to know
that the~ values are in their interests? Do these values play any role in the
outcomes of revolutionary transformations? That is, do they constrain the
social forms which are the result of major change? Are they historically
specific or are they interests which human beings have as part of their
nature? Finally, 1f these goods are in the universal interest of all, why Is it
that Marx thinks that the agents capable of realizing them constitute a
particular class? This thesis sets itself the task of clarifying and
"reconstructing" Marx's answers to these questions, in a manner which
remains faithful to the critical intent of his theory.
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Chapter Three: Labor and the Process of Historical Development:
The German Ideolo,n and the Grundrisse
3.1 Introduction.
In this chapter I explore Marx's two major discussions of historical
development, one given 1n The German Ideology and the second 1n the
Grundrlsse. I want to shaw that these discussions are importantly different.
In particular, I will argue that they present two distinct views of the
historical process and of the endpoint of that process, cornmunlsm.
In The German Ideology, Marx depicts hlsto.-lcal development in terms
of the growth of human productive power. He presents the form of social
relations as determined by the level of development of the forces of
production. In the Grundrisse, by contrast, Marx does not focus on the
growth of productive power. Instead, he correlates forms of social
organization with the development of distinct capacities w' '·:h allow human
beings to achieve not simply control over nature, but also social freedom.
Through history, accordin~ to the Grundrisse, human beings gain more
consciousness of the requirements for their freedom, they learn about the
constraints posed by specific forms of social organlzatlo;\, Th:s
consciousness leads them to act to abolish these constraintsl
The (worker'.) recognition of the products as its own, and the
Judgement that its separation from the conditions of Its realization 1s
improper _. forcibly imposed -- Is an enormous advance In awareneS!i,
It.elf the product of the mode of production relting on capital, and as
much the knell to itl doom ai, with the slave's awareness that he
cannot be ~operty of another, with his consciousness of himself as
• perlon, t e ex stence orilavery becomes a merely artificial,
vesetative existence, and cealel to be able to prevail as the basIs of
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production.!
This passage focuses on the importance of the ~rowing awareness of the
social conditions which limit human freedom. The achievement of this
awareness by social actors IS said to be the "knell" to the demise of a
particular form of social domination.
Not only do the two works differ in terms of their respective
discussions of the process of historical development, but they also offer
diverse conceptions of the endpoint of that development. The Ger.!!!!!1
Ideology describes communlsrn as a society which completely overturns past
social conditlons:2 whereas all previous societies are organized around a
divis.lon of labor, communist society abolishes the division of labor. The
Grundrisse presents an alternative conception in which the distinguishing
feature of communism 1s not the abolition of the division of labor, but the
fact that communism allows for collective control over social institutions,
central of which are the institutions of production.
I will argue that the Grundrlsse presents a more plausible conception
of communism and a more ac'pguate conception of its relationship to the
process of historical development. The argument In The Gerlnan Ideology
falls to explain why a particular set of social relations results from
historical transformations, as opposed to some other set equally optimal for
productive development. History might ~"ncelvably lead to a forrn of social
organization which Is a "functional equivalent" of communism with respect
to its effect on productive growth. There 1s no reason, then, to see
historical development as leadlr.g to communism. That is, there 1s no
relation between the frettdom which even according to The German Ideology
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communism is supposed to realize, and the process leading up to it. There is
no intrinsic relationship betweean the capacIty of human beings to Inl:rease
the productive forces and their capacity to achieve ~ocial freedom. In
contrast, the Grundrisse explicitly calls attt-ntion to the development of
human awareness of the conditions for social freedom. Human beings act on
this awareness to expand this freedom. Thus, communlsrn, as the complete
realization of social freedom, is intrinsically related to the historical
process of increasing human awareness of its conditions.
A problem remains, however, with the discussion of historical
development in the Grundrisse. Marx does not specify the means by which
human beings achieve their growing awareness of the constraints on their
freedom. His discussion suggests that this growing consciousness is a direct
result of changes in the condition of labor, of the ~rowing elnancl~atlon of
labor from its dependence on "preconditions." The phrases "preconditions of
labor" and "presuPPo5ition~of labor" appear frequently in the pages of the
Grundrlsse. Marx includes among the preconditions of labor both natural
and social factorsl scarcity and specl.t.lc relations of ~oclety. As
productivity expands, human beings become le';s dependent on these
preconditions In the reproduction of society. As labor's capacities develop,
human beings are able to control more of theIr circumstances.
Yet Marx never explains why the ability to master nature should also
2! the ability to consciously exercise control over social relations; why the
knowledge used In production should allo !!! the knowledge which allows
h~.man beings to regulate the1r social life under conditions which expand
their collective freedom. The Grundrlsse never provides an explanation for
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the process it depicts. I will argue in this thesis that the growing awareness
of the social constraints on human freedom is achieved not through labor,
but through the interaction and contestation of social classes over the
distribution of obligations and rewards in society. Nevertheless, while
Marx's discussion of historical development in the Grundrlsse is incomplete,
it provides evidence that another dev'" Jpment, besides the increase of
productive power, is important for the argument of historical materiaJisrn:
the growth of human knowledge about the conditions for soci,,1 freedom.
3.2 :he German Ideology,
i. The premises of history.
The German Ideology is one of the few places where \t1arx explicitly
directs his attention to the materialist conception of history.3 The project
of The German Ideology is to turn to history in order to defeat the
philosophical views of the Young Hegelians, as well as Feuerbach and
Stlrner.4 Marx attacks the Young Hegelians as idealists who believe tha t
social misery is caused by false consciousness, that is, by the errors or
illusions that people have about themselves, their relation to the world, and
other human beings. For the Young Hegelian.), the paradigm of false
consciousness Is religion. Religion 1s the "self-alienation of man, the
division of man from himself.'" The criticism of religion will thus free
people of the misery which accompanies their religious illusions. The
mistake ot these "ideologists" 6 according to Marx, Is that they mistake
"conceptions, thoughts, ideas" as "the real chains of men."7
Marx rejects the view that social misery 1s caused by false
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consciousness. He views false consciousness as the "phenomenon," but not
the basis of social misery. In order to understand social misery -- in fact, to
understand why there are illusions -- we have to look to the material
circumstances in whIch individuals actually live. Marx begins The German
Ideology with "premises" which, he claims, can be "empirically verified."g
To establish their validity all that is required is to look to experience. All
the "proof" they require is furnished by the individual "as he comes and goes,
eats, drinks and clothes himself ."9 ~arx wants to use these f'remlses in an
argument which will undercut the views of the Young Hegelians. Marx
intends to show that the social misery pecple suffer has been historically
(and not ideologically) produced.
The argument of The German Ideology reJies on three premises:
1. Human beings have "natural" needs directed to individual
preservation, As Marx argues, "men must be 1n a position to live In order to
'make history'."IO To understand the composition of these natural needs we
need to know certain facts: the relationship between individuals and nature,
what the physical or~anlzation of these individuals Is and what they need to
survive. These needs are defined I elatlve to the functioning of an
orgenism,ll As organisms, the basic needs of individuals are physIcal needs.
Marx writes, "LIfe involves before all else eating and drinking, a
habituation, clothlng and many other things." 12 "Natural needs" are thus
biological In origin and directed initially to the maintenance of the original
conditions of 11fe, to self-preservation. Such needs are shared between
hurnan belngs and animals, they themselves do not yield history.
2. In order to satisfy their natural needs (premise 1), individuals must
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produce and this production produces new needs. These needs are different
than those which are directed t\l physical survival. These new needs depend
on the exercise of developed capacities. Thus, while "hunger is hunger," as
Marx writes in the Grundris~e, the hunger "gratified by cooked meat eaten
with a knife and fork Is a different hunger than that which bolts down raw
meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth.' 13 The "need" for cooked meat,
then, is no longer a nt!ed understood relative to the survival of human
beings. Rather these needs are mediated by "consciousness instead of
instinct."14 What constitutes a "leed will vary from one society to another,
as the case of hunger illustrated above. The new needs contain a
"historical" element: as a society's productive powers expand, so does its
conception of "need." While Marx intends these new needs to be something
other than mere desires, they are clearly different than the "natural needs"
of the first premise.l'
3. FInally, there are "social relationships." 16 History depends on a
continuity in human existence; there must be propa'1atlon. This requires a
social relationship: the family. At first, this is the only social relationship.
La\e~, under the pressure of new needs (brought on in part by "rising
populatlonn)17 new social relationships arise.
While 'V1arx refers to these as "premises," it should be clear that they
are not simple assumptions. There is a lot built Into these premises, much
of which requires justification on its own. In particular, the second premise,
the creation of new needs 1n production 1s not at all simple or obvious. Marx
does not elaborate on precisely~ the new needs are 8"nerated through
production, He simply presents this as a "premise" about history in his
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argument against the Young tiegelians. But built into this premise is a view
about human labor in general and not simply as it is manifested in a
particular society. \t1arx is arguing that, in all societies, production leads to
new needs.
The premises of history are the preconditions for history's existence.
Yet, while as such they state the conditions without which there 15 no
history, they do not tell us much about what the movement of history will
look like. What form will the contlnous generation of needs take?
Furthermore, how does Marx derive from the premises of history hls
ul~d'!rstanding of the character of historical change: why ,nust the social
forms in which needs are satisfied (premise 3) undergo "periodica'ly
recurring r~volutionaryconvulsions?" 18 How is the expansion of new needs
linked to the process of historical development?
These are questions which The German Ideology must answer if it is to
accomplish its self-proclaimed task of debunking the views of the Young
He~ellans. Thus far, Marx has only given the premises of his argument
about historical development, I.e., that human beings must satisfy their
needs in a social framework, and that 1n satisfyin~ these needs through
production they create new needs (of a dlff~renc kind), Marx now must show
that through this activity of pr\lduction which even the Young Hegelians will
acknowledge, social relations change. Marx must demonstrate that this
production of new needs and not "criticism is the driving force of history." 19
That 15, Marx must show that the premises of history yield an ar~ument
which 1s not compatible with the contention of the Young Hegel1ans that the
criticism of "conceptions, thou'Ihts, ideas, the products of consciousness"20
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are the source of social misery. \Aarx must use the premises of history in an
argument about historical development.
ii. historical development.
The German Ideology is a frustrating work to read. In Part One of this
work, Marx makes no less than three atternpts to move from the premises of
history to his actual conception of hlstory.21 All three attempts break off
before an explicit link is rnade.. Nowhere is there a clear elaboration of the
precise nature of their relationship. In 'the first two attempts, Marx focuses
on the division of labor; in the third, on the development of the forces of
production.
~arx's effort to develop the consequences of the premises of history
is, at first, constructed entirely in terms of the category of the "division of
labor." He give'i no consist~nt meaning, however, to this terrn .. At times, he
uses it to refer to the fact that In order to meet their needs individuaJs
cooperate i'''~ each performing a separate productive task, e.g .. , bricklaying,
cooking, hunting. (In Capital, Marx refers to this as the "social division of
labor.") At other times, it signifies the division of certain specific tasks
among different Indiv'duals, as in a modern assembly Ilne).22 (Marx refers
to this in Capital as the "technical dl vision of labor.") At other times, Marx
identifies the divisIon of labor with ownershIp relations:
The various stages of development are just so many different forms of
ownership; i.e., the existing stage in the division of labor determines
also the relation of individuals to one another with reference to the
material, instrument and product of labor. 23
'rhe entire discussion of what comprises the division of labor 1s confused.
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This makes the task of elucidating its link with the premises of history an
arduous one. In what follows. , \J1ill use the term "division of labor" as
refering to both the social division of labor and the technical division of
labor, unless otherwise noted. I will not identify it with ownership
relations. 24
Marx uses the division of labor as the category according to which
social forms are both individuated and l"anked in a sequential ordering. He
distinguishes five forms of social ownership: tribal, communal or state,
feudal, cap~talist and communist, each of which is identified as a "stage of
development in the division of labor."25
The division of labor plays an important role in Marx's argument
against the Young Hegelians. To refute the Young Hegelians, Marx needs to
show (1) how the division of labor relates to the premises of history, (2) why
it tends to grow and, (3) how -- as a consequence of its "natural" course of
development, it produces social misery and conflict.
Marx locates the earliest stages of the division of labor in the
"naturei," physical inequality of men and women. This naturalinequallty,
however, is not very significant. Few tasks are divided. However, the
division of labor receives an important impetus from the forces of
production. Marx argues that changes in the division of labor are the
immediate consequence of changes in the productive forces:
Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative
extension of productlve forces already known, causes a further
development of the division of labor.26
One crucial fact to be explained, therefore, is why the productlve forces
grow. Marx needs to provide an ar gument for why there Is productive
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growth, to specify the relationship of that Rrowth to the division of labor
and social forms, and to address the role of classes in social change.
Earlier we saw that Marx holds that new needs are always created in
production. If the satisfaction of new needs could he linked directly to
exp~'nding productive power, then the production of new needs itself would
cause productive growth. One manner of for~lng this link is through Cohen's
device which was discussed in Chapter 1, indi~idlJcll rationality. The fact
that people are rational and that they desire to avoid work experl~nced as
burdensome will lead them to satisfy their increasing wants through
increasi",~ their powers. Alternatively, it could be ar~ued:
1. In producing to satisfy their needs, human beings develop their
capacities, including their cognitive capacities.
,. Production leads to new needs whose satisfaction requires an even
further development of capacities.
3. Other things being equal, human beings prefer to exercise their
developed capacities, and this preference increases the more that the
capacities are realized.40
4. The exercise of their d"veloped capacities requires (a) less tlrne
spent 1n mundane labor for the satisfaction of their natural needs and
(b) innovations 1n the I'bor process which make labor an arena of
exercised capacities.
NeIther argument 1s made explicitly in The German Ideology and the
move to an .historical factor, such .s individual rationality, to provide the
motor for productive srcwth 1s only lrr.pl1clt in Marx's text. Yet, given the
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way in which \t\arx sets up the relationship between the division of labor, the
productive forces, and the prernises of history, this way of closing the gaps
i~ a plausible ~olutlon. It allows ~arx to argue from the fact that human
beings produce new needs In a social context to the growth of the productive
forces and the division of labor, and to the alteration of the social context
itself.
Of course, Marx does not always argue In a manner which is consistent
with this conclusion. There are indications that Marx recognized that
historical development is not always linear and that social forms can diverge
from the lo~ic of development implied by the expansion of the productive
forces. Marx thinks, for example, that feudalism was founc1ed on a
destruction of productive forces of its historical predecessor, the slave
mode of production. The conquest of the declining Roman empire by
barbarian tribes, destroyed a number of productive forces and decreased
trade and industry.28 At times, Marx explicitly denies that any premises
about human nature playa role In his argument about historical
development. That development Is
nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which
exploits the materials, the capital funds and thus••• continues the
traditional activity In completely changed cirCUfnstances, and on the
other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed
activity. This can be speculatlve~ distorted so that later history is
made the goal of earlier hlstory.29
There are however significant problems with Marx's attempt to explain
productive growth in terms of the inherltence of the productive forces. In
the palsage just cited, for example, it 1s not clear what the relationship is
between the inheritance of productive forces and their "modification," l.e.,
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the expansion of the productive forces. The simple fact that a society
inherits a set of productive forces does not implv that these forces will be
expanded. In order to sustain that inference, a mechanism of growth must
be specified. This makes it more likely that ~arx does in fact rely on an
argument SirTlillar to Cohen's for 11nkln~ the premises of history to the
tendency for the productive forces to grow. As needs increase, productivity
must also increase or men would have to engagt! in doing what they would
rather not so: perform burdensome labor.
Once the division of labor is established, the commul\lty of interests
which chara:terized primitive societies shatters, and human beings lose
control of the conditions of their social cooperation. The division of labor
constitutes, in Marx's view, the primary source of conflict, leading to
private property,30 the opposition between individual and genera!
interests,31 and inequallty.32 The division of labor becomes an independent
power dominating individuals.
Marx's view of social change follows from his view of this process of
growing productive power. The level of productive development determines
the social form in which the individuals live. Every level of productive
development correlates with a specific social form. Each social form 1s,
moreover, compatible with only a fixed amount of productive growth. As
the forces of production grow, they reach a point at which they are no
longer compatible with the existing social form. 33 This Is the conjuncture of
revoJutjonary transformation. Contrary to the Young Hegelians, change 1s
onJy posslble to the extent that it 1s permitted by the level of development
of the productive forcesl "slavery cannot be abolished without the stearn
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engine and the mule and the spinning jenny.....34
Classes playa subordinate role in The German Ideology's explanation
for historical chan~e. The success or failure of class struggle in producing
social transformation is dependent on the requisit~s of productive
development which
decide also whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary
convulsions will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire
existing system.3 5
There is no indication in The German Ideology as to how classes and
their characteristic interests relate to the growth of the forces of
production and there is no independent treatment of class struggles as such.
Instead, the logic of class ac.tion is simply secured to that of productive
development and Marx proclaims that: ''''all collisions 1n history have their
origin•••!n the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of
intercourse."36
To summarize, 1n his polemic a~ainst the Young Hegelians, Marx has
contended that not ideas but material conditions are the source of hurnan
misery. Changing material conditions are associated with a ~r~wlng division
of labor which shatters the social community into separate interests. These
changes are a "natural" outgrowth, they do not result from the intentional
actions of individuals. However, while this "natural" process of the growing
division of labor creates social misery, it 1s also necessary if human beings
are to achieve social freedom.
Marx refers to the development of the forces of production as the
process through which man transcends his "embeddedness 1n nature"
(Naturwuchslskelt, formed from the words Natur, nature, and wachsen, to
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grow, meaning literally that ~rowing out of nature).37 Hurnan beings are
"embedded in nature" insofar as they are subordinated to circumstances
which they cannot control. By increasing their powers of production,
individuals create the material foundation on which to reappropriate control
over their social life. Without this foundation it would not be possible, \t1arx
believes, for society to function and reproduce itself under conditions of
collective freedom. Furthermore, without this foundation, communism
would be no more than another utopian fantasy, a social ideal which might
not even be possible. ~arx wants to show that communism is the result of a
"real histor ical movement."
However, in depicting the process of man's emergence frorn
embeddedness solely in terms of the mastery of nature through an incredsing
division of labor, ~arx can not successfully completed this self-appointed
task. The scheme of The German Ideology, while partially adequate, cannot
account for the transition to communism precisely because communisfn
requires a break with the entire process of historical development. IA.S we
shall see below, communlsrn requires that people master not only nature but
their own social relations.
iiI. Communism. the endpoint of history.
Marx conceives of communism as the endpoint of the historical
process. It marks the culmination of man's battle to master nature and an
end to class divisions In society. Communism Is a society In which the
conditions of production are subjected to "the power of the un! t.ed
individuals"38 (i.e., In which the producers democratically administer all
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social institutions in accordance with their needs). Individuals exercise
collective control over their cooperative activities:
a mass of instruments of production rnust be made subject to each
individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse can be
controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by al1. 39
The control and mastery of their activities requires that the conditions
which caused those activities to govern individuals are abolished, i.e., that
private ownership of the means of production be ended. The systern of
private ownership subjects the interests of one class of persons to those of
another. Whereas all previous social transformations were "restrlcted"40
insofar as particular social classes appropriated their gains, cornmunisrn
ends the private appropriation of productive power.
\1arx thus sees the goal of communism as th~ abolition "f private
property. And, as I n"ted earlier, Marx identifies the division of labor with
the existence of private property. He writes,
Division of labor and private property are, moreover, Identical
expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to
activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of
the actlvity.41
It follows from Marx's equation of the division of labor with private property
that, 1n order to abolIsh the latter, communism must also abolish the
former. Indeed, Marx appears to conceive of communisrn as a society
without a division of labor. He writes,
As soon a~ the dl~trlbutlon of labor comes into being, each man has a
particular, exclusive sphere of activity which 1s forced lJpOn him and
from which he cannot escape, •••while In communist so'_iety, where
nobody has one exclusive branch of activity but each can become
accomplished 1n any branch he wishes, society regulates the general
production and thus makes it possable for me to do one thing today and
another tomorrow•••42
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Cohen draws on the above passage as evidence that under comrnunisln the
social structure would subside: "The liberated association of individuals is
less a new social structure than freedom from social structure."43 fie based
this conclusion on his reading that Marx identified the abolition of the
division of labor with the superces',jion of social structure.
The passage Is certainly one of Marx's most utopian characterizations
of com munist society. There 1s no reason, however, to share Cohen' 5
extreme interpretation of communism as a society lacking all social forln.
Earlier in the above passage, \1arx draws a more subtle distinction between
a "voluntary" and a "natural"44 division of labor, implying that the latter,
but not the former, is to be abolished.
Yet even if Marx does not believe that all social structure ends wittl
communism, he does not explicitly identify freedom with the achlevefTlent
of control over social structure. Rather, ~"dividuals are free insofar as they
are able to develop their distinctive human capacities unconstrained by the
division of labor. Louis Dumont, for example, argues that Marx Is
"essentially individualist."4'
It is hard to give an answe.r to this charge solely on the basis of The
German Ideology, It 1s true that ~arx here portrays communism ns a
society 1n which each individual can fully realize his own powers. In
contrast to the earlier 1844 Manuscripts 1n which lv1arx spoke of Indlvldu~ls
as "specles belngs,"46 The German Ideology does not make mention of a
natural desire for social association. On the other hand, Marx does argue
that In communism "there 1s a necessary solidarity of the free developrnent
for &11."47 The value of community is probably much stronger for Marx than
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his explicit comments would indicate. What is important to note, however,
is that nowhere in The German Ideology does Marx rnake explicit the social
nature of mankind or the institutions which would express this nature. It is
elsewhere, particularly to the Grundrisse that we must turn to see Marx's
vision of communism elaborated.
I now move from consir 1ratlon of the goal, communlsfn, to Marx's
account of the process which brings it about. \t1arx's approach to the
establishment of communisrn is self-consciously novel. For Marx, unlike the
utopians whose morals and politics he rejects, communism emerges on the
basis of a "real movement" and nut an ideal:
Communism is not for us a state of affairs which Is to be established,
an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call comrnunisfn
the real movernent which abolishes the present state of things.48
What precipitates the destruction of capitalism and the emergence of
cOlnmunlsm? The problem for the conception of historical development on
which \1arx relies is to provide an a~cou"t for the possibility In history of a
process which overturns the domination of human beings by the division of
labor.
We have seen that the motor of historical develop,nent is the
productive forces. Social forms change In order to facilitate the growth of
these forces. Communism presupposes a massive growth of productive
power "without which want 1s merely made general, and with destitution
the•••old fiJthy business would be reproduced."49 In The German Ideology
'vtarx does not tell us exactly how the productive forces come into conflict
with the capitalist organization of production. There 1s no theory of
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capitalist crises of overproduction which cause une,nployment, war and
devastation similiar to that which Marx provides in The Communis!
,"anifesto•.50
Instead, Marx focuses on a particular creation of the capItalist division
of Jabor: a mass of propertyless "world-individuals." 51 These "world-
individuals" are created by: (1) the rise of a global rnarket which dlssc Ives
all their local ties and circumstances and (2) the dominance of machine
production which levels the skill and wage differentials between workers,
robbing them of their particular characteristics. 'v1arx refers to the workers
created by modern industry as "abstract" individuals. 52 Thus, Marx derives
the existence of the "agents" of revolution -- the proletariat -- troln d
materialist argument. It is the existence of these individuals with no
particular interests to advance, i.e., no prope~ty, which makes comrnunisln a
posslbiJi ty.
Marx, however, conceives of communisrTI not merely as a possibility,
but as the product of a "real movement." He must therefore give some
account of how and why the proletariat carries out a revolution and why
such a revolution will have as its result the establishment of communisrn. In
The German Ideology, Marx's attempt to provide such an account is, at best,
partial.
Marx links the fate of human liberation to the fate of the division of
labor. Yet, to the extent that the proletariat Is simply propelled forward by
the growth of the productive forces and the division of labor, Marx cannot
deduce communIsm as the outcome of this process. Communism, it wilJ be
recalled, requires a severe attenuation of, if not an end to, the division of
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labor. H"w can the division of labor produce a movement which overturnt:
the division of labor? Here, Marx's view runs into the difficulties we saw
earlier in our treatment of Cohen's version of historical materialisrn: it is
not clear why the division of labor should lead to communism as opposed to
some other social form functionally equivalent for productive development.
In fact, much of Marx's discussion in The German Ideology emphasizes
the importance of changes In proletarian consciousness. Workers rnust
reappropriate their self-activity, labor, which under capitalisrn "only
sustains their life by stunting It."53 Thus, Marx writes of the proletariat
that: "In order to assert themselves as individuals they must overthrow the
state.".54 Yet ~arx nowhere discusses how workers gain an awareness of the
relationship between communism and their self-activity. The explicit rneans
by which this awareness is achieved in The Communist ~anifesto -- class
struggle and political action -- are not discussed.
Marx constantly emphasizes the fact that through most of history
human beings are deluded about the nature of their social institutions, as
well as about their own powers. Their ideas about themselves are, for the
most part, derived from the interests of the ruling class." The Young
Hegelians are themselves guilty of inverting being and consciousness, of
turning everything upside down. And, under capitalism, everything appears
upside down; workers are ruled by the products of their labor. Capitalist
production conceals the role of human beings 1n the production process.
How, then, are workers to regaln control of their products, a proceCJs which
requires, In part, the shattering of their delusions? Marx's materialist
conception of consclou!)nes5 does not take us very far in answerlng thesf!
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questions. In particular, if proletarian consciousuess is supposed to result
from the division of Jabor, isn't "mass pin-headism" a more likely result
than communist consciousness? Marx seems dissatisfied with his own
"deduction" of communism from proletarian consciousness, for the final
argument for communism in The German Ideology 1s that it is the only way
in which workers can "safeguard their very existence."56
\1arx's attempt to replace the criticisrn of the Young Hegelians with a
"real movement" in material conditions does not, therefore, succeed. T\1arx
does not link the development of man's rna terial powers of production to the
overturning of social domination achieved by cornrnunisrn. In particular, he
does not show why the workers' ability to act in accordance with the
requisites of productive growth should result in their ability to achieve
sociaJ freedom. An account must be given of this abili ty to achieve social
freedom if we are to understand why cornrnunj~,n, and not some other social
form equally functional for productive growth, is the result of historical
development.
3.3 The Grundrisse.
The Grundrisse was written after Marx had immersed himself in the
study of political economy. The project of ~1arx's critique of political
economy, his intention to "rt:veal the economic laws of rnotion of modern
society,,,57 can be seen as an attempt to answer the unresolved question of
The German Ideology: what is the historical process which leads to
proletarian revolutionary action?
In the Grundrlss,., ~'arx picks up many of the themes of The German
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Ideology. Here too he attempts to clarify his understanding of the historical
process. The Grundrisse, however, also treats issues and themes which were
neglected in The German Ideology. In the first place, ""arx now reflects on
the role of his own theory in the historical process, purporting to explain
how it was possible for "Marxisrn" to arise when it did. In the second place,
Marx integrates his discussIon of history with a detailed analysis of the
capitalist labor process. Finally, and most significantly, ~arx characterizes
successive social forms in terms of the degree to which their structure
institutionalizes certain capacities, central of which is the capacity of
human beings to act autonomously.58
In The Gerrnan Ideology labor was seen primarily as a vehicle for rnan's
struggle with nature. While new needs were created through production, the
process by which these needs were satisfied was connected to a technical
rationality which continually expanded the division of labor. Labor was
portrayed as a process involving expanding productivity. In the 9rundrisse,
however, labor is depictf.d as the process through which hUtnan beings not
only gain control over nature, but also separate themselves from their
"embeddedness" in their given conditions. Their given conditions include the
form of their social relations "inherited" from the past. l-Iuman beings gain
an increasing awareness of the constraints imposed on them by these
relations. They come to recognize these constraints as "improper." Human
beings thus create, in history, the conditions for their social freedom.
1. The movement of hlstor~.
The Grundrisse begins, like The German Ideology. wllh a discussion of
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the "premises of history" which Marx now refers to as the conditions of
"production in general":
There are characteristics which all stages of production have in
common and which are established as general ones by the mind; but
the so-called general pre-conditions of all production are nothing mOl e
than these abstract moments with which no real historical stage of
production can be ~rasred.59
"Production in general" is a logical presupposition, specifying the features
which are necessary in order to conceive of producticn at all. These
features are abstract and Marx's interest in setting them out is not to
describe any actually existing society but to use them to distinguish what is
common to all social forms from what is different in order to see in virtue
of what features social forms develop. Historical development in the
Grundrisse is portrayed not so much in terms of a growing division of labor
but as a process by which human beings separate thernselves frorn their
"embeddedness" in nature.60
In certain respe':ts, this process of human 5eparation from nature
res~mbles \ttarx's discussion in The German Ideology. A key component of
this process of growing independence from nature is the creation of new
needs. J quoted earlier from the following passage in the Grundrisse:
Hunger 15 hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with
a knife and fork Is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw
meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. Production thus produces
not only the object, but also the manner of consumption; not only
objectively, but subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer.61
According to this passage, production creates not only the object, but also
the manner of consumption. Consumption becomes a conscious, as opposed
to an instinctive activity. The relationship of individuals to their needs
becomes a conscious one. Individuals increasingly create their own "needs,"
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independently of their natural needs.
The Grundrisse applies this idea of increasing consciousness
independent of nature, not only to needs but to the social relations of
production. As opposed to accepting these relations as merely given, human
beings develop an ability to critically reflect on them. Marx describes this
ability as originating in the relationship between labor and 1ts natural
conditions. Thus, he writes that in societies in which the productivity of
labor is scarcely developed,
the individual related simply to the objective conditions of labor dS
being his; related to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity,
in which the latter realizes itself.62
In these sn~i~ties, the relations within which the individuals stand appear as
natural, as relations pre-given to individuals and not created by theln.
Labor is not developed enough to subjugate nature. The aim of production in
these societies is always the reproduction of the individual within his given
relationship to the community. These societies are, therefore, traditional.
The relationship of labor to its material conditions thus has
consequences for the kind of relationship agents have to their society. As
human beings develop their productivity, and hence their ability to subjugate
nature, they no longer need to relate to nature in a traditional manner.
According to the Grundrisse, this results in increasing awareness, which
changes their relationship to society as well. Gradually, In history, hUlnan
beings emerge from their embeddedness in the conditions which they have
inherited from the past, and themselves begin to construct and take control
of their social relations themselves.
The Grundrisse distinguishes six major modes of productlon63 and two
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"intermediary" modes. The six rnajor modes of production are: (1) prirnitlve
communal production based on the tribe or clan; (2) the Asiatic rnode of
production; (3) the ancient (slave) mode of production; (4) the feudal mode
of production; (5) the capitalist mode of production; and, finally (6)
communism. In addition, two intermediary modes, the Slavonic and the
Germanic, are inserted between the ancient and the feudal modes. This
particular historical typology marks a change from ~ar)('s previous ones in
two respects: it incorporates an Asiatic mode of production and it allows
for alternative routes of development lS5uinR out of prirnitive comrnunal
production.
Marx discusses three routes out of the primitive life of communal
nomadic tribes:
1. The Asiatic rnode of production is described by Marx as the route
least susceptible to further historical evolution. It Is characterized by
direct communal property, in which an individual cannot own property in
separation from the community. There Is no individual property, but only
individual possession64 l.e., there 1s individual possession of land which is
owned by the state. Marx characterizes the Asiatic community as "a
substance of which the individuals are accidents";6' individuals have
identity only as members of the community. There is, accordingly, no
personal freedom, no separation of the individual from his soc!a! conditionsl
"The fundamental principle of the Asiatic form 1s that the Inc.Jividual does
not become independent of the communlty."66
2. The ancient mode of production, by contrast, appears as a "more
dynamic" form of historical life. In this mode of production, some
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individuals do own property, which is a precondition for membership in the
community; only citizens can be property owners. There is individual
freedom, but only for the property owning citizens. Furthermore, there is a
direct appropriation of the labor of one part of society by another in the
form of slavery.
3. The Germanic mode 1s a "mixed mode" in which individual and
communaJ property coe"ist. Individual property, however, predominates,
based on the separate household. Communal life exists only for the purpose
of securing common aims -- for exa,nple, for conducting wars, settlement
of legal disputes, etc.67
What is interesting about the presentation of these three modes in the
Grundrisse is that they are presented as if they are successive historical
stages of development.68 This, however, cannot be a claim about their
chronological order of appearance, as all three modes of production --
Asiatic, Germanic and ancient -- coexist historically, and the Asiatic mode
continues to exist long after the other modes of production have been
transformed. Nor does Marx indicate that these three forms can be ranked
according to the level of surplus they produce. They must therefore be
ranked 1n accordance with another developmental logic, not identical to the
growing division of laborl a logic of increasing social freedom. Each social
form is depicted as a distinct stage in the development of social freedom.
In the Asiatic mode, no one 1s freeJ In the ancient mode only the non-slave
citizens are free (and birth and other accidental factors determine whether
or not an individual will be free), 1n the Germanic mode, all are (somewhat)
free, circumscribed by their narrow locallstic social relations based on
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tradltlons.69 It is important that Marx does not distinguish these rnodes of
production in terms of their level of productivity.
With feudalism, social relations are characterized as relations of
personal dependence. Feudal social rela~;ons are represented by Marx as an
advance over its historical predecessors. Individuals are no longer treated
as slaves, as totally inorganic conditions of production. There is a mutual,
but unequal, dependence of serfs and lords, vassals and suzerains, laymen
and clerics.70 All social relations assume the form of relations between
individuals, who are seen as the bearers of obligations and rights. (These,
however, are still tied to their specific social positions: a serf's obligation to
his lord is represented by the corvee, the lord's obligation to the peasant is
protection,) Production is carried out in a traditional manner: "the chief
objective conditions of labor does not appear as a eroduct of labor, but is
already there as nature."71 These relations appear, that is, also as given,
and not as the product of human activity (which is in reality continually
changing them, using them as raw material for its own ends).
The complete differentiation between labor and its "precondltions," its
natural and social circumstances, Is the historical innovation of capltallsrn.
"For the first time nature becomes purely an object for manklnd."72 Human
beings gain the ability to confront and subjugate nature with no other
presupposltions than their own needs. How does capitalism accomplish this?
First, capitalism alienates labor from the material conditions of
production. Workers do not own any means of production. They are not
tied to any specific job or role.
The worker 1s thereby formally posltttd as a person, who Is something
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apart from his labor, and who alienates his life-expression only as a
means towards his own life.73
Whereas in the past, the goal of production was the reproduction of the
laborer In terms of a traditional role, capitalism overturns these traditions
In its drive to expand surplus value. Every "natural" limit to the full
expression of labor's productive capacities appear as obstacles to be
overcome. Thus, while in pre-capitalist societies labor was "embedded,"
I.e., dependent upon natural conditions, under capitalism, labor dominates
nature.
Second, capitalism alters the form of social relations. It develops the
universality of human capacities by socializing and concentrating the means
of production. \t1achine production and factories increase the social
combination of the workers.
Furthermore, a worker it, capitalist society has achieved a degree of
freedom which was impossible for the slave or serf. Workers have forrnal
control over their capacities and are reciprocally recognized by others as
having such control, simply through the process of capitalist exchange. The
formal freedom which workers have represents an advance over that held by
slaves (none) and serfs (some). Thus Marx writes,
The first presupposition (of capitalist production) 1s that the relation
of slavery and serfdom have been suspended. Living labor belongs to
itself, and has disposition over the expenditure of its forces, through
exchange•••The totality of the free worker's labor capacity appears to
him as his property, as one of his moments, over which he, as subject,
exercises domination, and which he maintains by expendIng It.74
Capitalism thus 1s characterized by: (1) a labor which Is universal and
generic, capable of beIng directed to any activity, (2) the material
prerequisites for the break by human beings from dependence on nature
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(through a massive increase in the productivity of labor) and (3) a structure
of universal social relations constituted on a basis of formal equality. At
the same time, the freedom which capl talist social structure
institutionalizes is only formal freedom; in reality, the interests of the
working class remain subordlnated to those of the capi tails t class. If,
however, individuals have not yet gained control over their social relations,
they have established the objective prerequisites. Capitalist labor, ~arx
tells us, is "the most extreme form of alienation," but it also marks a
turning point; it
already contains In itself, in a still only inverted form, turned on its
head, the dissolution of all1imited presuppositions of production. 75
The development of machinery increases abundance and decreases the
amount of socially necessary labor time. It also promotes interdependence
among people by linking them together through a world market. It does so,
however, in a form dominated by capital. Production is expanded not to
satisfy the needs and desires of the workers, but to augment surplus value.
All that is required to overturn this system, however, 1s for the working
class to recognize the whole systern of capital as their own product.
Marx depicts the process of historical development In terms of the
growlng emergence of human beings from their "presuppositions." This
process is discussed primarily In terms of a sequence of distinct stages o{'
social organization which embody increasing degrees of social freedom.
Marx does not explicitly characterize these stages as products of the level
of the productive forces. In fact, as I noted, he openly describes a part of
this sequence for which productivity 1s not the standard of rankingl his
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discussion of the lA.siatic, the Ancient and the Germanic modes of
production. Each social epoch is depicted as embodying a greater degree of
freedom than its predecessor.
Marx's discussion, furthermore, depicts a process of growing human
aw"reness about the constraints imposed on individuals by social relations
based on domination: labor's recognition that its "separation from the
conditions of its realization is improper." How does Marx explain how
human beings gain this awareness?
Like The German Ideology, the Grundrisse has little to say about the
role of social agents in bringing about changes in social forms. Marx
portrays the changing structural characteristics of these forms, but without
detailing precisely how the changes come about. How do human beings learn
what social forms are optimal for the realization of their social freedofn at
given stages of their development?
By not explaining the mechanisms through which this process is carried
forward, it might seem that the Grundrisse adds little to the discussion
already given in The German Ideology. Yet, while it is true that the
Grundrlsse 1s continuous with \ttarx's earlier work, it Is also marked by an
important difference.
On the one hand, the Grundrlsse does not repudiate the materialist
project: to show that "empirical" conditions and not "consciousness" are the
primary constraint on the form taken by social life. While for The German
Ideology the historical process is one of increasing efficiency which
promotes the expansion of the productive forces and the division of labor,
the Grundrlsse calls attention to labor's emergence from its dependence or.
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its "preconditions." Both the Grundrlsse and The German Ideologx root
historical development in a process which is identified with labor. It is
through labor that human beings create the pre-requisites for communism.
Labor is thus the foundation for the process each work treats. By rootlnK his
analysis in labor, Marx obscures the difference between the knowledge
which is gained in labor and production, and that which is needed for social
freedom. Social freedom requires knowledge of the appropriate distribution
of obligations and rewards among the different members of society. This is
not knowledge gained in labor. 76
On the other hand, the Grundrisse does call attention to the
importance of the recognition by social agents of the constraints on hurnan
freedom, as integral to historical development. This Is the strand in Marx's
work which I want to focus on. But rather than seeing it as the resuJ t of the
relationship between labor and its given condItions, I will argue that this
knowledge develops in social interactions, 1n class struggles over the
appropriate form of social cooperatIon.
Ii. The transition to Communism.
Marx's visJon of communism has also changed from that given In The
German Ideology. In the first place, ending private property is no longer
presented as requiring the complete, or nearly complete, end of the division
of labor. Differentiation of social functions will remain. Instead, the
indlvldual In communist society no longer performs labor as an appendage to
machinery, but relates to production as an independent and conscious agenta
The human beIng comes to relate more as a watchman and regulator to
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the production process•••steps to the side of the production process,
instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither
the direct human labor he himself performs, nor the time during which
he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive
power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of
his presence in a social body; it is, in a word, the development of the
social individual as the great foundation-stone of production and of
wealth.77
In the second place, in the Grundrisse Marx explicitly recognizes the
relationship between the the institutional structure of communism and the
achievement of human freedom. Communism is the form of social order
that encourages the autonomy of the members of that order. Autonomy is
the exercise of control by an agent over his or her actions and ne
circumstances of these actions. Autonomy requires that an agent have the
capacity to master his or her desires, actions, etc. The idea here 1s that to
act freely or autonomously Is not simply to act on the basis of preferences
which are adopted because of one's social position or individual natural
endowments. Instead, the preferences are chosen as the product of critical
reflection.
The idea of autonomy has often been criticized because of its apparent
reliance on a mysterious inward capacity of the will. Autonornous action
seems to require that an agent choose his or her ends independently of any
empirical conditions. The objection to this conception of autonomy has been
well put by Thomas Nagel:
I wish to act not only in light of the external circumstances facing me
and the possibilities that they leave open, but 1n light of the internal
circumstances as weIll my desires, beliefs, feelings, and impulses. I
wish to be able to subject my motives, principles, and habits to critical
examination, so that nothing moves me to action against my agreeing
to it. In this way, the setting against which I act Is gradually enlarged
and extended inward, tl111t includes more and more of myself,
considered as one of the contents of the world.
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In j ts earlier stages the process does genuinely seem to increase
freedom by making seJf ...knowledge and objectivi ty part of the basis of
action. But the danger is obvious. The more complete!y the self is
swallowed up in the circurnstances of action, the less I have to act
wi the I cannot get completely outside myself .78
Marx does not have a solution to the metaphysical dilemma about free
action which Nagel poses. But Marx characterizes autonorny in a way which
aJlows him to avoid NageJ's objection. Rather than viewing autonomy as the
freedom to act In a manner which is causally undetermined, ~arx views
autonomy as the collective exercise of control over social institutions and
practices, central of which is the system of production.
To bring out what is distinctive about ~1arx's characterization of
autonomy, it may be useful to contrast it with a second view found, arnong
other places, in the writings of John Stuart ~1jJl. For Mill, autonorny
consists in the exercise of independent judgement by a rational agent. Thus,
he writes:
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.79
According to ~1ill, communism Is preferable to cap! taJjsm if j t is the
case that communisrn's institutional structure will better prornote "human
liberty and spontanaelty."SO Mill holds that a social form is justified to
the extent that it promotes and secures the independence and freedom of
action of its individual members. These individuals, however, might choose
to pursue artistic or hedonistic interests removed from the everyday
concerns of collective Jife. They might, in point of fact, view wi th
apprehension the idea that they should devote a portion of their tirne to
activities which are required for collective self-government. While
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collective self-government might be a means to autonomy, it is not,
according to Mill, what autonomy consists In.
There are aspects of the Mll1ean view in the Grundrisse. Marx
describes communIsm as a society in which individuals realize their
distinctively human capacities in pursuIts which take place outside of the
realm of material production. Beyond this production, Marx claims, "begins
that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realln
of freedom •••"S1 Marx's adherence to the Millean view, however, poses a
dilemma: individuals exercising their autonomy may wish to opt out of
collective self-government. They may cede control over production to
managers, in order to be left alone to carry out their private projects. They
may allow despotism to flourish in aspects of social life, so long as they are
free to pursue their own interests.
Without wishin~ to dismiss the possibility of a conflict between
individual self-development and collective self-government, (in reality and
in Marx's thought), I want to suggest some reasons why Marx did not address
this dilemma. For Marx, unlike Mill, autonomy is identified with collective
self-government. In this consideration, it is important that Marx premises
the existence of social interdependence and holds that individuals have
capacities and desires which can only be expressed socially. They desire
such goods as friendship, mutual recognition and the expression of their
capacities in labor. Most importantly, Marx assumes that individuals desire
to be free under the conditions of their social interdependence. That Is,
they want to regard the practices and institutions of their society as
conforming to their own judgements about what is right, and not simply as
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an external constraint. I ,viii develop this latter point in Chapter four. In
the remainder of this chapter I want to consider the reliltionship between
labor and autonomy which is emphasized in the Grundri!ise.
According to the Grundrisse, communism abolishE:s the specific
features of capitalist production which prevent it from being a sphere of
autonomy. Under cap! t 11ism:
1. The work process is dominated by machinery und/or by repetitious
tasks which can develop few of the workers' capacities. Its
organization suppresses the development of intellectual capabilities.
Human beings excel only in those functions which they share with
machines.
2. Work is organized hierarchically. Neither the production process nor
the general circumstances of the work environrnent are controlled by
the worker. On the job, workers are told "exactly what to do and how
to do it."82 In the decision making process -- the process of decidin~
how the work is to be carried out, what its goals are, and how much is
to be produced -- workers have no determinln~ role. Workers rnerely
execute the decisions made by others.
CapitalIsm thus subjects workers to the undemocratic authority of the
planners, as well as the capitalists.
Marx mentions several ways of overcoming these obstacles to
autonomy in work. The first is to replace as much of human labllr as
possible in routine work by machinery; so that the human being comes to
"relate more as watchman and regulator to the productive process itself."S3
The second way to promote autonomy in work involves reorganizng the labor
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process, so that the activities of labor demand the developrnent 01 a wider
range of capacities (especially intellectual ones). In particular, this rneans
an end to the division between mental Jabor, the labor of planning, and
manuallahor, the labor of execution. The justification for these changes
clearly rests, on Marx's view, in their relation to autonomy. Routine factory
work restricts the ability of individuals to exercise many of the capacities
involved in controlling their circumstances, e.g., the capacity to irnagine.
Capitalism is characterized by Marx as "personal independence
founded on objective dependence."84 By this he means that while capi talism
grants the worker the freedom to sell or withhold his labor power, the
worker is objectively forced to sell this labor power in order to gain the
means of subsistence. The interests of workers are thus dependent on those
of the capitalists. If the interests of capitalists are not satisfied (e.g., there
are no profits) then factories close down and the workers own interests are
unmet.
The concept of the individual developing all of his capacities is a
feature of the .9rundrisse, like The German Ideology. "Free individuality" is
how Marx refers to the "third stage" of historical development, communist
society.S' However, Marx carefully distinguishes his conception of the
developed capacities of the many sided individual through labor from
Fourier's idea of labor as "play":
Free time - which Is both idle time and time for higher activity .. has
naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he
then enters into the direct production process as this different subject.
This process is both discipline, as regards the human being in the
process of becoming; and at the same time, practice, experimental
science,••as the human being In whose head exists the accumulated
knowledge of soclet),.86
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Rather than envisioning communism as the framework within which each
individual fully realizes his own powers in "higher activity," this passage
suggests that the realized individual also partic;ipates in the collective
production process, contributing to a wider aim than he or she could have
achieved alone.
In the discussion to this point explici t considerat ion of the i mmedia te
process by which communism is established has been avoided. In The
German Ideology Marx tries unsuccessfully to deduce cammunisrn from the
rise af the "world-tndividual" and the growth of the division of labor. The
Qrundrisse, by contrast, focuses on a process of hUIl,an consciousness
emerging from its dependence on inherited conditions. What rernains is for
individuals to recognize in the structure of universal relatIons created by
capitalism their own product. As \1arx writes,
When the limited bourgeois form is peeled away, what 1s wealth other
than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures,
productive forces, etc. created through universal exchanRe? The full
development of human mastery over nature, those of so-called nature
as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working out of his
creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous
historic development which makes the totality of development, i.e.,
the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, r.ot as
measured on a predetermined yardstick?87
This passage and others in the Grundrisse refer to the image of a "limited
form" which must be "peeled away" In order to reveal the reality beneath it.
In pre-communist societies, the social life process Is cloaked in a social
"veil" -- the existence of historically accidental or Instl tutionallzed
delusions -- which prevents individuals from understanding that the social
order Is their own creation, and Cc:ln be changed. According to Marx, thIs
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veil cannot be removed until there is "production by fret!ly associated men
and stands under their conscious control.u88 This in turn requires a (1)
material foundation, i.e., it rnust be materially possible for society to
function and reproduce itself in this proposed state, and (2) the possibility
that conditions of a given social structure can become seen as unacceptable
to its members, i.e., that they can criticize the features of domination and
dependence which characterize it.
With the growth of material productive power, domination becomes
less historically necessary for social reproduction. That is, domination is
less essential for society to reproduce itself at higher levels of productive
development. This fact, by itself, however, can not explain how domination
is overturned. We have seen in our discussions of Wood and Cohen that
while material progress may condition the expansion of freedom, it does not
determine it. That is, there are material preconditions for freedofn --
especially an easln~ of the grip of nature on human beings -- but materially
progress does not necessarily imply an expansion of freedom. To explain the
achievement of greater freedom, there must be some other process. The
Grundrisse, then, provides evidence that Marx saw a separate process in
addition to increasing productive power. This process 15 manifested in the
growing awareness by social a~ents of the constraints socia! relations set on
their freedom. Marx roots this process in the changes in labor's relations to
its "g iyen cond1t Ions."
3.4 Conclusion.
I have argued that the Grundrisse presents a more adequate <..;onception
of the relationship between the process of history and the endpoint of
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history than thdt offered by The German Ideologv. The Grundrisse relates
the structure of communism to capacities developing within history, in
particular, in the capacity of agents to recognize forms of social domination
and to reorganize social life 1n a direction which diminisht!s that domination.
The act of recognition Is presented in the Grundrisse as occuring in
labor, in the relationship of the worker to the conditions of his production.
At first, nature is scarcely historically modified and appears as a thoroughly
alien power. Grarfually, human beings raise thernselves up out of their
dependence on and domination by things over which they have no control.
have argued that in his discussion ~arx does not distin~ulsh the knowledKe
gained in labor from the knowledge which allows for social freedom. He
never explains why the knowledge used to master nature should also be the
knowled~e needed to regulate human social relations. In fact, the two forrns
of knowled~e are different, with no intrinsic relationship to each other.
Incre.sing productive power makes a form of social domination less
necessary, but it does not itself abolish it or produce knowledge about what
will replace it.
In this thesis, I will argue that this knowledge arises not 1n the
relationshlp of labor to its conditions, but within the relationship of classes
to one another In society, in class conflicts over the appropriate distribution
of rewards and obligations In society. I will defend the idea that human
beings "learn" 1n these struggles about their "true interests," their interests
al undlstorted by conditions based on social domination. I will argue that
autonomy 1s a "true human interest." My argument will be~in with the
importance of communism in Marx's thought as the endpoint of the
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historical process. Commun! 1m represents the highest form of historical
development because it institutionalizes the capacity for autonomy. It is in
virtue of its relation to autonomy, that comrnunism is better than its
predecessors, and not simply because it is more productive. It is also, I will
claim, in virtue of this reJation that hIstorical materialism predicts that
communism will tend to be realized.
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(~hapter Four: Autonomy, Morality and Human Interests
We have always revealed the hard kernel of social
ine~uality and lack of freedom hidden under the
sweet shell of forn1aJ equality and freedonl -- not in
order to reject the latter but to spur the working
class l:'to not being satisfied with the shell.!
4.1 Introduction.
According to the lirundrisse, human beings emerge through their
historical development to master nature and take control of their social
relations. In this work, f\1arx characterizes successive social forrns not only
In terms of expanding productive power, but also in terrns of the increasing
autonomy which is institutionalized in their respective political and social
structures. There are two distinct processes -- one which produces rna terial
progress and another which produces the expansion of human freedom.
have claimed that the la tter process is not determined by the former
process.
In this chapter, my aim Is to develop further an understanding of this
latter process, the growing embodiment of autonomy in social life and then
to show how this process relates to the process of productive development.
Both of these processes aie necessary if we are to reconstruct Marx's
argument for why communism results from historical development. In wha t
follows, three nlajor issues will be addressed. The first issue concerns the
standing of autonomy as a~. Chapter,2 reviewed Wood's account of
autonomy as a "non-moral" value. I argued that Wood's characterization of
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autonomy is not helpful in understanding Marx's endorsenlent of communism
in terms of its intrinsic value, its value as an end in itself. In this chapter, I
argue that autonomy represents for ~1arx an objective value, a value which
satisfies a true human interest.
The second issue concerns the rela tionship between autonom y and the
moral values which Marx cri ticizes. ~1arx does not make explicit his
conception of morality, but I will argue that his pronouncements can be
understood if the moral standpoint is viewed as an irTlperfect approxima tion
of true human interests. I will argue that Marx's understanding of rnorali ty
is simiJiar to his view about religion. ~1arx contends that religion
simultaneously distorts and expresses true human interests: j t is both an
iJlusion and the "heart of a heartJess worJd.,,2 For ~1arx, religion is rnore
than a product of "false consciousness": it expresses a genuine human
aspiration. Analogously, I will show that Marx thinl<s that morality has d
positive content; it is not simply a ruling class "ideology." The
interpretation of .\1arx's view of morality which I will offer is consistent
with the fact that ~1arx does make comparative assessrnents about different
moral systems. He explicitly prefers some moral systems to others. I wiJJ
argue that (a) his preferences can be understood in terms of the relationship
between respectlve moral systems and autonomy, and (b) that moral systems
evolve in history to represent human interests in an increasJngly accurate
manner.
The third, and final, issue I will examine concerns Marx's belief that
under communism, when the antagonism between particular and general
interests has been transcended, moral! ty as a specific form of consciousness
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will (like the state).3 wither away. I will argue that this is not a reasonable
doctrine.
4.2 Autonomy as an objective value.
In this section, I argue that ~1arx is committed to the view tha t
autonomy is an objective vaJue. There are two aspects to Marx's belief In
the objectivity of values. The first is that Marx thinks that the fact that
autonomy is objective contributes to the development of history. That is,
the fact that autonomy satisfies a true human interest is part of the reason
why people desire it, pursue it and, where possible, choose social systems
which promote it. I will develop this aspect of autonomy's objectivi ty in
chapter five. The second aspect is that values are objective in the Jlght of
their relationship to true human interests: if a value satisfies a true hurnan
interest, then it is an objective value. I will consider this second aspect
below.
What does it mean to say that a vaJue is in true human interests? Is
there any evidence that Marx thinks that autonomy Is in true human
interests? Chapter :3 discussed the concept of both na tura! and non-na tlJral
needs. Natural needs were equated with the necessary conditions for the
reproduction of individuals. Non-natural needs were defined wi th respect to
the necessary conditions for the reproduction of individuals a t a certain
level of social ana historical development. These latter conditions contain a
"historical and moral element.,,4 The definition of non-natural needs is
therefore dependent on the socIal perception of the necessary minimum for
physical reproduction, and what this minImum consists of changes over time.
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l\1arx writes that "hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked
meat, eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which
bolts down raw meat with the aId of hand, nail and tooth.".5 Production
creates~, in part, by developing the manner in which individuals
consume. \\'hereas individuals can physically survive eating raw meat,
cooked meat becomes a socially created need, something individuals
consider a necessity (at least in most advanced ca~\ tallst societies). Desires
are everything that individuals want beyond the scope of needs, for exarnpJe
diamonds and hot cocoa. Some desires may even be impossible like the
desire to live eternally.
\\'hat are interests? How do interests relate to desires and needs? All
needs (natural and non-natural) are interests, only some desires are
interests. According to Raymond Geuss, an agent's "interests" corresponds
to the manner in which that agent's particular desires "could be rationally
integrated into a coherent 'good life.,,,6 Interests are not identical to desires
and, rnoreover, an agent may fall to have an interest in the satisfaction of
many of his desires, as in the case of a partly reformed alcoholic who wan ts
a drink. Thus, an individual may have an interest 1n the non-satisfaction of
particular desires. Some desires will be contrary to an agent's interests
because they will not be consistent with his conception of how he wishes to
live. By contrast, an agent does have an interest In the sa tjsfaction of his
needs. As needs expand at different stages of social development, rnore of
an agent's desires become needs, and therefore the sa tisfaction of these
desires are In hIs true interests.
An agent can be deceived about his interests. When he Is we will
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speak of his "apparent" interests, which are not the same as his true
interests. For example, an agent may fail to realize that it is in his interest
to stop drinking because he has mistaken views about the effects of alcohol
consl'mption. The alcoholic who continues to drink because of
misinformation acts on the basis of an apparent interest, an interest which
derives from some mIstaken belief. In the case of the misinformed
alcoholic, it is easy to see why his interest is only apparent. It is easy to see
what his true interests are not, but not what his true interests are.
Geuss distinguishes between two different approaches to the definition
of true interests: the "perfect knowledge" approach and the "optirTlaJ
condItions" approach,7 The "perfect knowledge" approach starts frorn the
observation that changes in an agent's knowledge about his situation will
often lead him to recognize that one of his desires is not in his interest.
Thus, in the case of someone misinformed about the effects of drinking,
correct knowledge of the consequences of aJcohol consumption would
presumably lead that person to acknowledge that it is not in his interest to
drink. True interests are interests the agent would have if he had "perfect
knowledge," fuJI knowledge about his physical and psychic canst! tution,
capacities, circumstances and history.
It might be objected that the "perfect knowledge" approach does no
more than specify a set ()f interests which are rational for an agent to hold
in the light of his other desires. But it fails to define his true interests. The
formation of his previous desires may be so constructed that it Is rational
for him to want somethIng repugnant. Geuss asks:
If the Marquis de Sade had had the final Intergalactic edition of the
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Encyclopedia Brittanica at his disposal would what he pursued then
have been his true interests?8
It is conceivable for agents with "perfect knowledgeUto have an interest in
extremely diverse ends. We r,llght find a set of interests formed under
conditions of perfect knowledge "unacceptable,"9 as in the case where they
result from a tepa thological" social condi tions. Geuss asks us to consider the
case of the Ik, a tribe whose rnembers routinely prey on the sick and
helpless, display duplicity and in which parents frequently abandon their
young children. These characteristics of the U< might represent a ra tional
response to the condi tions of extreme hardship and scarcity under which
they live. In other words, it may be that the revolting interests which the Ik
have are appropriate for survival under the circumstances they find
themselves in. 10
The nlove to the "optimal conditions" approach is motiJated by a
scepticism towards th~ belief that interests whIch we strongly disapprove of
could in fact be "true." The Ik presumably would not have torrned an
interest in such behavior had they originally been pJaced under less horrible
conditions. The "optimal conditions" approach takes this insight and argues
that an agent can form a conception of his true interests only under
circumstances which are undistorted by poverty and physical priva tion,
brutality and coercion. The agent's true interests are defIned as the
interests which he would choose in a context purified of all the distortions
of the present.
How do the two approaches differ? Perfect knowledge Is perfect
knowledge at any moment in time: perfect knowJedge of your needs and
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interests under given condi tions. But thes'e given condi tions may produce
systematic distortions of an agent's desires and interests, e.g., in a capitalist
society, owners of the means of production have an interest in making a
profit. This is, however, not a true human interest: under circumstances in
which agents had a choice between capitalist and communist 50cia~
relations, certainly Marx thinks that they would choose the latter. An
agent's perfect knowledge of his circumstances cannot get him beyond
systematic social distortIons. In contrast, the "optima! conditions" approach
demands perfect knowledge, but under condi tions in which there are no
social distortions of the desires on the basis of which individuals forrn their
interests. The "perfect knowledge" approach gets you the best you can get
under a set of given and imperfect conditions. The "optimal conditions"
approach gets you the best you can get under ideal condl tions.
In lJtiJitarianism, John Stuart l\11Jl makes an argument which suggests
how the "optimal condi tlons" approach and the "perfect knowledge"
approach might converge. Mill argues that if an agent did experience both a
life organized around solely lower (bodily) pleasures and one which also
included higher (in te JJectuaJ) pleasures, he would choose the la t te raver the
former. And, if an agent would recognize tha t he would prefer a life-plan
which Inc:luded the higher pleasures if he experienced it, we can attribute to
him an Interest in such a life-plan, even where he has no effective desire
!l2!:. to choose It. For, if he did e~'perience both plans of life, he would
prefer the one which included the higher pleasures. This is, Mill tells us, the
verdict of the "competent jUdges"! 1 namely, those who are acquainted with
both life-plans. If an agent, thereiore, could have "perfect knowledge,"
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including knowledge of all the condi tions under which his interests could be
formed, and thus including knowledge of the conditions which allow for the
higher pleasures, the interests he would choose would be identical to those
he would form under "optimal conditions" of non-coercion and distortion. To
acquire "perfect knowledge" of one's interests, according to this view,
requires the possibility of experiment and the testing of alternative pJa.ns of
life. Some of these alternatives will involve less distortion than present
conditions. In this way, "perfect knowledge" can converge on the optl,naJ
conditions. As they gain knowledge and experience, agents will choose those
interests which they would, in fact, have forrned under optlrnal condi tions.
To bring ~'j!J's view to bear on the issue under dlscL.,ision: autono,ny,
on a ~1illean account, would be an objective interest just in case human
beings who could experience both a life-ptan which included autonomy and
one which did not (but which was in all other respects equaJ to the first)
would always choose a life-plan which included autonomy. Insofar as
communism alone among social forms fully embodies autonomy, agents
would choose communism over capitaJistn if they could experience both.
Marx, in fact, seems to think of communist society as a set of "optimal
conditions." He explicitly argues that communist society alone among social
forms does not distort our desires and interests. He wri tes,
Communist organization has a two-fold effect on the desires produced
In the individuals by the present day relations; sorne of the desires,
namely desires which exist In aJI relations and merely change their
form and direction under different social relations ..- are merely
altered by the communist social system, for they ar,' givt.n the
opportunIty to develo~ normal!f. but others...are totally deprived of
their condl tlons of ex stence.
If an agent could experience a life characterlzed by autonomy, he would
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always choose It over a life which lacked autonomy. And autonorny satisfies
the interests an agent would have If his interests were formed under
communism.
Of course, agents cannot now experIence communisrn. How then can
they actually recognize their interest in autonomy? This is especially a
problem as Marx believes that in cJass societies, the relations between man
clnd man and man and nature are tudden behind a "social veil." The
rna!n tenance of social order in such socie tIes depends upon acclden tal or
institutIonalized delusions, in particular, the belief that agents fnust accept
their institutions as relatively unchangeable, motivated by the wa}' the
world Is.13 ~'oreover, this vel! is "not removed from the countenance of the
social Jife process until it becomes production by freely associated rnen and
stands under their conscious controJ.,,14 ~1arx believes that only in
communist society can social order be maintained under conditions of full
knowledge In whIch nothing Is or need be hidden.!' So the ques tion of how
agents can obtain an awareness of their interest in autonorny Is a serious
one.
Marx sees Jabor as providing the basis for both the interest in, and the
awareness of, autonomy. Marx's argument that labor is the basis for the
human interest In autonomy 1s reJativeJy straight-forward. According to
Marx, the act of labor is itseJf an expression of autonomy and therefore it Is
something which always characterizes human beings. Autonomy Is thus not
somethIng which needs to be produced in human beings, but unleashed -- the
constraInts imposed by social and material condjtions removed. The basis
for this interpretation of autonomy as a capacity which always exists, a
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capacity which characterizes hurnan nature, is found in \1arx's idea of
human labor as a "posi ti 'Ie acti vi t y."
Marx's view of labor differs sharply from that of the classical polItical
economists. In the Grundrisse, Marx criticizes Adam Srnith for viewing
labor as a negative capacity, as sacrifice, something to be avoided: "And
this is labor for Sml th, a curse." However, "something whIch is merely
negative creates nothing." 16 Marx goes on to argue that the miser's or the
capitalist's abstinence creates nothing. Beyond reiterating one of the
conclusIons of the labor theory of value -- that capitalists create no value --
.\t1arx's discussion emphasizes the nature of labor as a "positive, creative
acti vi ty":
Smith is not aware that this overcoming of obstacles 15 in itself a
liberating activity -- and that further, once the external aims become
posited as aims which the subject posits -- hence as self--realizatlon,
objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is
precise ly labor .17
This passage calls attention to the nature of labor as the basis for the
exercise of autonomy. In labor, regardless of the social form in which it 1s
expressed, agents exercise their own distinctive human powers. Thus, even
the labor of capitalist society ls, despite its form as "wage-slavery," a
manifestation of the capacity to subject external circumstances to human
control.
This view of labor a.s a positive activity can be regarded as the
foundation for Marx's labor theory of value. 18 The labor theory of value
contends that labor is the "real social cost," that products are to be
measured by the amount of labor required to produce them. Moreover, the
labor which produces the products which have value is a generic, abstract
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labor, a labor capacle of beIng directed to any object. In a letter to
Kugelmann, Marx argues that as a cost of production, Jabor is the
underpinning of production and distribution in all social forrns:
That this necessity of the distribution of soclal1abor In definite
proportions cannot be done away with by a particular forrn of social
production, but can only change the !2!:!!lln which it appears is self-
evident. No natural laws can be done away with •••Science consists
precisely in demonstrating how the law of value operates. 19
\1arx intends the labor theory of value to be an empIrical proposi tion, but
one which also indica tes the success of man's struggle to conquer na ture. As
society's productive power increases, the amount of labor required to
produce a good decreases.
As a measure of the "real cos t of production," labor is the regula tor of
the distribution of social1abor among the various activities required to meet
various needs. This is a "law" true of alt societies. In capltaHsrn, however,
this law expresses 1tself in terms of value. The magnitude of value is the
form taken by the real social cost when the objects produced are
commodi ties, i.e., goods produced to be exchanged. In Volume I of Capi taJ,
Marx writes that,
The late scientific discovery that the products of Jabor, as values are
merely the material expressions of the human labor expended in their
production lrarks an epoch in the development of the history of
humanlty.2
In this passage, Marx refers to himself as having "discovered" that under
capitalism the "real socia! cost" takes the form of vaJue. The discovery Is
taken by ~1arx to be "scientific" and justified by more or less standard
empirical procedures.
Marx contends that even a great thinker like Aristotle was unable to
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"decipher" the role played by human labor wi thin slave society, because
universal generic labor did not play as such the role of crea ting social value:
Greek society was founded on the Jabor of slaves, hence had as its
natural basis the inequali ty of men and of their Jabor powers. The
secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence
of all kinds of labor because and insofar as they are human labor in
general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality
had aJready acqUired the permanence of a fixed popuJar opinion. This
however becomes possible only in a society where the commodity-form
Is the unIversal form of the product of labor, r.~nce the dominant
social rela tion is the rela ticn between men as possessors of
commoditIes. Aristotle's genius is dispJayed precisely by his discovery
of a relation of equali ty in the value-expression of commodl ties. Only
the historicaJ Ii mi ta tion inheren t in the socie ty in which he lived
prevented him from finding out wha t "In reali ty" this rela tion of
equality consisted of. 21
In this quote, Marx alludes to the "historIcal lirnitatlon" - slavery - which
prevented Aristotle from understanding the equality of human labor. But,
behind the social form of slavery, there is a "reality": labor is the positive
measure of real social cost.
l\1arx's understanding of the role of Jabor in production thus forms the
key to his understanding of the past. Marx writes that, "human anatorny
contains a key to the anatomy of the ape."22 but onJy insofar as "their
essential differences are not obli tera ted." It Is not obv ious, however, how
human anatomy in itself telJs us much about the apes. Rather, it can be the
"key" to ape anatomy only because we understand the apes as a
developmental stage in human evolution. In other words, we must see Jabor
as developIng its capacIty to create wealth in general, to be a generic
capacity capable of direction to any object, within alJ social forms.
The Jabor theory of value gives a measure of the "cost of production,"
and argues that production In all social forms Is consIstent wi th a "Jaw,"
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namely, ~hat production is regula ted by the distribution of labor arnong the
memebers of society in defini te proportions. The labor theory of value is
also consistent with Marx's view of man's self-creation through labor. Labur
is the vehicle of man's emergence frorn "embeddedness" in condi tlon5 which
he does not control. Thus, the fact that the labor theory of value is put
forward by Marx as the underpinning of social production means not only
that labor tirne regulates production in all social forms, but also that labor
as a positive activity, as freedonl, is also manifested --although In varying
degrees -- in each social form.
Moreover, if the distribution of social labor among the members of
society is subject to a "Jaw" as \iarx's letter to Kugelmann Indica tes, then
communism, in which individuals take conscious and collective control of
their production, acting within the Jirnits of this Jaw, Is freedom.
Communism institutionalizes labor as the capacity of individuals to act
consciously and colJectlveJy.
Marx's discussion of the human capacity to master and control
externaJ conditions --. to be autonomous -- is given in terms of labor. labor
1s understood both as the capacity to master nature and as the means
through which human beings exercise their essential powers. Regardless of
its various expressions in different social forms, labor Is always a "pas! tive
actlvI ty."
But the question remains as to how human beings recognize the
relationship between their capacity to Jabor and theIr true interests. Marx
sees human fulfillment in Jabor -- how are others, whose labor Is far troln
rewarding, themselves to see it? Marx writes to Kugelmann that "every
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child knows"23 that social labor must be divided proportionally in order to
reproduce society. What every child does not know is the relation between
that fact and true human interests.
Marx's focus on !!!2.2.!: obscures the role of knowledge and cr! tical
reflectIon in the process of history. Why should knowledge of the labor
theory of value produce knowledge of true human interests? How can
knowledge of the Jabor theory of value dispell the ideational and
institutional forms of social domination tied to capitalist society and also
provide knowledge about possible social alternatives? This is i,nportant
because, as we have seen, Marx thinks tha t communisrn wi!l not resuJ t
without the conscious intervention of human agents who free thernselves
from the illusions of the past. 24
Human labor provides a basis for the interest agents have in realizing
autonomy. But it does not yet explaIn the source of their awareness of that
interest. Thus, although the labor theory of value provides support for
Marx's claim that autonomy is a true human interest, by revealing the role
of labor in man's self...creatlon, it does not account for how agents gain an
awareness of their interest in securing a social system which
instl tutionali zes their autonom y.
I will argue that while the development of human capacities takes
place In labor, In technical progress In controlling nature, the achievement
of social freedom takes place through class struggles and the criticIsm of
Institutional and ideational forms of domination. The abilIty of people to
achieve social freedom depends not only on the development of their
material powers of production, but also, and most importantly, on theIr
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ability to gain knowledge of and act in virtue of their true interest in that
freedom. This knowledge Is gained independently of the knowledge which
allows human beings to master na ture I 't is achieved through the
interaction of individuals and classes within a given social form. In the
course of their social interaction, individuals Jearn that the dominant
morality of a social form as "embodied" in its institutions and Jaws, is not in
their true interests. This knowledge leads them to search for new forms of
social organization. I will discuss this process in the next chapter.
However, first I must discuss Marx's view of morality.
4.3 Autonomy and the Moral Standpoint.
In this section I explore the relationship between morality and the
process by which individuals gain greater knowledge of their true interests.
In Chapter 2, I reviewed Allen Wood's argument that morality has no other
purpose than Its functionality for a given class society. For Wood, there is
no link between the moral standpoint and the standpoint of social freedorTl
from which Marx condemns capitalism. In fact, \\'ood interprets moral! ty as
a threat to the self-understanding of every individual who follows 1t. (see
Chapter 2.) In this section I make two arguments against this view. First, I
contend that the moral standpoint -- defined as the standpoint that takes
the basic interests of each equally into account -- represents an imperfect
grasp of true human interests. On the one hand, the moral standpoint allows
agent:; to reflect critically on the institutional framework of their socIety in
terms of their aspiration to the common good. It represents an atternpt to
grasp their true human interests. On the other hand, when an agent takes
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the moral standpoint he must represent his own interests as opposed to the
interests of others. Thus, the moral standpoint views the interests of others
as a restriction on an agent's action. Second, I show that Marx recognized
progress in the moral systems of succe3sive social forms judged In terrns of
their ability (as embodied in laws and institutions) to realize autonomy.
(1) Morality as an expression of true human interests
Not everything l\1arx has to say about morallty can be reconciled with
the description of morality as merely a "functional ideology" for class
oppression. Marx does not endorse the Nietzschean view that morall ty is
psychologicalJy injurious to those who hold it. Marx, of course, condemns
morality. But, on the other side of the ledger is his underscoring of the fact
that there are moral claims at all, as opposed to sirnple domination.
~1oral1ty may not live up to its claims, but it is significant that It makes
such claims. I will explore this idea below.
There is ample evidence of \'1arx's disdain for morality_ He explicitly
regards "justice" ...- a central moral concept -- as a sanction for the
productive relations of a society and insists that capitalist exploitation of
the working class involves no injustlce. 2; He mercilessly exposes the moral
pretensIons of the bourgeoisie as only the "icy water of egotistical
calcuJatlon.,,26 And he condemns the claims made by socialists in favor of
equality and justice as "outdated verbal rubbish.,,27
Although Marx's explicit pronouncements do not give us a complete
understanding of his view of morality, there Is no doubt that he regards
mora! consciousness as, at least partially, distorting human understanding.
~1orality urges individuals to take the standpoint of the common good when
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in fact there is no such good -- only the competing interests of social
classes.
If morali ty is a distorted form of self-understanding, why does human
consciousness take a moral form? Why do individuals not relate to theIr
needs and interests directly, instead of viewing them from the standpoint of
morality?
f\1arx never directly answers this question, but he does COfT)ment
extensively on the parallel issue of religion as a distorted form of human
consciousness. His view stands in contrast to that of Nietzsche. 28
Nietzsche argues that religion is essentially a rationalization on the part of
the poor for the existing unequal distribution of fortunes. Religion 1s a
rationalization used by the weak to defend and exalt themselves: weakness
and submission become valued; strength and noblli ty, condemned. Nietzsche
debunks religion by revealing its source in the repressed sentiments for
vengance of the powerless. He argues that religion's positive valuation of
brotherliness and mercy stems from weakness, envy and the unacknowledged
thirst of the poor for revenge. The man professing religion is thus a sick
individual, malicious to himself and others. Nietzsche thus reveals the evil
root of religion. Rather than endorse religion's misdirection of human \'.'ill
and vItality, he proclaIms the "death of God" and sees the trIumph over
relIgion (and morality) as one of the central tasks of his "revaluation of
values."
By contrast, Marx argues that relIgion has a positive content, a root
which is not evil:
ReJigion is the self-conscIousness and self-esteem of Man who has
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either not yet found himself or has already lost hirnself again. 29
Religion's appeal is really the appeal of each person's own self-affirmation.
At the same time, this self-affirmation as religion is misdirected, projec ted
onto a metaphysical being, beyond man and nature. Religion is thereby
associated with false consciousness, with man's illusions about his own
nature. But the~ of religion is not false consciousness:
Religion •••is the fantastic realiza tion of the human essence, because
the human essence has no true reali ty •••Religious distress is at the
same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against
real distress,3D
Religion originates in the misery of real conditions. It gives expression to a
social life which really is alienated, empty and degraded. Moreover,
according to this passage, religion not only expresses real mise ... y but is a
protest against it. It represents a protest against suffering because it
asserts the human aspiration to freedom and community against their
attenuation in class societies. Religion laments our natural/social
conditions and in doing so it tells the truth about those conditions. That is,
it correctly portrays man's social conditions as ones of misery. In opposition
to this misery, religion holds out the promise of a life in which men are
affirmed and respected. Religion is "the sign of the oppressed creature, the
sentiment of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions."3l The
problem wIth religIon, according to Marx, lies in the form of its protest,
that it projects human aspirations beyond the secular world. This
projection, Marx beJieves, reconciles us to our miserable conditions on
earth.
The criticism of relIgIon Is thus for Marx the demand that the promise
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of religion be realized. Religion is not simply to be rejected as delusory.
RelIgIon is only a symptorn and the battle against it cannot be won until life
itself is no longer at odds with the human aspIration for freedom. The
criticism of religion will not be successful until the "eri ticisrn of ear th" .32
has been completed, so that the condi tions which systematically produce
religion as distorted human consciousness are abolished. In communist
society, there will be no religion because freedom and community will be
realized in the secular world.
What would nlorality be for Marx if it were similiar to r~ligion in the
sense of being an expression and a protest wi th respect to rea! condi tions?
In other words, does moral! ty as a form of false consciousness also "tell the
truth" despi te its distortions?
It is commonly argued that rnorali ty provides a framework for our
mutua! protection. According to this view, the function of rnoraJi ty is to
counteract the limits of rnan's sympathies, his limited resources, his Ijrni ted
knowledge. Hume, for example, writes that
It is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of rnan, along
with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice
derives its origin,3.3
Morality is a devIce which Is beneficial to men because of certaIn
contingent features of their common condition. It restrains their passions
and makes possible rrtutualJy beneficial cooperatIon among individuals.
Marx accepts this view of morality: he sees morality as providing a
framework for societIes In which the interests of one group stand in conflict
with another:
Whatever form they have taken, one fact Is common to all class
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societies, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by another. No
wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despi te the
multiplicity and variety it displays, moves wi thin certain common
forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except wi th
the total disappearance of class antagonisms. 34
In cJass'iocieties, the interests of particular groups and individuals are
opposed to each other, and rnost often also opposed to the collective
interests of all: "freeman and slave, patrician anj plebian, lord and serf,
guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, st(and) in
constant opposition to one another, carr(y) on an interrupted, now hidden,
now open fight."); For Marx, this fight ultirnately issues in a new social
order. But without some basis of agreement the opposition of interests
would turn society into a war of all against all and not lead to the
supercession of an old order by a higher order. Limits must be placed on the
competitive cJaims between classes or a state of war will result. Marx sees
class struggle in societies, not civil war.
In order for the conditions necessary for produ~Live growth to obtain,
a state of war must be avoided. Society cannot easily expand productive
capacity under circumstances of civil war. A common frarnework is needed
to facilitate production. \1arx sees morality as such a framework. The
alternatives to morality, such as manipulation and repression, are more
costly than if people can be influenced to consent to society's instItutional
arrangement. If individuals were not susceptible to moral appeals, the
possibilities for achIeving even a limited social peace would be minimal.
What exactly are human beings susceptIble to, when they are
susceptible to moral appeals? AccordIng to Thomas Scanlon, to be
susceptible to moraJ appeaJs is to be susceptIble to the desIre to justlfy one's
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actions (and institutions) to others. 36 It is to be susceptible not sirnply to
heed one's own desires and impulses, but to seek a justification for thern
which others will not reasonably reject. 37 When an agent takes the
standpoint of morality, he evaluates his actions in the light of the interests
of everyone and gives equal weight to their interests. His judgernent of
what is best to do (e.g., right) takes the interests of others lnto account: he
judges his own good wi th respect to the good of others.
NIetzsche, of course, thinks that this susceptibility is the sign of a
defective psychology and that the moral standpoint is injurIous to the
individual who adopts it. The fact that morality is a frame'work for
productive growth does not undercut the Nietzschean view. It could be the
case that morality is harmful to the psychological health of individuals, but
functionally necessary if society is to maintain and reproduce itself. The
necessar)' role of morality in insuring survival might weaken some of the
force of the Nietzschean objection (since we would not likely choose to
abolish moral! ty under these circumstances), yet the objection still stand.
Marx's discussion of morality, however, suggests that he thinks that
there is a posItive side to the human susceptibility to morality, independent
of the fact that morality is necessary for productive growth. I think ~arx
is best reconstructed by in cerpreting the human susceptibl1i ty to morali ty
as an expression of the human desire for social freedom. In seeking
justification for our actions, we seek to give reasons for what we do.
Furthermore, the reasons we seek to give In morality are reasons which we
want others to accept (or not reject). \\'e seek to reconcile our interests
with those of others.
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If religion holds out the promise of a human existence without rnisery,
morality's appeal Is the appeal of a standpoint from which all interests could
be reconciled. For, according to Marx, morallty arises In a world in which
interests are 1n conflict, In which the claims of one group oppose the cJairns
of others. The moral standpoint makes a unlversaHstic appeal to a "(ornrnon
good," promising a framework in which the basic interests of each will be
weighted equally, and in whIch no particular group will be privileged. It
offers us hope of a reconciliatIon of interests through balancing,
coordinating and integration. The moral standpoint abstr ~ct~ frorn the
particular differences of individuals and groups and considers only Whd t IS in
the common interest of each. It thus constructs in terms of an abstract
standpoint, a wor.d of social harrnony. Mora!! ty hoJds out the prornjse of a
universal good which is 1n the true interests of everyone: a world of equal
freedom.
At the heart of the issue here is whether this universalistic prornise
can be anything more than self-serving for particular interests. \1ar x, 1n
fact, argues that particular classes contending for social dominance always
repres~nt their interest as a unlversal1nterest:
For each new class whIch puts itself in the place of one ruling before
it 1s compelled merely In order to carry through its aJ,n, to represent
its interest as the comrr.on interest of all the Inembers of socIety, tha t
is, expre~sed 1n ideal form. It has to give its ideas the form of
unlvenaJity and represent them as the only rational universally
ones.
"Compelled" -- this is clearly compatible with the view that in order to
mobilize the I~pport of others, rising classes must mask their particular
Interests. In other words, clas~es make universalistic claims, only to
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influence others to follow them. ~'orality is a deception. However, if there
were no impulse to a "general interest" then there would be no "compulsion"
for the ruling class to represent its airns as such. It rnight, for exarnple,
offer only particular rewards to itself and its allies. Mar}\ , however, argues
that each ruling class represents its Interests as general interests not only to
others but also to itself. The French bourgeoisie, for example, needed to
represent their interests as general Interests
in order to conceal from themselves the boul'geol!l limitations of the
content of their struggles and to keeR their enthusiasm on the high
plane of the great historical tragedy.39
The desire to justify one's actions to others (and to oneself) is quite strong;
even the ruling class is susceptible to moral reasoning and argument.
And, even if the rulIng class is insincere in its cJal,ns, the atternpt to
justify themselves has consequences: rnorali ty gives hostage to future
generations. A claim that an interest is universal has its own entajlments:
when agents see that the claim is faJse, the moral appeal10ses Its force.
Insofar as no moral system really reconciles the interests of opposing
classes, each moral systern contains the seeds for its own destruct jon: "all
the weapons it (the bourgeoisie) had forged against feudalism turned their
points against itself.nllO Each moral system is superceded by another in
which a greater degree of freedom Is institutionalized: "Every ruling class
achieves i15 hegemony on a broader basis than that of the rullng class
previously.n41
Thus far we have seen that Marx's writings on morality, interpreted in
the light of his view of religion, yields a conceptIon of morality as a
distorted expression of true human interests. On the one hand, moraJity
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arises in circumstances in which the interests of one individual do in fact
diverge from the interests of others. The circumstances are those of class
societies, in which classes have opposing interests. ~1oraJity functions as a
framework for common protection and for further productive growth. While
morality expresses a standpoint in which there is harmony of interests, in
reality one cJass dominates others. Morality thus deludes individuals about
the nature of their Instl tutions and actions.
On the other hand, morall ty expresses the human aspira tion to a war Jd
of social harmony and freedom. Morality represents that world abstractly
but its abstract depiction tells the truth about the real world in which the
interests of each conflict wIth the interests of alt. There 15 no point of
reconciliation between the actual interests agents hold; the reconciliation
must be an abstract one. Morality gives expression to the human desire for
the common good, a society in which each individual Is free. Insofar as
morality holds out this promise, each moral system contains the basis for its
own 5upercession when it is seen that it does not live up to its claims.
(11) progress in moral systems.
The implication of this interpretation of ~1arx's argument Is tha t rnoral
systems will evolve In a direction which more closely realizes true human
interests. Moral systems progress tOWB. ds communism.
Some actual changes in moral systems which can serve as evidence for
Marx's argument are as follows:
1. Greater numbers of people have been incorporated into the
standpoint of moral! tya mora! systems increasingly trea t kings and
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paupers as equal. IndIviduals are regarded independently frorn the
social posi tions whIch they occupy.
2. Social arrangements based on subs tan ti ve inequaJi t y (e.g., sla ver y,
serfdom and caste systems) have been Increasingly acknowledged as
illegi ti rna te.
3. Moral justification has become distinct from religious justlfica tion
and mythology, making its appeal on rational grounds.42
Each of these changes involves the admittance of grea ter numbers of
individuals Into social life on a basis which recognizes (or clairns to
recognize) their capacity for autonomy.
A central problem for ~1arx's theory of history is to provide an account
of the rela tionship between this process of Increasing freedom and the
process of t:xpanding productivity. G.A. Cohen argues, as we saw, that the
social relations of successive societies are those rela tions which are
optimally functional for productive gray/the Thus, Cohen would have to
explain the direction in social relations (and the norms they embody), i.e.,
the fact that successive socIal relations embody greater autonomy than
their predecessors, by showing that autonomy is necessary to the increase of
productive powers. For example, Cohen might argue that free-Jabor is rnore
productive than slave-labor because the free laborer identifies his work with
his self-realizationJ the free laborer sees himself In his work and assumes
responsibility for It. But to so conceive his work as an extension of himself,
he must be free, he must not work simply out of fear and coercion.43 Social
relations which aJlow for greater autonomy are therefore necessary for
productive growth.
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) have argued, against Cohen, that there may be socIal relations
functionally equivalent for productive growth which differ along the
dimension of autonomy. Evidence for this possibili ty is provided by \~arx's
own writings, in particular, his letters concerning the possibili ty of socialist
revolution in semi-capitalist Russia. However, my argument about the
existence of functionally equlvalent social rela tions does not prove tha t the
process by which social freedom expands is separa te from tha t of growing
productivity, because it could be the case that all the avaIlable functional
equivalents represent progress along the dimension of socia! freedom. 41+ If
aJJ the functional equivalents are always better than the socIal relations of
their predecessor, then the process of increasing sociaJ freedom is not
separate from that of increasing productivity: greater social freedom Is
functional for productive growth. There is onJy one historical process, not
two. And, therefore, I have no argument against Cohen.
Marx's writings provide Jittle explicit support for the strong claim on
which Cohen's view relies, I.e., the claim that.2!! historical options are
always better on the value dimension of socIal freedom. Marx doesn't
therefore preclude the weaker and more plausible claim tha t functionally
equivalent social relations can differ widely with respect to the social
freedom they embody. This weaker claIm is more consonant wIth historical
experience. Capitalist industrIalization, for example, seems equally possible
under democratic regimes or extremely brutal dIctatorships (South Korea,
Taiwan, etc.) Neither ~arx nor Cohen give any expJicit argument for why
the theory of historical materialIsm requires the adoption of the strong
cJaim. In the absence of any such argument, and In the face of some
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historical evidence to the contrary, it seems more reasonable to adopt the
weaker claim. This weaker claim, however, requires that the process of
growing social freedom be accounted for by a mechanism separa te from tha t
of growing productIvity.
Once the weaker claim Is adopted, it becomes unclear why there
should even 2! historical options available for productive growth which also
increase social freedom. Why should the two processes whIch produce
productive growth and increasing freedom go together, instead of pulUng in
opposite directions (e.g., increasing productivity and diminishing freedom)?
I am unable to cJaim any necessity for this parallelism and, indeed, there is
aJways the possibility that the two processes will diverge. This is, of course,
not a possiblJit)' which ~1arx explicitly envisions, but it is no Jess possible for
that.
There Is one inter-relatjon between these two processes which I should
like to point out. Progress in realizing social freedom is materially
conditioned. That is, without material progress, there wouJd be no progress
in realizing autonomy. In partIcular, the exercise of autonomy depends on
material factors; It can be fulJy exercIsed only under conditions of relatIve
abundance. Only under such conditions, for example, is meaningfUl work
(see Chapter 3) a general possibility. Thus, progress In realizIng autonomy 15
constrained by the level of material development.
I now provide some evidence that Marx explicitly recognizes progress
In moral systems judged from the standpoint of autonomy. He endorses
certain mora! systems over others. In "On the Jewish QuestIon," he endorses
the expansjon of "rights" wlth!n capItalist society. He argues that the
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formal recognition of each individual as free and equal represents a "great
progress••• the final form of human emancipation within the prevaIling
order."45 In this essay, Marx advocates extending the vote to Jews in
Germany, a position not held by other radicals of his time. These radicals
argued against any reform which stopped short of an immediate realization
of the general good. Against them, 1\1arx defends political emancipation,
the extension of rights and formal liberties to a particular group. as a
partial step towards the realizatIon of social freedom. ~1arx's argument
suggests that he judges the morality of capItalist society "progressive" frorn
the standpoint of autonomy. It expands collective control over social
circumstances by abolishing the artificial distinctions between groups of
individuals. All individuals are recognized as having the capacity for
autonomy in capitalist society_
In The Crt tlgue of the Gotha Program, Marx dIstinguishes between two
distributional systems: (1) first-stage communism, as it emerges "ln every
respect, economically, morally and intellectually still stamped" by capi talist
soclety46 and (2) a higher phase of communist society in which "the
productive forces have increased with the all round development of the
individual, and aJJ the springs of coopera tive weaJth flow more
abundantJy.,,47 The first of these societies Is characterized by a system of
"right," that is, by morality. The second Is a system which transcends
moral! ty. In what respects does Marx view the mora! system of first-stage
communism as an advance over that of capitaJist socIety?
In fIrst stage communism, each worker contributes a certaIn amount
of Jabor time to society and receIves In return a certificate for a
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proportional number of hours (the hours worked minus a part set asIde for
the replacement of instrurnents of production, subsidization of the elderly,
etc.) With his certificate, the worker draws from the social stock of
available means of consumption. His share is thus proportional to his
contribution. As under capitalism, the principle of formal equality Js
applied -- labor time is exchanged for an equivalent amount of Jabor hours
But the conditions of communist society are more equal than those of
capitalist society as classes have been abolished. Only labor inputs are
exchanged for certificates, so that no one can contribute anything but labor:
al! must work. Further, because nothing can pass to the ownership of
individuals except means of consumptIon, no one can own the labor power of
anyone else. So although first-stage communisrn and capitalism share the
principle of equality of exchange, only with the former are "principle and
practice no longer at Joggerheads."48
It is important to note with respect to the issue of progress In rnoral
systems that Marx refers to the communist principle of Jabor contribution as
an advance over the formal equaJity of capitalism. Moreover, it is an
advance In terms of a principle of right, i.e., a princlpJe of distrIbutive
justice, a moral concept. The rights and equality of fIrst-stage communism
represent a greater fulfilJment of the conditions for ful! and equaJ freedom
promised by the .nora! standpoint, a greater harmony of Interests. Whereas,
In capitalist society, rights are forma! and procedural, the rights of early
communist society take into consideration the social and poll tical
inequalities whIch Jimlt the full expression of human autonomy. No one has
a right to own the means of production, Accordingly, the interests of
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workers are no Jonger subordinated to the interests of the capitalists.
First-stage communism, however, is still marked by an imperfection.
Full communism, Marx cJaims, will be a society in which the social
consciousness of the general interest will no longer take a moral form, just
as social association will no longer take the form of the state. \\'hy is the
morality of first-stage communism imperfect? First stage communism
achieves both a massive productive surplus and an end to social classes.
Why does Marx then postuJate a second stage?
4.4 FuJI Communism.
Marx qualIfies his endorsement of first-stage communism's prInciple of
right ..- the "con tr ibution principle." Although this prIncipJe is incornpa tibJe
with the existence of classes, I t rewards certain natural differences. If one
worker can work longer than another (perhaps because he is stronger), then
he will earn more. The contribution prInciple thereby "tacitly recognizes
unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natura!
privileges.,,49 It is inequi table because Inequall tIes in intelligence and
strength should not justify unequal reward. This is not a particular problem
with the contribution principle, but with rights: every right is
a right of inequality, In Its content•••Right by Its very nature can
consist only 1n the applicatIon of an equal standard; but unequal
individuals (and they would not be dIfferent individuals if they were
not unequal) are measurable by an equal standard only insofar as they
are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite
side only•.50
The moral standpoInt abstracts from my particular interests; it consJders my
interests from "one definIte side only," based on an abstract norm of
equality, Because morality arIses when my own interest and the interests of
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others conflict, Its reconciliation of interests ignores the particuJar
interests of individuals, identIfying a set of interests common to each of
them. Because it can find these common interests only from a standpoint
which abstracts from IndIvidual differences, It presupposes the existence of
these differences. In other words, It takes these differences as given. The
moral standpoint starts from the opposi ticn between my interests and those
of others.
But under full communism there is no such dist.nction: interests are
really coherent. That is, Marx views communIsm as a society in which my
judgement about what advances my own good is not distinct from my
judgement about what is best taking the interests of others equally into
account. "'hat advances my own good is at the same time advancing the
good of others.
What couJd Marx have in mind by this? FuJI communism is
characterIzed by the needs principle: "from each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs." ~1arx's assumptIon (which he shares with
Hume) Is that in a society beyond scarcity, "justice" will be unnecessary.
Both the worker who Is stronger and the one who Is weak will give what they
can and take what they need. Without thIs assumption, the complete
reconciliation of interests would be impossible: distribution would require
some criterion.5J In fact, even the needs principle relies on some criterion
of what constitutes a "need." It does not advocate that people get what
they want, but only what they~.
Equally important for ~1arx's conception of communism as a society
beyond the moral form of consciousness Is the interdependence of the values
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which communism realizes: my autonomy Is only possible In a system of
equal autonomy. Likewise, the values of cooperation, meaningful work and
the pursuit of knowledge are values not only good for the individuals who
pursue them, but are also 11k" Jy to enhance the well-being of others. In
achieving these ends we thereby contribute to the good of our associa teSt
With the needs principle, human interests no longer take a moral form,
just as under communism spirituality will no longer take a religious forn1.
However, there Is a point at which the analogy between rnorality and
religion seems to break down: the needs systern of communism will not
result in immoralism, but the end of religion will result In atheism. Under
communism, individuals are directly motivated by what Is collectively good,
that is, by what they were attempting to grasp through the moral
standpoint.
Marx's endorsen,ent of full communism is direct evidence of his view
that communism is a society which realizes true human interests. FuJI
communism is superior to first-stage communism not because it increases
productivity, but because it fully realizes autonomy. The desire individuals
have for autonomy explaIns why they eventually reject the distributive
system of first-stage communism. First stage-communism 1s flawed by its
abstract treatment of individuals. By rewarding separate unique indIviduals
equally -- by considering thern from one side only -- even "communist
justice" tacitly reproduces inequalIties. Morality Is flawed, moreover,
because it understands individuals as bound to each other by a mutual
system of constraints. FulJ communism is not an framework in which each
person realizes their private ends, but a community of shared final ends in
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which individuals participate in "the total sum of the realized assets of
others."52 Under full communism, individuals no longer need the moral
form to represent their true interests, because the interests of each are
compatible with the interests of all. Under these conditions, individuals
dispense wi th the moral form.
This is, I think, a reasonable reconstruction of Marx's views on the
relationship between morality and autonomy. However, even as
reconstructed, f\1arx's view is problematic insofar as it depicts a society
totally without the need for a moral framework. The idea of perfect social
harmony is a utopia in light of the existence of scarcity even at the stage of
materlaJ abundance. Collective decisions on the social aJloca tion of labor,
the dIvision of labor-time between free and necessary labor, will remain
questions of pubJic debate. Even as the abstract standpoint of morality is
eroded by expJicit consideration of needs, the question of which needs, i.e.,
the social weighting of needs, will remain. In his grimmer moods, \t1arx
recognizes that society wiJI always be subject to some external constraInts,
to necessary work which will be a possible source of conflict and
deliberation. The realization of autonomy Is never "perfect." \\'hile human
interactIon comes to be regulated more and more on the basis of such non-
moral values as friendship, association and mutual respect, production
remains a realm of necessity, bound by the need to regulate the Jabor of
individuaJs according to society's needs. It thus remains subject to
delIberation and more importantly, to distrIbutive consIderations of justice:
Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to
maintain and reproduce life, so must civilIzed man, and he must do so
in all social formations and under all possible nlodes of
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production •••Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized rnan,
the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with
Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled
by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving thi., with the least
expenditure of energy and under condi tions most favorable to, and
worthy of, their human nature. 53
Communism, contrary to Marx's declaration in The Communist Manifesto,
cannot be a society wIthout a rnoral form of consciousness. And, in this
sense, ~1arx's criticism of existing society cannot be as radical as he
intended.
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Chapter Five: Freedom Rising
5.1 Introduction
This chapter cOfnpletes the argument of the thesis. Past chapters
have argued for the need to "reconstruct" historical rnateria!lsm, in order to
make explicit the fact that Marx's theory of history must consist of 'TIore
than a thesis about the development of the productive forces.
"Reconstructed historical materiallsrntt is comml tted to three other theses:
(1) that there has been a growth of autonomy in history (see chapter 3); (2)
that autonomy 1s a "true human interest" (see chapter 4); and (3) that the
moral systems of successive so':lal forms are increasingly accurate
representations of true human interests (see chapter 4). I now consider wha t
'vtarx's argument about the conditions for the transf\Jrmatlon of one social
form to its successor would have looked like, had he consistently held this
"reconstructed" view, namely, that progress towards comrrunlsm depends on
two procosses: one of increasing productive power and a second process by
which true human interests are increasingly realized in hIstory. The rnost
important of these interests Is autonomy.
Individual autonomy consists 1n the actua! exercise of control over
one's own actions. Chapter three argued that autonomy Is realized in a
social order when its members exercise collective control over the major
socIal institutions, most crucially those of production. According to Marx,
communism is the social form in which this occurs. Communism allows
human beings to achieve autonomy under conditions of social
interdependence. Furthermore, under communism, autonomy would satisfy
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the desires which agents actually have (see Chapter 4). Previous to th~
attainment of communisrn, however, agents' awareness of their interest in
autonorn y is distorted by the illusions associa ted wj th class socie ties.
Agents often desire ends which are contrary to their true interest in
autonomy.!
Thus, we have two questions. First, since agents do not~ live under
the "optimal conditions" of communist society, how can they gain an
awareness of their true interest in autonomy? Second, and related, how can
agents develop an understanding of the manner in which their social
relations constrain their ability to be autonomous? The answer ':0 these
questions is that while agents cannot gaIn a complete awareness of their
interest in autonomy and the social form which insti tutjoni1Jizes autonorny,
they can gaIn some knowledge of them which then enables these agents to
abolish some of the constraints from which they suffer. By leading to
certain actions, this knowledge thus moves agents closer to the "optirnal
conditions" under which they can realize their autonomy. What we need,
then, is an account of how agents gaIn this growing awareness. I will argue
that the objectivity of autonomy plays an important role in this process of
growIng awareness. The fact that autono,ny satisfies true human interests
Is part of the explanation for why people come to desire it and pursue it.
In this chapter, I develop an account of a "learning process" by whIch
agents achieve an increasing awareness of their true interest in autonomy
and the institutional requirements of autonomy. It Is this IncreasIng
awareness which leads them to act to bring about autononly. The "learning
process" which I will describe initially takes place among the oppressed and
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exploited social classes. The subject of this learning process is not prirnarily
individuals, but groups; in particular, social classes. The idea of a collective
learning process is, admittedly, not unproblernatic. In what follows, I witl
try to make it appear more plausible.
5.2 Theoretical discussion
Historical materialism attefnpts to explain the social transformations
which have occured in history and the ,direction which these transforrnations
have taken. That is, historical materialism, as a theory of history, offers an
explanation of the causes and the resul ts of major historical changes. In
particular, it attempts to explain the development of the productIve forces
and the growing autonomy which is realized in social forms, both of which
are taken by Marx to be the preconditions for communisrn.
G.A. Cohen has clarified the argurnent for why the productive forces
tend to grow in history. But historical materialism also maintains that there
has been a growing embodiment of autonomy in social forms. Roughly, a
society )( "embodies" a value y when the institutions, laws and practices of x
are generally acceptable to an agent 1n virtue of his commitment to value y.
For example, the laws and institutions which characterize feudal society
would not be endorsed by an agent committed to the value of equality.
In the world of ancient Athens, slavery was generally accepted. In the
modern world, the institution itself 15 widely condemned as illegitimate.
The task of historical materialism is not so much to explain why slavery 1s
condemned after it Is abolished but to show how individuals and groups
within a slave society come to criticize slavery and replace it with a social
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form which allows for a greater achievement of their true human interests.
Why is autonomy increasingly realized in social forms? In particular, is
there any connection between the fact that autonomy is in true hurnan
interests and the fact that it tends to occur?
I will argue that there is a connection. But before I propose an
explanation for the realization of autonomy in social forms, I will briefly
address a common argument which maintains that there can not be any such
connection on philosophical grounds. This argument rules out explanations
which rely on values: values, it Is claimed, can not enter Into the
explanation of facts. In response to this argument, Peter Raiiton gives the
following example:
Bobby Shaftoe went to sea because he believed it was the best way to
make his fortune, and he wanted above all to make his fortune. 2
In this example, Bobby Shaftoe's actions are explained by showing that it 15
rational for him to go to sea, given his beliefs and desires. Norms of
rationality, thus, enter into the explanation of behavior. Therefore, this
exarnple shows how normative criteria can enter into the explanation of
behavior.
Railton shows that values can enter into explanations and that the
philosophical objection is unfounded. I now want to turn to the substantive
claim that a certain type of value, namely, objective value, can explain
behavior and actions In history.
I have argued that autonomy Is an objective value. Its goodness for
human agents does not, therefore, depend on the conceptions which they
hold about their interests. Specifically, its goodness does not depend on its
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being recognized as such. At the same time, the objective value of
autonomy rests on a relational rather than on an absolute sense of
goodness.) It depends, that is, on the constitution of human beings. Thus,
to return to an earlier example from Chapter 4, it is in the objective
interest of an alcoholic to stop drinking, but the truth of this clalln is
dependent on features of human physiology and psychology. Objective
interests are "supervenient" upon natura! and social facts.
In what way, then, do the objective interests themselves contribute to
the explanatIon of behavior? In what sense does the fact that an alcoholic
has an 22Jectlve interest 1n not drinking explain why he stops drinking?
Presumably, we can explain this fact in terms of the supervenience basis of
thIs objective interest (i.e., the alcoholic's physiology, etc.) alone. How,
then, can explanations using the concept of objective interests be genuinely
informative? In what sense does the appeal to objective interests help
account for the evidence? Ther! seems to be no need in the case of the
alcoholic for the explanation to refer to an independent realm of values.
Thl'S, Gilbert Harman argues,
Observation plays a role In science that it does not seem to play in
ethics. The difference 1!' that you need to make assumptions about
certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the o~servatlons to
support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make
assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence of••.50'"
called moral observations•••ln the moral case, it would seem that you
need only make assumptions about the psychology or moral senslbl!Jty
of the person making the moral observation.4
Harman's argument can lead to naturalistic reduction, moral nlhllsm or non-
cognltlvlsm. It questions the place of values in the world of facts.'
Regardless of where it leads, however, Harman's argument doubts that
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values can be genuinely explanatory. The use of values in an explanation,
Harman argues, cannot be informative. Harrnan believes tha t there Is no
way of deciding the issue of whether or not objective values (or interests)
exist.6 Nonetheless, his argument suggests that there is no reason to appeal
to values in explana tion.
Railton argues that objective interests can serve an explanatory
function. In particular, he argues that an agent's objectIve interests play an
explanatory role in the evolution of that agent's desires. Through trial and
error, agents can Jearn that certain desires do not serve their objectIve
interests. If a given desire is not in the Int'~rest of an agent, Rail ton argues,
then there will be feedback, operating largely through unreflective
experimentation, which will Influence the formatIon of the agent's desires.
Railton illustrates this point with a discussion of Q traveJler with a stomach
illness who desires a glass of mIlk. The effect of drinking hard-ta-digest
milk only worsens the traveller's conditIon. After repeated milk drinking
and bouts of Illness, he happens upon a bottle of 7-Up, drinks 1t and
immediately feels better. The next time he feels sick (or perhaps the time
after that) he will have learned through feedback and reinforcement that his
desire for milk is not in his interests. A "wants/Interests" mechanism,7 as
postulated by this example, allows for objective interest to playa role In the
evolution of subjective (I.e" merely perceived) interests and desires.
The question is whether or not an appeal to objective values or
interests can provide an account of moral beliefs and socia! practices which
Is more usefuJ than that offered by someone who Is sceptical about such
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values. I will argue that objective interests can have an explanatory
function with respect to tile direction in which agents' moral beliefs and
practices have evolved. This direction is precisely what historical
materialism needs to explain: why do moral beliefs and practices and social
institutions tend to approximate those which agents would choose if their
desires and interests were formed under communism? The alternative to
the realist strategy which I will take must be to ascribe this direction to
some other process (such as material progress) or to chance.
If we accept the premise that autonomy is an objective interest and
that communism alone among social forms embodies autonorny, how can this
premise be part of the explanation for the development of agents' beliefs
and actions? The argument proceeds as follows. Social forms which depart
from the arrangement of institutions and practices which characterize
communism will depart from true human interests. The departure~ of these
institutions from true human interests will tend to encourage
dissatisfaction, particularly among those whose true interests are least
taken into account. Thus, the oppressed social classes who are granted
sinall possibility to exercise control over their lives are in an especially good
position to recognize the fact that an existing social order is not 1n their
true interests. Whether or not they will recognize it depends on mi'n)'
factors, but the fact that the social order Is not objectively in their
interests may help to explain why they come to so recognize it, when they
do.
Analogous to the case of Ral1ton's traveller, the discontent of the
oppressed may produce an experience feedback as to which social
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arrangements better approximate true human interests. As hUlnan agents
learn more about the sources of their frustrations, their desires witt tend to
evolve to accord better with their true interests. They will tend to reject
tho,e insti tutlons and practices which fail to accord recogni tion to their
lnterests. And, if communism is a society in which the interests of everyone
else are taken equally into account, they will tend to choose those social
institutions which increasingly resemble those of communist society.
In the Grundrisse, Marx refers to the growing self-consciousness of the
slave and wage-laborer In a manner which is consistent wi th this account of
learning:
The recognition of the products as its own, and the judgement that its
separation from the conditions of its realization is improper ... forcibly
imposed - is an enormous (advance in) awareness, itself the product of
the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to itC)
doom as, with the slave's awareness that he cannot be the property of
another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of
slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases
to be able to prevail as the basis of production.8
In this passage, Marx refers to the new awareness of the slave and worker
not as a change but as an enormous advance. It is an enormous advance
precisely because this growing awareness enables agents to recognize their
true human Interest~ as opposed to the interests which they have because of
their p"rticular situation in a particular social form. With this new
awareness, they reject some aspect of social domination.
The mechanism whereby agents' behavior 1s brought into congruence
wIth their true interests is not especially direct. It Is less direct, for
instance, than i.n the case of the individual traveller. It can tend to push the
oppressed 1n the direction uf satisfying their own particular interests ..~ and
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not their true interests. For example, it can push the oppressed to act
against the interests of other weak groups.9 Thus, oppressed groups often
turn on other oppressed groups, as when skilled, whi te rnale workers seek to
deny other groups (e.g., blacks, women and unskilled workers) an equal
position in the labor market. The oppressed are often deluded about the
causes of their suffering, and there is no guarantee that the learning
mechanism will be effective in all cases. This possibility has Jed some
within the Marxist tradition to argue that not the oppressed but intellectuals
are the group rnost likely to correctly identify their true human interests. 1a
These Marxists claim that intellectuals, who are not only in a position to
read and study, but who also experience greater autonomy than the
oppressed, are a more reliable historicaJ lever for moving true human
interests forward.
There are two possible responses to this line of argument. In the first
place, the argument can be dismissed. \t1arx thinks, at least in capi talist
society, that intellectuals play a ~ubordlnate role in collective learning. ii
Working class institutions and political parties are sufficient to ensure that
the working class will develop a knowledge of their true interests. Marx
repeatedly refers to trade unions as "schools" for socialism.
In the second place, the argument about intellectuals can be accepted,
but its significance denied. Marx does not think that all classes are 1n an
equally good posItion to recognize their true interest or solve their
collective action probJelns (see beloN). Thus, other groups or individuals
may playa role In the learning process. Peasants and slaves, for example,
may be 1n a very poor position to overcome their collective action problems.
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However, it is not the origin of knowledge but its widespread dissemination
which is irnportant. Regardless of who first recognizes true human
interests, the question is which groups will be responsive to this knowledge.
~ot all groups are equally responsive to a given set of ideas, and a given set
of ideas is not equally attractive to all groups. The oppressed may lack
knowledge of the social conditions required to expand their autonolny, but
they will be rnore or less aware that their autonomy is inhibi ted.
Furthermore, there must be institutions and urganizatlons for the diffusion
of these ideas, and if intellectuals corne to dominate those Insti tutlons there
is the danger that the intellectuals will promote their own interests and not
the knowledge which they have gained. The learning process could, in that
case, be easily derailed.
Not all agents, then, will be equally capable of learning even if
confronted with the appropriate knowledge and/or experience. The ruling
class has material interests which make its learning less likely; it has
powerful interests which inhibit its ability either to perceive or to work
towards promoting true human interests. Marx undoubtedly has this in mind
when he writes that "it is only in an order of things in which there are no
more class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be poli tical
revolutions." 12 The old rulIng class often needs to be defeated. Once a new
level of social learning is institutionalized, however, it becomes more or less
accepted. Marx does not think that agents in a communist society will
continually try to re-establish capitalism, as one might expect them to do if
capitalIsm was in their true interests. Rather, agents will recognize that
capitalism Is not In their true interests. At each historical stage, agents
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learn about the connection between their interests and the general interest;
they learn that some form of social domination is not really in their
interests.
There is an obvious objection to this argl1ment about learning: it
assumes that the translation of new knowledge into action is unproble,natic.
But a group may be too scattered or too weak to rnobillze effectively even
where it recognizes its interest in overturning a r:onstraint on its freedom.
Or it may face overwhelming repression. The most important chal1eng ~
with regard to the translation of knowledge into action, however, does not
concern circumstances of repression and class weakness. Game theorists
have argued that even if each member of a group recognizes that a public
good ...-a good whose attainment would benefit everyone -- 1s in his interest,
h~s acting rationally might mean that the group will D.2.! achieve the
concerted action necessary to gain that good. This is because, to the extent
that each member of the group Is rational, he may be tempted by the
prospect of a free ride; of benefitting from the successful struggle of others
for the public good without having to make the effort of partic:ipating in the
struggle himself. The result is free-rider egoisrn: if each group member
reasons from his self...lnterest, the result is that nothing will be
accomplished. As Mancur Olson puts it, "class-oriented revolu Lionary action
will not occur if the indlvidual~ that make up a class act rationally." 13
Is there a way out of this paradox? Two features of the situation of
oppr~ssed social groups suggest how they will tend to be able to modify their
collective action problems. The first feature of their real situation is that
it Is likely to be one in which problems whose solution requires cooperation
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will lJe recurrently presented to them. Through their repeated failure to
enact desired goals b}I not cooperating, agents often Jearn that cooperation
is necessary. Repeated fallure can, for example, lead them to enact
sanctions for non-coopera tion, as in the case of a closed union shop.14
A second feature of the situation of oppressed social groups which
will tend to ease their collective action problems is the existence of
solidarity among individuals wi thin a class, due to their c\Jmmon values and
posi tions. Through continued interaction, members of an oppressed group
become both concerned and informed about one another. This growth in
rnutual concern and knowledge leads to more solidaristic relations among
the agents and these new relations tend to reinforce ttlemselves. In other
words, once class solldarity emerges, it tends to become the don,inant
strategy for agents within that class. Solidarity also can lead to sanctions
for transgression. Marx emphasizes the factor of solidarity in his discussion
of working class revolutionary action, which I will discuss below.
The above considerations provide reasons for thinking that classes are
in an especially good position to solve their collective action problems.
Agents in a class have mutual sympathy for one another, they are placed 1n
a situation In which probJ~ms involving collective action are serially
presented, and their problems occur In a context of struggle and conflict
which fosters their adeptness at enacting sanctions.!'
But even if we conclude that oppressed groups can increasingly
perceive theil' true interests, there 1s a final objection to the argument
about objective values which must be answered. In the case of class
societies, the interests of different classes are opposed. Wha t is in the
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interests of society as a whole may not be in the interests of each of its
diffEtfent classes (e)(cept in the infamous long run). There will be
disGgreements betwt-en soc1al classes as to what best realizes true hUlnan
interests. Why should the oppressed be sLlfflcently powerful to enforce their
knowledge- of what is best?
It is her~ t~at the role of morality as an lrnperfect e)(pression of true
human interests Is important. As I discussed in Chapter 4, mo:" ;1 clalrns are
addressed to all agents in a so~iety. Morality provides agents wltt'. reasons
to accept social institutions and practices. The reasons given will differ
from one society to another, but at the very least, agents fTlUst believe that
the institutions and t • cictices which embody these moral values provide a
framework in which they can satisfy their basic interests. Moreover, all
moral systems claim to give agents motivations for acting and criteria for
evaluating which are rflstlnct from considerations of self-interest. Marx
explicitly argues that moral systems claim to represent, and to SOule extent
really do represent, the "general1nterest." 16 That is, because morality is
addro \sed to !!! members of a socletr, they will tend to lnvolve more than
the particular interests of a particular class. Moral harms must bd capable
of justification 1., the eyes of all IT'embers of society. Otherwise, class
societies might degenerate intc, civil wars,
But Marx arlu~s that morality 1s also the form taken b) social
consciousness when society 1s divided into opposing particular interests, l.e.,
when one loc1al class dominates another class. Thus, while a mora! system
1s • framework In which agents ,::ollectlvely achieve a degree of control
over locial circumstances, it also sanctions the rule of a particular class.
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\1orality serves, then, as an irnperfect expression of the conditions for
autonomy: it represents a certain degree of social freedom, at the sarne
time that it contains illusions about the conditions for sociaJ freedom.
By cJallning to represent a general interest without actually being a
general interest, ;noral norms underr:ut themselves. The outbreak of social
discontent and class struggle shows the partial truth of moral claims. As
the conflict mounts, the sense of oppression and injustice becolnes greater
and the illusory aspects of society's norrns more transparent. This enables cl
shift 1n values, a shift whIch can have an important lrnpact on class
struggles and social tranformiations by unleashing the power of the
oppressed, whil" (potentially) making the exploi ters more reluctan t to use
theirs.
Thus, soclal1earnlng emerges because sOlne agents have the capacity
to recognize the human interest in autonomy through their understanding of
the social constraints on their freedom, and to act on that recognItion. The
existence of morality gives these agents tl0tential leverage over the rest of
society; moral talk refers to the real world and has consequences. If a
society claims to represent the general interest and does not in fact
represent it, its claim gives hostage to future generations.
The existence of a wants/interests mechanism which allows agents,
under the influence of positive and negative associations, to adjust (more or
lesl consciously) their desires and partH~ular interests to their objective
interelts allows us to explain the actual evolution in moral systems detailed
1n Chapter 4. The.e change. Involved (1) the lncorporatlon of greater
numbers of persons on a bllis of equallty, and (2) the shift from justification
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based on religion and myth to justifIcation wh.~h makes "an intrinsic
connection between normative principles and effects on human interests." 17
The wants/interests rnechanism allows us retrospec lively to explain the
actual evolution of human desires. Every major social and poll tical
transformation has suffered a morn! defeat before these changes took place:
the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution, the AmerIcan Civil War, and
the Russian Revolution. In this process, new standards of condemna tion
were developed and the new morall ty claimed to express (and really
expressed) the hopes and interests of a wider segment of mankind. Even
where universal interests have not been the standard, criticlsrn of authority
has made use of th~ fact that this authority has not lived up to its prornises.
Although it is not always easy to apply this schema to particular historical
developments, the wants/interests mechanism allows us to explain the
general direction of moral norms.
'.3 Historical Discussion
The preceding discussion has been abstract. In this section, I present a
historical example which supports my argument for collective learning. This
example is drawn from capitalist society. In the conclusion to this section, I
will argue that this analysis of collective learning can strengthen Marx's
argument for the transition from capitalism to communism.
'.31 An example
One example In modern society of collective learning concerns the
decline of racial discrimination and the broad elimination of legal barriers
for citizenship. Less than thirty years ago, American blacks were denied
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the right to vote, excluded from rnany jobs and educational opportunities.
Racisrn was a deeply rooted ideology. Through the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, most whites, North and South, considered blacks their
inferior3.18 The decline of the racial caste systeln in the United States was
the result of changes in the ideology of both blacks and whites. While the
existence of quiescence does not show consent, there were certainly many
blacks who believed that segregation was "the way the world is" and could
not be changed. Rosa Parks, the \1ontgomery bus boycott, and the Freedorn
Marches taught people that this was not so.
While the movement against racism has not been totally successful,
American society is characterized today by a general equality which was
inconceivable forty, or even twenty, years ago. Blacks and whites work side
by side In many settings which produced anti-black strikes and riots in ti Ie
19405. Survey data shows marked upturns In white attitudes of support for
desegregation. Former white racists have accepted -- many genuinely, some
hypocritically -- the equality of blacks and whites. In the words of a recent
study on racial attitudes in AmerlcB,
What hal changed 1s the normative definition of appropriate relation~
between blacks and whites. Whereas discrimination against, and
enforced segregation of, blacks was taken for granted by most white
Americans .s recently .s the 19405, today the dominant belIef 15 that
blacks deserve the same treatment and respect as whites, and that
some degree of racial1ntegration is a desirable thlng. 19
This example involve. changes 1n the self-conception of blacks and in the
attitudes of thole who have benefited from the oppression. Black oppression
gave rise to it sociaJ movement which explicitly focused on the disjunction
between the professed ideals of society and its actual practices.
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5.32 The transition from capitalism to communisrn
Capitalist society is the society whose developmental prospects Marx
is most concerned wIth. He sees the e,nanclpatory potential for capitalist
society in the condl tion and exper lences of the working class. In capl tails t
society, moreover, the working class is composed of the vast rnajori ty of the
population. Because of this, Marx expects that there will be a rnore direct
relatIon between the workers' consciousness of the constraints on their
freedom and the abolition of capitalist society than has occurred at any
time in the past. This is both because the working class has grea ter
t<nowledge about human interests than 1ts predecessors and because in
capitalist society, there is no need for workers to convince other social
classes before they are to succeed.
In thIs section, I reconstruct Marx's argument about the transi tion to
communism, using the previous discussion as its basis. I show that
communism can be the endpoint of the historical process only 1f workers
recognize capitalism's property reJations as a constraint on their truf'
interests. Capitalist society is incompatible with the "general interest"
expressed by the moral norms which its members accept.
In Volume I of Capital, Marx makes a series of claims about the
tendencies of capitalist economic developmentl (1) capitalist competitjon
leads to the monopolization of the rnesns of productl\Jn, its control by a
small number of ownerSI (2) capitalist production tends increasingly to
displace the labor component In production by machinery, thus leading to a
"reserve army" of unemployed workers, (3) capl talism furthers the
development of cooperatIon among workers by assembling them Into large
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factories and workshops, thereby concentrating the means of production;
and (4) capitalis,n increases the division of labor.
As a result of these processes, workers are organized, de-skil1ed20 and
degraded21 at the same time that the development of large scale industry
based on machinery lays the foundation for production which is distinct from
labor.22 The transformation of society becomes rnaterial1y possible:
capitalism creates the wealth and productive machinery to generate an
enormous surplus.
According to Marx, the changes in the structure of capitallst
production make apparent the common interests of the working class. On
the basis of this awareness, workers will see the need to overthrow
capitalism and establish communism. But "lOW exactly are they to see thi~:
In particular, how do thc!y !!! that their "separation from the conditions of
their realization is imeroper?"23 Why should the recognition of the common
position of the working class as a whole generate a movement for
communism, rather than for some other form of social organization?
Marx's own explicit discussion of this process focuses on the pu;suit of
material interests. Through defending the conditions which maln\ lin theh·
own survival, Marx believes that workers will be led to challenge the logIc
of capitalism itself. Underlying Marx's discussion 1s nis assumption of the
fundamental1mportance of the objective conflict of materlal1nterests. At
time., Marx presents the abolition of capitalism ae necessary 1f workers are
to realize even their immediate material Interests.24 More often, hl&
emphasis 18 on the growth of working class association In the struggle to
defend these Interests.2' In their struggles, workers begln to associate with
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one another in a mannel ~,hich leads them to act in concerted opposi tion to
capitalists: they le~rn that to oppose capitalists ~ffectlvely they have to
act collectively, and not as isolatelllndividuais. Through this collective
action, they come to vaJue their association for its own sake. Their revolt
against capitalism stems from their recognition that the structure of
capltaU,t society is an impediment to their collective association.
But what values sho•• ld the proletarian community adopt? Association
is possible on various bases. Not all associations need be egalitarian, for
example. And, if we reject \1arx's belief that there is a clear trend in the
direction of the h.:tmogenization of wage levels, then we need some other
basis for the workers' "common position."
According to one interpretation of Marx's theory of proletarian
revolution, the success of working class str'lggJe depends on the abili ty of
workers to free themselves from the moral standpoint of capitalist society
and reject it as a hoax.26 As I have emphasized In previous chapters.
evidence for this view can be found in Marx. Furthermore, Marx often
presents communist consciousness as a direct product of changes in the
labour process. This is a view which I have tried to debunk 1n this essay.
ha~e argued that the role of collective kn\)wledge about values Is crpcial in
social transfo!mations. Indeed, without this knowlege communism would not
necessarily be the end product of history as opposed to some other socia!
form equally optimal for productive growth. In fact, morality plays a
crucial role 1n motivating working class revolutionary action for
communIsm, namely, workers' attempt to realize the general interest
expressed In the morality of capitalist socIety.
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The position of the working class in capi talist society is one of
sUbjugation, exploitation, frustration and delusion, caused by existing social
relations. Capitalist relations of production prevent workers frorn
exer~ising substantive control over their circumstances or traIn usIng their
realized capaclti~s. Thus, capitalist society, like all class societies.
contains a group whose aspir( Ions for freedom are particularly vppressed by
the class relations of that society: in a capitalist society, the satisfaction of
the interests of the workers are dependent upon the prl,)r satisfaction of the
interests of the capitalists.
But this oppression is difficult to sustain L'ecause the moral norrns of
capitalist society contain an element of protest against that oppression.
These norms lead to protest against that oppression insofar as they portray a
standpoint from which all interests must have equal weighting. 11'\ capitalist
society, practices and institutions are justified only to the extent that they
are applicable to everyone.
The moral norms institutionalized in capitalist society are completely
universal, but formala they do not take into account In their application the
fundamental inequal1 ties of social life. These inequali t ies, howev~r,
continue the subordination of the interests of one group of people (workers)
to the interests of another group (capitalists). These Inequalities produce
departures from a society In which there 1s equal freedom, I.e., communist
society.
Thft workers' dependence on the ~apitallsts leads to conflJ':ts, to
strussles over matarial interests. Through these conflicts, workers learn
that the satisfaction of their materiallnterests depends on the will of the
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capitalists, who have Intere~ts which are opposed to th(=!irs. They thus learn
that there can bp no "general Interest" until the capItalist social relations of
production are changed. While many of the practices and institutions of
capitalist society institutionalize a greater degree of social freedom than
previous societies, there is still no real community of interests. The
universality of capitalist moralIty Is merely formal.
'.If Conclusion.
This essay has tried to address a central probJem in Marx's theory of
history: the relatl.)nship between the tendency of the forces of production to
grow and the tendency for freedom to be realIzed in social fife. It JS clear
that Marx sees both processes at work in history_ However, he never
presents any account of their relationshIp. This relationship Is, however,
crucial1f he is to show why communism and not some other social f~rm
equally effIcient for productive growth results from the "real movement" of
history.
G.A. Cohen argues, as we saw earlier, that the growth of freedom Is a
necessary consequence 01 the development of human productive power. Not
only does the development of the productive forces, on Cohen's al:count,
establish the material ba,is for human freedom, but 1t is !!.!!t!! the exercise
of that freedom, sInce through production human beings develop their
essential capacities. I have argued that Cohen has failed to establish this
conclusion. There are social forms functionally equivalent for the
advancement of human productive power. There Is no reason to belIeve that
all the pOI.lble functional equIvalents !!!.2 represent progress on the
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dimension of social freedom. The growth of freedom must therefore be an
independent process.
fiow can Marx explain that process, which is crucial for his theory of
history? I have argued that in order to provide such an explana tion, \1Clrx
Inust be "reconstructed" as a value realist, that is, as someone who believes
that there are values which are in true human interests. The Inost
important of ~he5e values is autonomy. I have tried to show how the
objective value of autonomy can play an explanatory role in the evolution of
agents' rnora! beliefs ana practices. My argument rests on the pastula tion of
a feedback mechanism through which agents can learn that certain of their
desires are not in their true interests. Social forms which depart from '~he
institutional requirements of autonolny encourage the growth of
dissatisfaction and unrest, even where agents initially believe that a social
form is in their interest. There is a feedback mechanism In which the
interests of a group In autonomy leads to a change In the groups actlon~i and
beliefs. Objective values can have an expla.latory function.
To the extent that my reconstruction is successful, 1t bears on an'Jther
problem In the interpretation of Marx. Marx paradoxically condemns rnoral
values but advocates communism as better than capitalism. In virtue o',f
what, then, did Marx condemn capitalism? My thesis builds on a distinction
drawn by Allen Wood between moral and non-moral values. However, "'ood
does not address the nature of the non-moral values which Marx advocates.
I argue that these values are in true human interests, whereas the mora!
standpoint Is only a distorted representation of those interest3. The mOI'a!
standpoint represents true human interests In the form of an abstract
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recon(:iliation of interests. When an agent takes the standpoint of morality,
he evaluates his actions in the light of the opposing interests of others. But
under comrnunism, \t1arx argues, there will be no need to represent our
interests as opposed to those of others.
I clairn that while ~arx condemns the moral form, he sees the content
of morality as a distorted representation of true human interests. The
appeal of moral! ty is the misdirected appeal of a standpoint from which all
interests could be reconciled, a world of social harmony. While this appeal
is mis-directed, and while each moral systern sanctions the rule of a
particular class, the use of mora! argument has consequences. \1oral cJairns
give hostage to future generations when it is discoverej that they are not
what they claim to be. "'oral norrns evolve In history to more closely
approximate true human interests.
*
How are we to assess reconstructed historical materialism? I have
shown that it presents a superior argument to the interpretation of
historical rnaterlal1sm understood solely in terms of the development of the
productive forces. G.A. Cohen's interpretation, for example, did I'ot off~r
any argument for why particular social forms emerged from productive
development, instead of other forms equally optimal for productive
development.
If we are to assess the p.)wer of reconstructed historical materialism
understood as a critical theory, then it seems to me that the relevant
comparison is to Hegelian idealism, a view to which it bears many
simil1arltles. Hegel too saw In history a "real movement" to froedoln
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unfolding within the moral norms and beliefs of successive societies. In
addition, some contemporary political theorists inspired by Hegel have
stressed the need for "internal cri ticism," for criticism which begins frorn
the conventional beliefs of a society. They argue that internal criticisfn
rnust be seen as a precondition for normative discussion of any kind.
Criticism does not work on the basis on abstract moral theorizing; rather, it
is possible, if at all, only because the ideals irnplied by d society's norlTIS are
seldom embodied in its practices and institutions. How does reconstructed
historical ITlaterla!lsm fare in cornparison with the Hegel-inspired progralll
of social criticism?
Reconsructed historical materialism differs from Hegelia.n views in
two respects. First, Hegel sees autonomy as realized in a social form which
still contains a state, a market economy and a moral systefn. Human
freedom is realized in all these spheres, although the rnarket economy of
civil socIety is subordinated to the rules and authority of the state. Marx
correctly criticizes Hegel for failing to consider that in a capitalist society
economic wealth is fungible into political power and that under such
conditions the state cannot control civil society but will be controlled by it.
To represent the state as the general interest, Hegel Is forced to represent
it as independent of the needs and interests of individuals.
The solution of reconstructed historicaJ materialisrn to this problem,
however, is utopian insofar as Marx believes that full communism is a
society in which no social divisions or disagreements will remain. It is the
ideal of a perfectly harmonious community. This is unrealistic, given that
even in a society of "superabundance," people 'Ni11 have conflicting interests.
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There will be situations in which the realization of the goals of one person
will prever&t anothe: person or persons from achieving their goals. This rnay
happen over conflicting values (value realism is not commi tted to the
position that all values must be true or false) or over positional goods (not
everyone can sit behind hOlne plate at Shea Stadium). liistorical
materialism's critique uf existing society must therefore be less "radicaP'
than \t1arx in tended it to be. Communism will not do away wi th "moral
consciousness."
The second respect in which reconstructed historical materialism
differs with Hegel-inspired social theory is over the issue ~f "false
consciousness." While according to reconstructed historical materialisrn,
common-sense consciousness contains a certain degree of knowledge about
true human interests, there are also systernatic distortions. There is no
guarantee that illusions will be dispelled. Rather, learning about human
interests depends upon historical experiences, especially class conflicts
which reveal the lack of a real community of interests.
There is undoubtedly a tension here between the overall theory of
history Marx offers -- the slow emergence of man's consciousness of the
conditions required for social freedom -- and his attempt to develop a
critical the,ory which dispels human illusions. If the growth of knowledge
about human interests is the characteristic tendency of history, why should
there be the need for a special theory to aid In the dispelling of illusions?
This tension, however, is not as severe as it might initially seem to be.
Collective learning Is not inevitable. A c, itical theory of society can
facilitate this learning by demonstrating the mystlficatory aspects of social
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life contained within existing social structures and ldeologies. \1arx the
crltical theorist can offer nothing beyond this act of revelation -- It is the
~ocial agents themselves in their struggle against domination who ,must
part.icipate in the crt:~tlon of their ONn freedom.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1. For a discussion of the role of illusions in rnaintaining social
domination, see ~orman Geras, "\1arx and the Critique of PoHtical
Econorny." In Ideology in Social SCi!.!l£!. Edited by Robin Blackburn
(New York, 197)).
2. Peter Ratlton, "Moral Realism" in The Philosophical Review, xcv
(number 2) 1986, p. 186.
3. Railton, p. 183.
4. Gilbert Harman, The Nature of \1oral1tYI~n Introduction to Ethics
(~ew York, 1977), Pi 6.
,. Gilbert Harman, "Is There a Single True Morali ty?U 1n Morall ty,
Reason and Truth. Edited by D. Copp and L). Zi,nrnerman (Totowa,
19841, p. 12.
6. Harman, "True Morality," p. 48.
7. Ra!lton, p. 182.
8. Karl Marx, G,"undrisse, trans. M. NicoJaus, (New York, 1~73) p. 463.
9. This is a point recognized by Rallton.
10. See V.I. lenin, What 1s to be Done (Peking, 1973). Michael Walzer
suggested this OD]ection to me.
11. Thus, communists have only a limited role 1n working class revolution.
See "The Communist Manifesto," 1n Robert Tucker (ed.) The Marx-
Engels Reader, (New York, 1978) p. '00.
12. Karl Marx, The Puverty of Philosophy, (New York, 1973) p. 175.
13. Mancur Olson Jr., The Loslc of Collective Action, (New York, 1969) p.
10'.
14. see Olson, 22. S!!., PP' 7 '.91, and 96-97 for a discussion of such
measures.
1,. Marx does not think that all classes are 1n an equally good posl ticn to
solve their collective action problems. As a case in point, see his
discussion of the French peasantry in The 18th Brumaire of Louis
~'201.on, (New York, 1969) p. 123ff.
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16. See, for example, Karl ~Aarx, The German Ideology (New York, 19/ j)
p. 65-66.
17. Railton, p. 198.
18. See, for example, George Frederickson, The Black lInage in the Whi te
'Aind: The Debate on Afro-Arnericans' Character and Destiny, 1817-
1914 (New York, 1971). ·
19. See H. Schurnan, C. Steeh and L. Bobo, Racial Attitudes in I~fnerlca
(Ca,nbridge, 198 ,).
20. Karl Marx, Capit,!! vol. I, (New York, 1(77) p. 545.
21. Capi tal, vol. I, p. 482.
22. Capi tal, vol. I p. 482.
23. Grundr isse, p. 463.
24. See, for example, Karl, ~arx, The Communist Manifesto in The \1arx-
Engels Rttader, p. 483: tiThe mOdern laborer ..•instead of ri:Slng with
the progress of industry sinks deeper and deeper below the condi tions
of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper •••"
25. Shlomo Avineri quotes a passage which suggests this line of argument.
See The Social and Political Thought of Karl ~ar)( (New York, 1968) p.
141.
26. See the discussion In Chapter 2.
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